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PREFACE 
(vi 
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in 
London 3-13 May 1960, an attempt was made by the Tunku Abdul 
Rahman to have South African racial problems debated. Although 
the Conference subsequently agreed not to discuss the matter 
as a conference, Mr. Loum agreed to informal discussions with 
limited groups of Prime Ministers. Thus a showdown with South 
Africa was temporarily averted, although part of the communique 
issued by the Conference, for the first time publicly expressed 
the Commonwealth's belief in the equality of peoples : 
"The ministers emphasized that the Commonwealth itself is 
a multi-racial association and expressed the need to ensure 
good relations between all member states and peoples of the 
Commonwealth." 
The Conference also made clear South Africa's position regarding 
an application for republican membership. It was decided that 
in the event of South Africa choosing to become a republic, 
her continued membership in the Commonwealth would not be 
automatic. Conference refused to anticipate the issue despite 
the fact that a precedent had been set in 1957 when a Prime 
Ministers' Conference had agreed in advance to Ceylon remaining 
in the Commonwealth as a republican member. 
Thus the 1960 Conference, although technically a victory 
for those members who believed intrinsically in the observance 
of non-interference in domestic affairs, was in essence a clear 
adumbration that their predominance was on the wane, and that 
confrontation of South Africa would not long be delayed. 
(vii) 
This was borne out by the events of the 1961 Conference, 
when countries hostile to South Africa made their attitudes 
clear. South Africa's racial policies were to determine the 
decision to allow the Republic of South Africa to remain within 
the Commonwealth. With mutual intransigence, Dr. Verwoerd 
and his opponents failed to find a compromise. The former 
remained steadfast in his belief that apartheid was the only 
practical solution to his country's racial problems and the 
latter adamantly maintained that South Africa's racial policies 
were a threat both to Commonwealth cohesion and world peace. 
Dr. Verwoerd eventually withdrew his country's application 
to remain as a republican member of the Commonwealth, an action 
which was a significant landmark both in the evolution of the 
Commonwealth and in the development of the South African nation. 
Thus a bald summary of the immediate events preceding South 
Africa's withdrawal 
It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the long-term 
pressures which were present in South Africa, firstly as a 
result of her multi-racial society and secondly as a, result of 
her membership in the multi-racial Commonwealth. The Documents 
(Appendices C and D) have been included to highlight :- 
(i) the consistency of the Afrikaner antipathy for 
the symbols of Commonwealth association; 
(ii) the widespread nature of the hostility of 
Commonwealth members to South Africa's racial policy. 
(iii)To show the interwoven threads of conflict at home 
and hostility abroad - the combined effects being 
felt particularly in the context of South Africa's 
Commonwealth membership. 
South Africa's racial complexity has stimulated the 
proposal of a unique modus operandi for solving the great problems of 
a multi-racial society, in a decade where it has become obvious that 
few, if any, multi-racial societies have succeeded in overcoming 
the evils of prejudice and social and economic discrimination, 
although as in the case of India, Britain and the United States, 
there have been legislative attempts to do so. South Africa's 
crime in the post-war world has been to appear to legislate for 
the indefinite extension of White supremacy within the Union. 
This permanent aspect of apartheid has become less attractive to 
international society as each year new nations add to the heterogeneity 
of institutions and associations such as the U.N. and the 
Commonwealth. Apartheid, therefore, has been a target of vili-
fication for more than two decades though few of its antagonists 
have ventured a practicable alternative which could take into 
account the fact that White South Africans have no other home. 
The tendency of the nations of the world to cluster in 
self-conscious racial divisions in the display of attitudes and 
reactions to many vital political issues has caused apartheid 
to assume the role of a chronic irritant in international affairs. 
The unprecedented collapse and the discrediting of "colonialism" 
(with its loose and ubiquitous definitions) have rendered Afrikaner 
Nationalism (and notions of racial superiority) an anachronism 
in an era marked by both adherence to the ideal of equality of 
all peoples and by the growth of "white guilt". 
Thus a thesis on South Africa's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth has some significance as a task performed in an 
Australian university. While no claim is made that in South 
Africa similar undertakings may not be under way, in Australia 
there has been relatively little apparent interest in the issue. 
This is in spite of the fact that it highlights the development 
of an extlusive White nationalism interested in preserving a 
unique culture in close proximity to vast numbers of alien 
peoples and that it reveals the collective and irresistible 
determination of the non-White Commonwealth to extract racial 
justice (perhaps revenge) from the Commonwealth association. 
The study of South Africa's withdrawal sheds much light 
on both the influence of racialism in international affairs 
and on the excesses and resources of the defence mechanism of 
a beleaguered nationalism. It shows the complexity of the 
problems of achieving multi-racial co-existence within a single 
state and multi-racial co-operation within an international 
association. 
INTRODUCTION 
The White settlers of South Africa were colonists who did 
not intend to return to Europe after a period in the new land. 
Today, the majority of Whites in South Africa have no strong 
ties with any other country. South Africa is their home1and. 1 
Race relations have been a dominant factor in South African 
politics since the earliest days of settlement and have developed 
against this background of the permanence of the White settler. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, South Altica did 
not hold many attractions for large-scale European migration 
and the first years of settlement saw relatively little discrim-
ination on the grounds of skin colour. 2 	The distinction 
between racial groups was more significantly based upon religious 
differences - Baptism having a social value which temporarily 
out-weighed pigmentation. 3 
The gradual evolution of the social equation : White = 
Christian; Black = heathen, led to the almost complete subjugation 
of the Hottentots by the Europeans at the end of the eighteenth 
century.4 	Bushmen were hunted as beasts, the frontier Boer 
1. Neame LB., A History of Apartheid, Pall Mall Press, 
London, 1962, p. 11. 
Ngubane J., An African Explains Apartheid, Pall Mall Press, London, 1963, P. 129. Marquard Leo, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, 
Oxford Paperbacks, London, 1962, p. 4. 
2. Neame, op.cit., p.13. Van Jaarsveld, F.A. The Afrikaner  Interpretation of History, Simondium Publishers, Cape Town, 1964, p.5 
3. MacCtone I.D. Race Attitudes in South Africa, Witwatersrand 
University Press, Johannesburg, 1965 (1937) p. 41. 
4. Ibid., p. 119. 
never regarding them as fellow-humans and justifying his right 
to dominate the surrounding heathen by virtue of his religion. 
The concept of treating a non-Christian as an equal, was alien 
to the frontier mentality. The heathen were excluded from the 
pattern of Calvinist salvation. 1 	Thus the criteria of member- 
ship of the superior social class were Christianity and skin 
colour.2 By the end of the eighteenth century, the former 
tradition of admitting coloured Christians to the European social 
milieu was dying out, The Boers had come into contact with 
African tribes with a more advanced culture who had migrated as 
far as the Zuurveld as cattle-herders and farmers. This con-
frontation produced raids and counter-raids, 3  which continued 
for more than a century and long after the last major war in 
the Cape in 1878, continued to strengthen inter-racial antipathies. 
Soon after the British Gdvernment occupied the Cape for 
the second time in 18064 , it re-organized administration, abolished 
the slave trade and instituted circuit courts which highly incensed 
the Boers, for they were now eligible for trial for mis-treatment 
of Hottentot servants. 5 The attempt of the British Administration 
1. 	Ibid. p. 127. 
2, Allport G.W., The Nature of Prejudice, Doubleday Anchor 
Books, New York, 1958, p. 20. 
3. Marquardt op. cit., p. 7. 	Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol II, Part 2, p. 24, Oxford University Press, London, 1942. 
4. Ratified by the Congress of Vienna, 1815, 
5. Vatcher W.H., The White Laager, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, p. 8. 
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to fix a boundary for the colony and the substitution of sale 
at auction for grants of land, exacerbated the Boer-British 
ill-feeling and increased the desire of the Boers to free them-
selves from alien British institutions by trekking to the 
territory beyond the frontiers of the Colony. 1 
• The Orange Free State and the South African Republic developed 
along their own lines and, in 1858, the Constitution of the 
South African Republic included the clause : "The people desire 
to admit no equality between coloured people and the White in-
habitants, either in church or state." 2 
Despite this definite statement of racial distinction, the 
discovery of diamonds in 1866 and gold in 1868 led to the mass 
employment of 100,000 Africans as mine-boys. This had a three-
fold effect.Itbastened the inexorable dependence of White profits 
upon Black labour, and it also highlighted both the servile 
relationship of Blacks to Whites and the differences between the 
Boer farmer, the urbanized Dutch in the South and the British 
industrialists. The mineral wealth also accelerated British 
imperialism and the increasing intensity of the Anglo-Boer con- 
frontation culminated in the Boer Wax - the "Second War of Independence."' 
1. De Kiewiet C,W„ A History of South Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1942, p. 182. 
2. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 12. 
3. The Boers regard the war of 1881-82 as the "First Iftr of Independence". 
The Boer War and the memory of real and imagined events 
during the wax accentuated and perpetuated the differences between 
the two European communities in South Africa. These differences 
were apparent during the First World War, when Boer leaders organized 
protests against involvement in "England's warsu. 1 
The rapid industrialization of South Africa between the two 
World Wars had far-reaching consequences in the field of race 
relations. The balance of the European population shifted from 
rural to urban and the numbers of manufacturing and commercial 
establishments quadrupled. The ports and railways, public service 
and public expenditure showed corresponding development and 
created great demands for employment, especially in urban areas. 2 
Not only did the Boers flock to the towns, 3 but many Bantu 
were needed as the unskilled labour force for the new industries. 
This dual urbanization threw into relief the problem of "poor 
wbitism". The poorer Whites t in the main, Afrikaners, in terms 
of commercial or industrial skills, had only the badge of colour 
1. Marquard t op. cit., pp. 23-4. Despite these protests, however, 136,000 of 685,000 European men of fighting age 
enrolled for service. 
2. Deutsch K., Nationalism and Social Communication, M.I.T. 
Press, Cambridge (Mass), 1953, p. 246. 
3. Marquard t op it C--. p. 24. 
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to distinguish themselves from the African and, as they could 
not indulge in "Kaffir-work", a livelihood was precarious. 1 At 
the same time, the Black proletariat was increasing and labouring 
for insufficient wages, and by the early 1920's the plight of 
the newly-urbanized Boers was so serious that 20% of them could 
be classed as "very poor". 2 
The Nationalist answer to this problem was a "civilised 
wage policy", based on colour and aimed at making "Kaffir-work" 
tolerable to the White man, so long as he was better paid. These 
poor Whites remain, in the 'sixties, 3  the most prejudiced and 
loyal supporters of the Nationalists, as their superior social 
status is based almost wholly upon colour 4 and legislation. 
The continued increase in the rate of urbanization threw 
the labour market into a state of chaos and the Native Economic 
Commission, appointed in 1930 (President, J.E. Holloway) declared : 
"It is essential that no time shall be lost in developing the 
Reserves and in reducing the present pressure on land, by 
making available more areas for Native occupation." 5 This 
Commission also drew attention to the development of native 
1. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 49. The Round Table, Vol. 23. "The Poor Whites in South Africa", p. 605. 
2, Patterson S., The Last Trek, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1957, p. 140. 
3. Hunter Guy, (ed.) Industrialization and Race Relations, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1965, Chapter V, p.122, 
Sheila van der Horst quotes 22% of white labour still 
earning less than £500 a year in 1960. 
4. Akzin B., State and Nation, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1964, p. 114. 	Patterson, op, cit., p. 145. 
Neame, op. cit., p. 60. 
nationalism or race consciousness and is one of the earliest 
official recognitions of the potential of the Bantu as an influence 
on South African politics. The increasing volume of discriminatory 
legislation which reached its ultimate expression in apartheid, 
as announced in 1948, and as "separate development" in 1958, 
reflects both the growing insecurity of the European group and 
its determination to keep South Africa under White control 
despite almost universal international hostility. 
The main factor to keep in mind when considering the history 
of race relations in South Africa is that divisions are seldom 
clear-cut. The most obvious division is between White and Black, 
but it is further modified, if one discounts divisions within 
these groups, by the existence of the Coloureds (mostly in the 
Cape) and the Asians (mostly in Natal and along the Reef). It 
must also be noted that the ramifications of the racial cleavages 
extend beyond the frontiers, to include Portugese and Rhodesians 
within the White group and 70 million Bantu with the Black group 
of South Africa. 	The Asian minority also has strong ties 
with India, which cause complications in the international attitude 
to race relations in the Republic. 
With increasing demands for equality from all the non-White 
groups in South Africa it seems impossible to envisage a state 
in which the claims and aspirations of the five main racial groupp 
I. 	Marquard t op. cit., p. 34 
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in South Africa would coincide in one course of action. It is 
claimed by the Nationalists that "separate development" will 
remove sources of friction and allow the separate groups an 
autonomy to manage their own affairs, without infringing on the 
rights of others. 
Given the long history of complex race relations in the 
Uhion,the fact that White South Africans have been established 
for three centuries, and the mushrooming of Black states in 
colonies where the Europeans had an alternative home, then the 
friction generated by apartheid is comprehensible. It is not 
that apartheid or "separate development" in themselves are 
intrinsically different in concept from the practical applications 
of previous racial policies. Rather, it is that the Anti-White -
supremacists have become more politically powerful and articulate 
since the formulation of apartheid. 
It is against this background of the multiplicity of races 
and the attendant problems that the withdrawal of South Africa • 
from the Commonwealth must be studied. One must be all the time 
aware of a triple perspective; firstly, the development of 
Afrikaner nationalism throughout the entire history of the Union; 
secondly, the corresponding development within the Union of 
groups hostile to Alrikanerdom; and thirdly, the effect of the 
Second World War on the development of Afro-Asian nationalism, 
the negative aspects of which - anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism 
and anti-whitisn - became increasingly important in South 
Africa's relations with the Commonwealth. 
In many ways a convincing case may be built to substantiate 
the contention that withdrawal was a manifestation of the anti-
imperialist doctrine of Afrikaner nationalism. Republicanism 
had been, since Union, a long-term objective for the Afrikaner 
nationalists, an achievement which would completely sever all 
vestiges of limitations of sovereignty - an ever-sensitive 
preoccupation of Afrikanerdon. Of all the nationalisms to 
crystallize in the present century, Afrikaner nationalism has 
perhaps been the least successful in finding a champion. 1 
Fraught by dissension within and threatened by unsympathetic 
forces outside the country, Afrikaner nationalism reflects one 
long battle for consolidation to achieve synonymity of "state", 
"nation" and "yolk". 	It has been, since 1945, an increasingly 
popular target for attack by other successfully emergent 
nationalisms. 
The racial composition of South Africa has ensured the 
continuance of domestic disunity, and the campaign waged in the 
U.N. has understandably been viewed by the Afrikaners as a threat 
to their sovereignty and also as a cynical example of the 
application of dual standards of judgment of the conduct of the 
1. Fred Alexander makes the interesting observation that even 
in Quebec he found little sympathy for the Afrikaner 
nationalists. c.f. Canadians and Foreimpeasx, 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1960, pl. 137. 
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larger and the smaller powers within the U.N. The persistence 
of this campaign ensured that South Africa would either have to 
give lip-service to the concept of racial equality or suffer the 
wrath of the anti-colonialist revolution. 	The development of 
anti-whitism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism as aids to 
the consolidation of African (and Asian) nationalisms in the post-
independence stage, has created a limited and specific cohesion 
among many of these nations who use the terms in abusive and 
acrimonious accusations against former colonial powers. The 
tremendous impact of these 'isms may be seen in the sudden change 
in the nature of the post-war Commonwealth. As recently as 
1958, Nicholas Mansergh was able to generalize on the one broadly-
defined obligation of Commonwealth membership - the adoption of 
parliamentary democracy (albeit with local variation). 1 	By 
1960, this was at the best only marginally accurate. The reason 
for the changing emphasis lay in the expansion of independent 
Africa and the increasing articulateness of Asia. Multi-racialism 
was, by 1960 considered to be the over-riding concept of 
Commonwealth membership, and more negative obligations such as 
parliamentary democracy, and non-interference in each other's 
affairs were no longer as important as the expression of the 
politically idealistic aims of a great mul•i-raCial)issoaiation'of 
people. The concept, to be valid as a raison d'etre of the 
1. Mansergh, N., Commonwealth Perspectives, Duke University 
Press, Durham, N.C. 1958, P. 31. 
Commonwealth, must necessarily be unanimously recognised.' 
Despite this obvious need for unanimity, the South Africans 
insisted on their sovereign right to formulate and execute 
their own domestic policies without external influence. (It 
should be noted also, that South Africa had both her own definition 
of "multi-racialism" and unique fears of its implications). 
With a growing appreciation that the role of scapegoat for 
the Western world had been assigned to them, the South Africans 
showed their awareness of the necessity for maintaining their 
belief in the righteousness of apartheid (or nseparate developmeni) 
as the whole world gradually accepted the fact that White South 
Africa's claim for a permanent settlement in South Africa (at the 
same standard of living) was no longer as important as the need 
to uphold the doctrine of equality of all peoples, and to 
vocalize this concept in the respective international forums. 
The complexity of the factors contributing to the decision 
to withdraw is no doubt due to the coincidence of the origins 
of the internal fissures within South Africa and the external 
threats from outside the country. The traditional English-
speaking Afrikaner antipathy was exaggerated by South African- 
British collisions - most evident in the Commonwealth connection; 
the Indian problem was exacerbated by India's policies within 
the Afro-Asian world, and in the U.N.; and the historical fear 
1. N.B. the pressure being brought to bear on the traditional 
supporters of South Africa in the U.N. 
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of the "black peril" within South Africa was given profound 
dimension by the increasing militance and success of the emerging 
African nationalism. With the kaleidoscopic effect of 
potentially disruptive forces inside the country merging with 
threatening external pressures, it is little wonder that the 
Nationalists persisted in maintaining a stoical intransigence 
in the face of criticism. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to outline the internal 
tensions and the external threats born of the racial composition 
in South Africa to decide whether South Africa had any real 
alternative to withdrawal, given the historical legacy of the 
Boer War, her "laager" ethos and the anti-colonialist revolution 
in the post-max world. Consideration must also be given to 
the possibility that the South Africans had a much clearer 
perception of both their own attitude to the prospect of withdrawal 
and the subsequent results, than had the Afro-Asian states which 
were largely responsible for her actual decision. In other 
words, the question must be asked whether the Commonwealth had 
clearly defined expectations of the effectiveness of the use 
of ostracism and isolation as methods of political punishment 
which would encourage South Africa to reform. Putting the 
question more positively, just what was achieved by the forced 
withdrawal, given the assumption that the Commonwealth stance 
was made in the attempt to ameliorate the conditions of life for 
1. c.f. Australian Outlook, Vol. 19, No. 2 (August 1965), "National 
self-determination and the multi-racial state : the problem of South Africa", Fryer, A.K., pp. 180-191. 
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the non-White members of South Africa's population, and that 
it was not merely another manifestation of the anti-whitism 
that had been increasing since the Second World War? 
At the same time, the ambivalence of South Africa's attitudes 
to withdrawal must be kept in mind. The 1961 Conference was not 
necessarily a simple victory for South Africa's opponents. An 
attempt must be made to evaluate both the forcefulness of 
Afrikanerdom's old antipathy to the Commonwealth and its 
traditional objective of secession, and the effectiveness of the 
"new" Commonwealth's antipathy to South Africa's racial policies. 
That the withdrawal profoundly influenced the Commonwealth 
cannot be doubted : what is questionable is the contention that 
isolation would cause a liberalization of the racial policies 
of South Africa. 
Thus the study of South Africa's withdrawal bears great 
relevance for the consideration of three distinct political 
phenomena. It leads to the observation of the behaviour of 
a beleaguered, emergent nationalism, which at all times believed 
itself to be intrinsically threatened by diverse hostile forces. 
Secondly, it reflects the changing nature of the Commonwealth 
and its ability to adapt itself to demanding circumstances, and 
thirdly it questions the effectiveness of the use of isolation 
as a punitive measure in the attempt to bring external pressure 
to bear on a country to enforce a change in its domestic policies. 
CHA PTBR ONE 
AFRIKANER NATIONALISM 
IN THE COMBBTRATICTI CAMP (1901) 
(Final Verse) 
Forgive? Forget? Is it easy to forget? 
The sufferings, the anxiety was so very grievous.. 
The iron hasecorched and narked for the ages, 
Branded our people, and this wound is too deep, 
too close to our heart, and too deep in our being do 
Patience, oh Patience, that can endure so much. 
Louis Leipoldt (1880-1947) 
Hunger, E.S. African Field Report, Struik, Cape Teen, 19611Pp.622-3. 
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Of all the nationalisms flourishing within the African 
continent, Afrikaner nationalism is the most classic in form. 
It has been described in terms of Toynbee's theory of challenge 
and response1 and its rapid development and progress seem to 
bear out this description. Afrikaner nationalism is born of 
the common language, religion and history of an ethnic group. 
Its one digression from the "pattern" of nationalism, is that 
it is nurtured by a fear from within 2. This has caused a 
perpetual closing of the ranks to form a rigid exclusiveness 
that is not based solely on aversion to coloured groups alone, 
but on a deep-seated fear of any out-group. 
Afrikaner nationalism is based on the Calvinist idea of 
the divine election of a chosen people and its broad biblical 
basis justifies, for the militant Afrikaner, his rejection of 
admixture of blood and the concept of equality of races. He 
sees the Black Africans as Canaanites, or sons of Ham4 and, as 
such, they are ineligible for admission to the political structure 
of South African society 5 . The Afrikaner nationalism, already 
growing in the eighteenth century, became increasingly a reaction 
against British domination and anglici zation6 and the concomitant 
humiliations experienced by the Boers. 
1. Roux, E., Time Longer than Rope, University of Wisconsin 
Press, Madison, 1964, p. 369. 
2. Vatcher, op. cit., p. ix. 
3. Van Jaarsveld, P.A., The Awakening of Afrikaner. Nationalism, 
Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, 1961, p.3. 
4. Ibid. p. 7. 
5. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 4. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 55. The Australian Journal of History and Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3. 
"Political Equality in South Africa and Methods of Reform", 
Crespigny, A de, p. 363. 
6. Spottiswoode H., (compiler) South Africa : The Road Ahead, 
Bailey Bros. & Swinfen Ltd., London 1960. p. 66. 
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Its propaganda is centred around three crises which caused 
unification of the group to preserve its self-conscious 
existence - (1) the Great Trek; (2) the struggle against 
British imperialism, specifically in the Transvaal War 1880-81, 
the Jameson Raid 1896, and the Boer War 1899-1902, and (3) the 
rise of the Black man in Africa while the Afrikaner was still 
trying to reverse the decisions of the Peace of Vereeniging, 
between 1902 and 1960: 
The Great Trek was a reaction to the British insistence 
on law enforcement, the abolition of slavery and Ordinance 50, 
and the attempt of the British to limit the expansion of the 
colony. The Trek has formed the core of Afrikaner nationalist 
mythology, for it was the enactment of the story of a chosen 
people moving into the wilderness in pursuit of freedom. It 
has been a perpetual cause of difference between the two white 
groups in South Africa . Blood River has become the symbol of 
determined Afrikaner resistance against great odds 1 
Prior to 1877 there had been little need for the Boers to 
concern themselves with their awn history 2, they had not 
experienced a crisis as a self-conscious group, united throughout 
the nation against an aggressive pressure. The difficulties 
confronting the Transvaal Afrikaners, upon realizing that 
nature had provided boundaries to their land as formidable as 
those of the British, made them consciously accept the Transvaal 
.as.a fatherland 3 
1, Vatcher, op. cit., p. 9. 
2, Van Jaarsveld, (The Afrikaner Interpretation) op. cit., p. 160. 
3. Ibid., p. 165. 
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The annexation caused the further realization that the destiny 
of the Republic and its independence were bound with the future 
of the whole of South Africa. Sympathy from the Free State 
Volksraad1 and the Cape Houses of Parliament awakened the concept 
of South Africa as a political. entity for the Afrikaner. 
In 1879, 6000 Afrikaners gathered at Wonderfontein in the 
Transvaal2 and Britain was made aware of the rapid deterioration 
of the South African situation and also of the rising phenomenon 
of Afrikaner nationalism, After the outbreak of war, the 
consolidation of the Afrikaners was made manifest in correspondence 
between the Orange Free State and the Transvaa13 , in the materials 
and men crossing the boundary4 and in the political and cultural 
movements in the Cape. 
The reunion of leaders from the Transvaal and the old Cape 
Colonists, who had been separated by the Great Trek, led to the 
conscious recognition of the unifying force of common language 
and religion as a basis of a South African nation, inspired 
by a love of freedom from oppression 5. After 1881, "the people" 
gradually became synonymous with "the nation"6 and the 
geographical boundaries were less important7 . 
	
1. 	Ibid., p. 167 
2, Vatcher, op. cit., p. 15. 
3. Van Jaarsveld, (The Awakening) op. cit., p. 168 
4. Ibid. 
5, 	Ibid., p. 186. 
6. Van Jaarsveld (The Afrikaner's Interereatkm) op, cit. P. 35 
7, Van Jaarsveld (The Awakening) op. cit. p. 187, 
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The same year saw the establishment of an Afrikaner Bond in the 
Free State, with the explicit purpose of uniting all Afrikaners 
throughout South Africa. Mhch use was made of historyl to 
infuse nationalism into the now self-conscious group of Afrikaners 
and to give them a unity of purpose to oppose British imperialism, 
A cultural re-awakening was also taking place - the First 
Language Mbvement and the newspaper Patriot2 becoming major 
instruments for making Afrikaans a "legitimate" language. 
The growing consciousness of common cultural characteristics 
and common religious beliefs developed the concept of nation, and 
aggressive propaganda was aimed at "traitor" Afrikaners who 
favoured the British. The love of the past and a sense of 
mission for the future, became the major features of Afrikaner 
nationalism; monuments and symbols proliferated to make the 
people more aware of their valiant struggle against the British. 
The Boer War, which was the culmination of the Anglo-British 
confrontation, was seen by J.C. Smuts as, "....an epic struggle 
between the smallest and greatest of peoples.° 	The British 
used 450,000 troops drawn from the vast empire and the Boers 
with 87,000 men enforced a two-stage war - a regular campaign, 
fought in 1900 and guerilla warfare which persisted until 1902. 
In this "Second War of Freedom" the Boers found the spiritual 
emphasis which could stimulate their nationalism albeit on a 
basis of revenge, 
1. Ibid., p. 191. 
2. The Australian journal of Politics and History, vol. 9 ( 1963). W.K. Hancock,, "Boers and Britons in South African History", p. 15.26 (p.15) 
3. Patterson, op. cit., p.31. 
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The Boers equated the losses in the concentration camps with 
genocide - 20,000 women and children died. 1 The Boer charges were 
substantiated by stories of "fish-hooks in the bully-beef" and 
poison in the sugar2. In point of fact, the British were also 
appalled by the death-rate in the camps and the team sent to 
investigate conditions laid the blame on circumstances largely 
beyond British control. The previous isolation of the Boer 
families had kept them safe from infectious diseases, but the close 
confinement of the camps, allied with an appalling lack of hygiene 
and beliefs in quack remedies, led to an unprecedented 
susceptibility to diseases such as dysentery, measles, bronchial 
pneumonia and diphtheria which were rampant in the camps. Martin 
draws attention to the incredibly high infantile death-rate before 
the war3. The "ordinary" consequences of wax - lack of food, 
cattle diseases and unprocurability of dairy products, were, in 
themselves, sufficient to increase this figure. 
Whatever the degree of cu1pability4 (and it must be remembered 
that the British army lost 13,750 young men from disease in the same 
period), the fact remains that Afrikaner historians have subject-
ively interpreted the results to exacerbate Anglo-Boer antipathy 5. 
1. Martin A.C.The Concentration Camps, Howard Timmins, Capetown 
1957, p. 31. 2. Ibid., p. 76. 
3. Ibid., p.36. 
4. Halperin V. Lord Milner and the Empire, Oldhams London 1952, p.117 Amery J. Life of J. Chamberlain Vol. 4, P.95. "We would have closed the camps the day the war was over, had we not 
known that, as a matter of certainty, it would have involved the 
deaths of thousands and tens of thousands of women and children". (Quote from Hansard, Fourth Series, vol. exIv, Co.232, Nov.5, 1902) Bunting, B., The Rise of the South African Reich, Penguin Books Harmondsworth 1957, p. 31. 
5. Martin, op. cit., pp 77ff. quotes from J.C.Otto, Die Konsentrasiekam 
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The Boer women, in their suffering, became identified with the 
Boar nation itself : 
"X was in the veld until they made peace. Then we laid 
down our rifles and went home. What I knew my farm by, 
was the hole under the kappie where I quarried slate 
stones for the threshing floor. That was about all 
that remained as I left it. Everything else was gone. 
My home was burnt down. vy land* were laid waste. 
My sheep and cattle were slaughtered. Even the stones 
X had for the kraals were pulled down. mp wife went 
into the concentration camp with our two children and 
she came out alone. And when X saw her again, and 
noticed the way she had changed, I knew that I, who 
had been all the way through the fighting, bad not seen 
the Hoer War." - 
Poets like Eugene Marais, Colliers and Totius, who had 
experienced heartbreak because of the camp*, added depth and 
bitterness to the growing fund of Afrikaans literature 2 , and 
the Sense of common tragedy rallied the battered Afrikaner 
nation against the even more insidious threat of Miler's 
anglicisation. With=Ahe stark *Query Of the camps, the 
devastation of the scorched earth policy and the plum for a 
fusion of cultures under British rule 3, the Boer nation 
prepared for Union. 
1. Patterson, op. cit. p. 241 (quoting H.C. Bowman) 
s. 2. MungeWAfrican Field Reports, Struik, Cape Town, 1961,p p. 620-643. Patterson, op. cit., p.55. 
3. Halperin ()pa cit., p.126. CrankshaW, Ls The Forsaken Idea, Longman's London, 1952, P.98 
— 22 - 
Lord Milner believed that, as Afrikaans had no formal 
grammar or literature, English should become the official 
language of the country ' . This caused further hardening of 
the Afrikaner nationalists, who saw in this a direct attack 
upon their group-consciousness and pride. Despite the policy 
of anglicization, the Christian-National schools were maintained, 
as were the Afrikaner political organizations which kept alive 
the unifying sense of grievance against the British and forced 
a Constitution at Union which has been described as a "delicately-
balanced compromise".2 
The First World War 3 , the• crushing of the Afrikaner Rebellion, 
and the strikes of 1914 and 1922, caused a further consolidation 
of the exclusive quality of Afrikaner nationalism. Anti-British 
feeling ran high and there was overt sympathy for the Germans 
from some sections of the Afrikaner community4 la The Fourie 
execution after the Boer Rebellion became another nationalist 
symbol, akin to the Jameson Raid and the Slagter's Nek episode. 5 
The abortive rebellion taught Afrikaner extremists the wisdom of 
careful planning and accentuated the importance of the political 
field in the battle against the English-speaking group. 
1. Wrench J.E. Alfred Lord Miler,. Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 
• 1958. p. 240, • Vatcher, op. cit., p.34. 
2. Ngubane, op, cit., p. 56. Vatcher, op. cit., p.38 
3.•Marquardt op. cit., p. 25. 
• 1:0845. •4. Vatcher, op if Hertzog believed that in the Boer War the Germans had "in their darkest hour, opened their hands and hearts to them 
(the Boers)" c.f. South African House of Assembly Debates (1915) col. 44 (vow:- 
• t. p. 15. 5, Patterson S., op i c_
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The Nationalist Party came to power, with the aid of the 
Labour Party, in 1924 and Hertzog was influential in the 
preparation of the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which he believed 
held the true statement of South Africa's independence. Thus 
the die-hard demand for a republic was neither necessary nor 
desirable1 	The twenties saw the increasing urbanization of 
the Boers and the consequent change in the traditional may of 
life built on family, farming and Calvinism. Urbanization 
removed theemonomic basis of Boer family life2 and caused a 
degradation of the role of father, and equally significant - the 
appearance of a clearly-defined class structure in Afrikanerdom, 
with a growing proportion of "poor-whites" 3 . 
These effects were noted by the Afrikaner leaders and the 
Afrikaner Broederbond (established 1918) gradually spread its 
influence into every sphere of South African life. An 
exclusive secret organization, modelled on Masonic lines, it 
comprised influential Nationalists "accountablm only to God" 
for its actions. It had the broad aim of bringing about 
South Africa's God-given destiny - a Christian, National, 
Calvinistic Afrikaner Republic. 4 
1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 25. 
2. Note also the tremendous diminution of the size.of 
estates under the Roman..Dutch law of inheritance 
c.f. De Kiewiet, op. cit., p. 191. 
Vatcher, op 4 • cit., p. 84. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 134. 
4, Military Intelligence Report on the Afrikaner 8roederbond, March 29, 1944, p.15. 
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The Afrikaner Broederbond decided to advance the Afrikaans 
medium schools as the most vital means of achieving its aims : "A 
nation is made through its youth being taught and influenced at 
the school in the traditions, customs, habits and ultimate 
destination of its volk." 1 
The Afrikaner Broederbond fostered a growing interest In 
Nazism by visits and training periods in Germany 2 which increased 
the propensity of some Afrikaners to favour ..Tirmany at the expense 
of Britain. 
During the thirties, the Afrikaner Broederbond influenced the 
educational, economic, cultural and church life of South Africa and 
was the subject of an investigation and a subsequent attack by 
Hertzog3 , which caused publication of the report of a military 
intelligence inquiry by the Smuts' Government in 1944. Despite 
this attack, the Afrikaner Broederbondts hold on South Africa 
strengthened, especially against British "domination". 
The basic and continuing strength of the Afrikaner nationalism4 
lies in the interlocking directorate of the numerous community 
institutions which it supports. 
1. Ibid., p. 15. 
2. B.g Dr. Diedrichs qualifying as a quisling at the Nazi 
Komintern Training School, Military Intelligence Report 
op. cit., p. 8. 
3. Legum, South:Af;ica i'Crisis for the West, Pall Mall, London, 1964, p. 48. 
4. It is now assumed that most of the members of the present Government are members of the Afrikaner Broederbond 
c.f. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 87 
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This degree of cohesion l gives the vital sense of security and 
belonging which reassures the new urban migrant in particular. 2 
The development of internationalism caused the fanatical 
Afrikaner to try to perpetuate both the division in the White 
South African group, and the more obvious divisions between 
Black and White, 3 in the interests of Afrikaner cohesion and 
exclusiveness. 
The tone of Afrikaner nationalism has altered radically 
since the thirties. As late as 1925, some Afrikaners were 
ashamed of their language 14 and the nationalist movement was 
largely defensive, endeavouring to maintain and popularize group 
unity. The corresponding development of the National Party has seen 
various moods from the intransigence of du Toit and Kruger, through 
co-operation with the British under Botha and Smuts, to the hiving 
of the "purified" party of Malan. The present composition of the 
Party is largely a homogeneous group which is almost completely 
synonymous with Afrikanerdom. The 1948 Election returned the 
Nationalists to power in full control of their awn political 
destiny, and by changes of political mood and direct manoeuvres 5 
the Party has entrenched itself with increasing power. 6 
1. In 1960 there were 500 organizations affiliated with the F.A.K. 
cf. Carter G., The Politics of Inequality, Thames & Hudson, London, 1958, p, 230, 
2.o.fFromm, Erich, The Fear of Freedom, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 
London, 1960, p. 104. 
3. Vatcher, op, cit., p. 80. 
4. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 76. 
5. E.g. The removal of Coloureds from the voting roll. 
Ibid., p. 141. 
6. In 1948 - 36.4%; 1953 - 49%; 1958 - 55%; 1966 - 58.52% of the votes. 
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Partly to enforce a strengthening of the two major 
European groups in the population, and partly because of the 
traditional rivalry with Britain, the Nationalists increased 
their demands for a republic and, by 1960, the time was 
considered opportune : "the final victory in the long struggle 
for supremacy" 1 . Thus a defensive movement, born as a 
response to British policy had become an exclusive nationalism, 
intent on maintaining its adherents' supremacy over a far 
larger majority of the population, which, although politically 
impotent, showed similar signs of awareness of group-consciousness 
as those present in the early days of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
To recapitulate then, Afrikanerdom's exclusive nationalism 
is based on a unique language, common race, culture and religion, 
a sense of grievance for hMmiliations inflicted by Britain, and at leas 
informally upon white superiority. It uses as one of its most 
powerful methods of consolidating the group a doctrinaire 
system of education, based 7Largely on the importance of the 
Mother-tongue. It is an exclusive nationalism which has 
identified itself as the "true spirit of South Africa"2 and 
in its most militant form tolerates non-Afrikaner Whites for 
political expediency only. 
1. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 174. N.B. many Afrikaners believed 
that India, Pakistan and Ghana had achieved believable constitutional autochthony and sovereignty before 
South Africa. 
2. Deutsch, op. cit., p. 159. 
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It has tightened the cohesion of the group firstly by 
exploiting the fear of the British and more recently by 
the threat of Bantu domination, and its basic mythology is 
centred around a small group overcoming great odds • the 
chosen people. Its religion, politics and culture are 
inextricably entwinedl, to give a fanaticism to its self- 
righteousness and an authoritarian nature to its government 
which is, in effect, responsible only to God. 
1. The Political Quarter, "Power and RI: 30 Relt atli9o59.na in 
South Africa", Junits Lewin, p. 394, 
CHAPTER TWO 
ENGLISH 	SPEAKING SOUTH A 
	
A 
True sons of Africa are we, 
Though bastardized with culture, 
Indigenous, and wild and free 
As wolf as pioneer and vulture - 
Yea, though for us the vision blearing 
No membrane nictitates the light, 
Though we are cursed with sense and hearing 
And doubly cursed with second sight. 
Still doomed that skyward screech to hear 
That haunted us in youth, 
We shall grow terrible through fear, 
We shall grow venomous with truth, 
And through these plains where thought meanders 
Through sheepish brains in wormy life, 
Our lives shall roll like fierce Scamanders 
Their red alluvium of strife. 
Roy Campbell. 
Stanzas 9 and 10 from "Poets in Africa". 
0 Donnell Margaret J., 
_____Jay....91S.....cj&walttVerseAnAnthol omm 	 Blackie & Son, London, 1963, p.322. 
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The English-speaking group in South Africa comprises 
1.4 million of the European population, who live predominantly 
in Natal, Cape Town, the Eastern Cape and Witwatersrand. 
The group still shows certain attributes which distinguish it 
from Afrikanerdom and some of these attributes are the direct 
result of heavy migration from nineteenth century Britain - 
already highly urbanized. Thus the English-speaking group 
is much more highly urbanized than the Atrikaners. 1 	Class 
differences between the two groups are still apparent. The 
English still enjoy a higher socio.economic status, despite 
the growth of the number of Afrikaners entering the professions. 2 
The English-speaking group are also aware of the advantages of a 
world language, and a certain proportion in the group still tend 
to regard Afrikaans as inferior, although 70% of the European 
population is more or less bi-lingual. 3 
Although there has been a tendency for both groups to co-
operate during crises (for example, the Second World War) both 
display different political behaviour. • Labking the militant, 
articulated objectives of Afrikanerdom, the English-speaking 
South Africans project no clear image. 4 
1. About 82% of the European farmers are Afrikaans-speaking. 
Marquard op. cit. p. 70. 
2. Only 30% of the country's professional personnel are 
Afrikaners. Vanden Bergh, (caneville) p. 105. 
3. Narquard, op. cit., p.67. 
4. De Beer, W. Multi-Racial South Africa, O.U.P., 1961, p. 16 
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They have been content to build the national economy and to 
divert their enthusiasms and energies into the achievements 
of material comforts and financial success. The greater 
proportion of English-speaking South Africans are of British 
originl and, although they regard South Africa as their 
homeland, they have, nonetheless, not felt the same degree of 
isolation as the Afrikaner, and have therefore not developed 
the same defensive cohesiveness. 	For the most part they have 
been town-dwellers, active in commerce and industry, the skilled 
trades and the professions. They control most of the wealth 
in South Africa, and have been responsible, not only for the 
growth of industrialization, but• also for much of the cultural 
and educational progress of the country. 2 By 1960, despite 
aggressive forays by the Afrikaners into big business, the 
English-speaking group still controlled 90% of the invested 
capital and 99* of the mining capital in the country4 . 
Virtual monopolization of economic power has not brought 
proportionate political power to the group 5. Political 
activity was at its height in the period 1910-1933, when 
the English-speaking group were engaged in party and trade 
union affairs, sometimes in alliance with Afrikaners, but 
more often in direct competition with them. 
1. A large and influential body of Jews is active in the South African business world and are linguistically assimilated with the English-speaking group. 
2. Marquard, op 	cit. , . 	 72 
	
o  --o, n  
3. Ibid., P. 73. 
4. Legum, C. & M. South Africa : Crisis for the West,Pall mall, London, 1964, p. 108. 
5. In 1962, only 36 of the 160 Members of Parliament were English-speaking. 
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The competitive spirit waned with the coalition of the South 
African Party and the Nationalist Party, when Afrikaner leaders 
only, seemed to gain prominence. Since 1931, the United Party 
has represented the older line English-Afrikaner compromise, and, 
until the declaration of the Republic, favoured co-operation with 
Great Britain and the Commonwealth. It has traditionally 
retained the majority of English-speaking votes although, in 
recent years, many of the English upper class and many Jewel 
have turned to the Progressive Party. The chief feature of 
the United Party is its great diversity. Its membership 
exhibits a wide range of attitudes to the dominant question 
in South African politics - race relations. 2 This makes 
the statement of a coherent policy on race relations a virtual 
impossibility - yet the United Party remains the only 
theoretical alternative to the Nationalists in Parliament. 3 
The heavy weighting against the urban votes (predominantly 
United Party), and the consequent need to woo the rural vote, 
has forced the United Party to adopt an ultra-conservative 
race policy. 
1. For a history of Jewish contribution to South Africa see Saxon G. & Hots L., The Jews in South Africa, O.U.P. 
Cape Town, 1955, especially Chapter 19 and the Epilogue. 
2. Carter, op. cit., p. 300. 
3. It has however, become the underlying assumption of the South African political system that the par13ameptaiy opposition, 
whatever else its function, does not provide an opposition. 
"The South African Party System", Stanley Trapido, Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, July 1966, p. 83. 
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Its party platform tends to exhibit a certain ambivalence - 
on the one hand, the necessity for opposing the Nationalists 
and, on the other, the need to be cautious in racial matters 
in the effort to retain and enlarge its European following. 
This dichotomy renders the United Party a poor and incohesive 
shadow of the Nationalist Party, with no comparable ability to 
awaken ideological fervour. 
Since the 1948 elections, and the subsequent political 
emphasis on colour, the English-speaking group as a. whole 
has been roused from political passivity on two significant 
occasions. The most notable was at the proposed legislation 
to remove the Cape Coloureds from the common roll of voters. 
This caused the dramatic inception of the Torch Commando, 
professing (for a time) complete sympathy with the Coloureds, 
and aiding the United Party in a protest election. The 
Torch Commando had the specific objective of forcing the 
Nationalist Party from office and the more general aim of 
bringing together the two European groups. It flourished 
briefly, but was never liberal in the same sense that the 
present South African Liberal Party understands the term. 
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Its main significance lies in its reflection of the inadequacy 
of the party system to provide constitutional channels of 
protest in South Africa. 1 
The second occasion in which the English-speaking South 
African group acted with decisive cohesion was in the period 
immediately preceding the referendum for a Republic. The 
bare majority in favour of the Republic (52%) is a token of 
the effectiveness of the group's support. 
It is on the vexed question of apartheid that the 
English-speaking group remains irrevocably divided. The 
more liberal and more radical members tend to give political 
allegiance to the Progressives or to the Liberal Party. The 
Progressive Party enjoys Oppenheimer's support and is pledged 
to "the maintenance and extension of the values of Western 
civilization, the protection of fundamental human rights and 
the safeguarding of the dignity and worth of the human person, 
irrespective of race, colour or creed". 2 	Its racial 
policy is more liberal than that of the United Party, but it is not 
liberal enough to command the support of the non-European 
groups. The Party is seen as too liberal by the majority 
of Whites and as too conservative by the non-Whites. 
Nevertheless, it has attracted many intellectuals to its 
ranks, for it gives an alternative to the largely identical 
policies of the Nationalists and the United Party. 
1. Carter op. cit., p. 332. 
South Africa : A Study in Conflict, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Connecticut, 1965,pp, 169 ff. 
2. Legum, op. cit., p. 106. 
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The Liberal Party supports universal franchise and therefore 
receives qualified support from non-European groups and in 1961 
received 0.3196 electoral support from European South Africa. 
It is comprised of a small group of crusaders who refuse to 
moderate their demands and objectives to create a wider 
electoral appeal. 
Other socio-political bodies for anti-government action 
In South Africa are the Education League, the Congress of 
Democrats, 1 the Institute of Race Relations and the Black Sash 
Organization. Perhaps their greatest contribution lies in the 
international publicity they receive in the role as the 
conscience of European South Africa. 
Perhaps the most effective champions of liberalism in White 
South Africa are the non-political bodies - the English-speaking 
universities, the Churches and the Press. These have been the 
innovators of campaigns against the restrictive legislation of 
apartheid. The English-speaking universities, mindful of 
academic freedom, have consistently opposed discriminatory 
legislation and they have a history of greater liberalism in 
attitudes to non.,EurOpean students. 2 Similarly, the English-
speaking churches have been more liberal than the D.R.C., in 
relation to non-Europeans, having far less segregation by colour 
and no theological justification for that which does occur. 3 
Church leaders such as Bishop Reeves4 and Monsignor Denis MUtley5 
have been pioneers in radical opposition, but without, one suspects, 
the wholehearted support of their respective congregations. 
1. Communist-dominated. 2. Legum, op. cit., p. 100 
3. Carter, op. cit., p. 337 4. Now in exile. 5. Sometime President of the South African Institute of Race 
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The English-speaking press dominates the daily paper 
• circulation in South Africa1. Of the 22 daily newspapers, 
17 are English-language, and support either the United Party 
or the Progressives. Despite the constant threat of 
Government censorship, they remain relatively outspoken and 
critical of Nationalist policies2 . Ownership of the 
English-language press is dominated by two major industrial 
combines, and despite editorial insistence on independence 
the papers sometimes reflect the equivocal relationship 
between big business and the Government in South Africa. 
This relationship is an important one. South Africa 
shows a sharp distinction between capital - largely held 
by the English-speaking group - and political power,, in 
the hands of the Afrikaner. The ineffectiveness of political 
protest against apartheid has led the business leaders to 
concentrate more and more on the economic ramifications. 
1. Afrikaners are very touchy on this point : See South Africa. 
House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 105, Col. 8280, 20/5/60 
(Dr. De Wet) "That is the tragedy in South Africa that 
particularly the English Press - as well as certain 
Afrikaans periodicals - are controlled by a number of 
financiers who dictate what should happen in South Africa." 
The hostility of the English speaking press was noted in 
Parliament by Hertzog as early as 1915, - See South Africa 
House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 1915, Col. 170. This 
has remained a constant theme of the Nationalists. 
2. Spottiswoode, op. cit., p. 74. 
Dr. Coetzee asserts that the English-language press keeps 
alive the caricature of the Afrikaner bogey. 
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It has become the fashion for big business to make accommodation 
with the Government on matters which do not directly threaten 
their economic progress. The main concern of the business 
leaders is to maintain the status suo, or to initiate gradual 
changes which will not create revolutionary upheavals. As 
militant African politics threaten to be disruptive, the 
business leaders give qualified support or, at least, passive 
resistance, to Government policy * rationalizing their inaction 
by the belief that apartheid will be rendered unworkable by 
the economic integration of the country. 
English-speaking opposition to apartheid is not based 
so much upon moral grounds as on the methods of implementing 
the policies. The English-speaking group fears that the 
utter inflexibility of the Nationalists might precipitate a 
revolution and that a few minor concessions would prolong 
White domination for the foreseeable future2. The characteristic 
attitude of the English-speaking South African is not liberal 
on racial matters - the majority uphold the segregationalist 
philosophy, but prefer a degree of flexibility and a more 
pragmatic approach than that of the Afrikaners 3 
1. Legum. op. cit., p. 111. 
2. Van den Berghe, P., Caneville : African Township, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1965, p. 69. 
3. Legum, op. cit., P. 99- 
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Most business men do not oppose apartheid because they are 
liberals, but rather because they consider it to be 
impractical, costly, harmful to their awn economic interests, 
and politically dangerous. 1 The United Party has supported 
the Government on many issues2 , including dictatorial 
legislation that vastly extended the power of the Nationalists. 
The formation of the South Africa Foundation3 to publicize 
South Africa abroad, in an attempt to mitigate the effects 
of a largely unfavourable world press, indicates that a 
significant proportion of English-speaking businessmen 
have agreed to a modus vivendi with the Nationalist Government 4 . 
The traditional respect for parliamentary legalism has 
militated against the desire to resort to extra-constitutional 
tactics against the Government, because it is clear that the 
English-speaking group could bring effective pressure to bear 
against the Government, through economic action, if it so 
desired. It seems obvious that the English-speaking group prefers 
to maintain the status quo for the time being 5  and is willing to 
pay the price of increasing dictatorship for a relatively free 
hand in economic development. 
1. Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op. cit., p. 206. 
2. Ibid., p. 105. 
3. Legum, op. cit., p.p. 113 ff. 
4. Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op. cit., p. 69. 
5. There is a growing body of evidence to support the claim that 
English-speaking financiers are aware of the tremendous wastage 
under the system of migratory labour and that this will 
eventually dissipate their unreserved, if passive, support of the status quo. c.f. Hunter, op. cit. p. 136. 
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The Government, on the other hand, in return for self-imposed 
political impotence in the English-speaking group, promises to 
interfere as little as possible with business, and not to use 
the wide dictatorial powers at its disposal to muzzle the 
press and to ban the (ineffectual) political opposition. 
The Afrikaners have traditionally looked upon the English-
speaking group as un-South African and as possessing a 
dual patriotism. The Afrikaners have long accused the English-
speaking group of a spurious sense of superiority and this has 
persisted throughout the history of the Union'. Yet it must 
be remembered, when considering the English-speaking group, that 
it is not a cohesive, fully united group in anything but the 
linguistic sense. Even radical opposition to apartheid is 
not restricted to the English-speaking group. It is certainly 
not completely antipathetic towards Afrikanerdom, as in many 
cases attitudes and values are shared simply because of Whiteness. 
Hence, racial attitudes and policies tend to be similar for all 
practical purposes. There has ,_41sJo. been a large degree of 
Afrikanerization of the English and Anglicization of the 
Afrikaners and there certainly seems to be much validity in recent 
the/Afrikaner claim to have cemented the two White groups. 
1. See for example South African House of Assembly Debates, 
Vol. 1915, Col. 170 (8/3/15) and Vol. 99, Col. 83, (1959). 
4o 
• The development of South Africa since withdrawal seems to 
verify the traditional contention of the Afrikaners, that 
unity would be possible only when the ties with the monarchy 
were cut. Perhaps the one dominant characteristic of the 
English-speaking group (besides its economic domination) 
is that its more radical members see themselves, and indeed 
are seen by the outside world, as the conscience of European 
South Africa. The effectiveness of radical protest is, of 
course, marginal in a country whose whole social, political 
and economic pattern is geared to either discrimination or 
segregation, and it seems probable that, in the event of a 
future crisis, both European groups will aamr. together to 
meet the "black peril", and English-speaking South Africans 
will indeed have much more in common with the Afrikaners than 
with the British1 . 
1. This phenomenon has appeared in an extreme form among 
White Rhodesians in the face of any suggestion of 
military interference by Britain. 
CHAPTER THREE 
SOUTH AFRICA - BRITAIN:  
( I ) COLLISION 	COURSE  
(II)COLLISION 	POINT:1960  
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South Africa's relations with Britain were largely coloured 
by the imcompatibility of the Afrikaner - English-speaking 
groups, and this caused the Afrikaners to transfer internal 
antagonisms to the sphere of Commonwealth relations and vice-versa. 
The possible collision courses between Britain and South 
Africa were many. The hyper-sensitivity of the Afrikaner to 
interference, real or imagined, ensured the continuation of the 
conflict for the duration of South Africa's monarchical status. 
Perhmn the most specific causes for contention lay in the 
existence of the High Commission Territories, in the 
constitutional complications of the "entrenched clauses" 
particularly in respect of the Cape Coloured franchise I  and 
in the persistent republican movement. 	As the first two 
issues have been dealt with elsewhere in considerable detail, 2 
this chapter is primarily concerned with republicanism, which 
in some measure permeates the whole ambit of British-South Africa 
relations. It certainly prohibited the Afrikaners from 
attaining complete objectivity in the appraisal of political 
situations and most definitely was an obvious and omnipresent 
factor in the making of the decision to withdraw. 
1. For details of the Cape Coloured community, see Appendix A. P. 195 
2. See for example, Lord Bailey, South Africa and the High 
Commission Territories,Oxford University Press, London, 1963, 
and Marshall, Geoffrey, Parliamentary Sovereioty and the 
Commonwealth, Oxford University Press, Londen, 1957, pp. 144ff "South Africa : A Case Study". 
Not merely concerned with the abolition of constitutional 
ties, the republicans were even more obsessed with the 
psychological considerations which could not be permanently 
exorcized by any means other than secession. 
The history of the republican movement in the Union of 
South Africa falls naturally into two significant periods - 
(i) 1911-48 and (ii) 1948-61, the former period reflecting 
the success of the more moderate Afrikaner groups and the 
latter encompassing the period of political paramountcy of 
the more extreme Afrikaners. The periods are divided by 
the 1948 General Election which returned a Nationalist 
Government for the first time and on the basis of a "Black 
Peril" electionht a time when the Commonwealth was about 
to undergo a complete transformation. 	Rather than 
reflecting the pressures and tensions of the Afrikaner-English-speaking 
antipathy, the history of republicanism is more accurately the 
story of the various and changing fortunes of the factions of 
Afrikanerdom. These factions may be imperfectly described 
as (i) the "imperialists"; (ii) the moderates; and (iii) the 
extremist republicans. The triumph of the last group is the 
measure of the success of an extreme nationalism which was 
not only concerned with the constitutional limitations of 
sovereignty but with any symbol or implication of external 
domination. For the die-hard Afrikaner the chief threat to 
sovereignty, at any stage since Union, was the imperial connection. 
1. Other issues were important. The mood engendered by the Great 
Trek centenary celebrations, although temporarily obscured by the 
Second World War, reached new intensity after the war ended, 
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The legacy of the Boer War was deliberately kept alive and, 
from time to time, re-vitalized to consolidate the 
republican movement. 
Afrikaner nationalists, like most nationalists emerging 
from colonial status, concerned themselves with the trappings 
of sovereignty - flag, anthem, language and the attainment 
of completely unfettered autonomy. These preoccupations 
led to discussions on the desirability of a republican 
constitution and Afrikaner writings proliferate with claims 
that the only true sovereignty for South Africa lay in the 
abolition of all ties with the monarchy. Nevertheless, the 
proponents of this creed were for many years over-shadowed by 
more moderate leaders who succeeded in attracting the support 
of the majority of the population until the success of the 
Nationalists at the 1948 election. 
The early period in the development of republicanism is 
characterized by ambivalence, as more moderate Afrikaners 
such as Botha and Smuts were determined to fuse the two White 
races into a great South Africa. Hertzog, too, not as extreme 
as Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd, was able to come to terms, at 
least temporarily, with the constitutional changes in the 
Commonwealth. 	The whole of this period in the development 
of republicanism is characterized by the strong personalities 
and differing views of the acknowledged leaders of Afrikanerdom 
whose personal attitudes to, and evaluations of the formulation 
of imperial and Commonwealth policies caused some marked nuances 
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and variations in the exposition of the republican ideal. 
The whole issue throughout the history of the Union, bears 
the tremendously acrimonious emotionalism of a civil war, 
with various factions simultaneously claiming to represent 
Afrikanerdom. 
Botha, in his opening address to the Boer Congress held 
in Pretoria in May, 1902, prayed "That it may please the 
Almighty Father to inspire all the Whites of South Africa with 
like-mindedness, that hence one nation may be born." 1 "That 
one nation may be born" became the plea of the successive 
leaders of Afrikanerdom - "imperialists" and their bitterest 
opponents. For the first period (1911-48) this ensured that 
the more negative aspects of Commonwealth membership would 
be significant, and that Commonwealth relations would be 
dominated by considerations of autonomy and autochthony. 2 
1. Quoted from Spoelstra by Thompson, L.M., The Unification 
of South Africa, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960, p. 31. 
2. For a lucid exposition of the distinctions between 
the two see Wheare, K.C., The Constitutional Structure  
of the Commonwealth, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1960, pp 89-113. 
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There can be little doubt that Botha's moderation, and 
Smuts's eventual "conversion" by Campbell - Bannerman's gesture 
in granting self-government to the Transvaal and the Orange 
River Colony1- led many other Boers to look favourably at the 
imperial connection in the first decade after Union. Nonetheless, 
the forces of militancy, although outnumbered, remained vocal 
and increasingly effective. Botha himself believed that the key 
to South Africa's development as a nation lay in the ability 
to forget the grievances of the past2 while continuing to 
strive for sovereign independence within the Commonwealth. 3 
4 From 1911 onwards he repeatedly praised the imperial connection s 
which drew him much support from the English-speaking South Africans, 
1. Round Table, No. 41 (1950-51) p. 17. 
"It was Campbell-Bannerman perhaps more than any other 
British statesman who enabled General Smuts to know and 
appreciate British character, and to admire and value 
British democracy." 
See also, Millen S.G., General Smuts, Faber & Faber, London, 
1936, (vol.2) p.21I. 
2. Paton Hofmeyr,Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1964, p.51. 
3. Hancock Smuts, The Sanguine Years, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1962, p. 351. 
Findlay, J.G., The Imperial Conference of 1911, 
Constable & Co., London, 1912, p. 26. 
N.B. the Boers' outraged reaction to the report that Botha, 
while attending the Conference (1911) had been a guest of 
His Majesty the King in full court dress, including silk 
stockings. These became a symbol of national treason. c.f. 
Brady Alexander, Democracy and the Dominions, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1947, p. 349. 
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but at the same time alienated many Afrikaners whose bitterness 
concerning the Boer Wax had not yet had time to dissipate. His 
concept of "nation" was never marked by Afrikaner exclusiveness, 
but was wide enough to embrace bothpeoples temphasizing those 
common factors shared by both groups 1 . Unhappily for South 
Africa, his generosity was not shared by many of his own 
people who could not agree with his contention that membership 
of the Empire carried no taint of British domination. 
The Treaty of Versailles and Botha's death in the same year 
(1919) each had a marked effect on the development of Afrikaner 
republicanism. Smuts, Botha's successor, with a Weltanschauma 
based on the philosophy of Holism, went even further than Botha 
in praising the Empire. He envisaged the Empire as the greatest 
community of nations and states that had ever existed 2 , the most 
successful experiment in international co-operation 3 , held 
together by an hereditary kingship4 . 
1. Hancock, (Smuts), op. cit., p. 355. 
2. Dawson, R.M., The Develo ment of Dominion Status, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1937, p. [Lj6. 
3. In 1919, this. Empire seems to have 
Smuts, not/ aR imperial federalism been significant to nor eventually a w rld 
government but more a world legal and moral order. c.f. O.D. 
Schreiner's view in Comiu of Age E.H. Brookes &Co., 
Cape Town 1930 pp 87-98. 
4. Smuts actually agrued the merits of a hereditary kingship 
system-anathema to South African republicans. 
c.f. Millen, op. cit., (vol. 2) p. 46. 
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His admiration for, and participation in the Commonwealth, 
earned him the scorn of avid nationalists who dubbed him "the 
handyman of the Empire" 1 and accused him of national abandonment 2 . 
The greater his popularity (particularly as a member of the War 
Cabinet) the more bitterly was he resented. Yet it is inaccurate 
to assume, as did his Nationalist opponents, that Smuts sought 
to immerse his South African nationality in the greater depths 
of an imperial unity 3 . In his opinion, Commonwealth membership 
enhanced South Africa's stature in international affairs. As 
proof of this, Smuts drew attention to the new status of the 
Dominions achieved at the Versailles Conference 4 . His view 
was not shared by the republicans. Tielman Roos, for example, 
denied that South Africa's status had been changed by the War - 
she was simply "an entity of the British Empire" 5. His opinion 
was endorsed by Malan, who wanted to know if the Dominions had 
the right to separate from England as she apparently had the 
1. Kruger, D.W., The Age of the Generals, Dagbreek Book Store, 
Johannesburg, 1958, p. 107. See also Pirow, Oswald, 
J.B.M. Hertzog, Timmins, Cape Town, 1957, p. 19. 
2. Millen, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 46. 
3. Ibid., p. 44. Hancock, (Smuts) op. cit., p. 351. 
4. It is interesting to note the opposed objectives of Smuts 
and Hertzog at the Conference, Hancock Keith, Survey of 
British Commonwealth Affairs, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1937, (vol. I) p. 70. 
5. Kruger D.W., South African Parties and Policies 1910-60, 
Bowes & Bowes, London, 1960, p. 116. 
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right to divest herself of her colonies 1  . Hertzog, too, was 
unimpressed, declaring the Afrikaner people more interested 
in freedom than in status in the imperial context 2 . 
Hertzog himself had found conciliation too difficult a 
policy to follow and3 , as a compromise, had developed his "two-
stream" policy, maintaining equal rights for the separate 
development of the cultures of the two White races 4. The 
imperial connection was to him desirable only insofar as it 
served South Africa's interests5 . Throughout the duration 
of the War, his National Party continued (with marked success) 
a campaign of opposition to Botha's policies, featuring the 
• demand for a republic as the only possible means of achieving 
national independence. 6 	The two mutually hostile forces 
continued to divide Afrikanerdom - the division being 
1. Ibid., p. 117. 
2. Ibid., p. 117. 
3. Hancock, (Smuts) op. cit., p. 361. 
4. Kruger (The Generals) op. cit., p. 67. 
5. Dawson, op. cit., p. 146 
6. Kruger, (Parties) op. cit., pp 69-70. 
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accentuated by the persistent "home complex" 1 of the English-
speaking group - which incited nationalist accusations that 
the British were participating in unwarranted interference in 
the domestic affairs of the Union. 2 
Hertzog's demands for a written statement of South Africa's 
constitutional status in the.Empire 3 received substantial 
satisfaction in the Report of the Inter-Imperial Relations 
Committee of 19264 , and for a time, he, and many other 
republicans, were subdued in their opposition to the imperial 
connection and tended to concentrate their energies on the 
many domestic problems of the Union. 5 The moderating effect 
of the Balfour Declaration enabled Dr. Malan to supersede 
Hertzog as the arch-enemy of the Empire, and as 1.irtzggs:reyiving 
1. The attitude of superiority of the average English-speaking 
South African towards the other official language, 
undoubtedly made many converts to the Nationalists in the 
years that followed Union. 
See an interesting article in Round Table, Vol. 19, 
(1928-29) "Afrikander Culture and Politics", pp 125ff. 
2. Kruger (The Generals) op. cit., p. 133, Paton, op. cit., p.71. 
Note also in this context, Harcourt's speech (12/2/14) 
Keith A.B., Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 
(1918-31) (Part 2), Oxford University Press, London, 1961 
(1st Ed. 1932) pp. 109ff. 
3. He was particularly concerned that the international 
community recognise the sovereign independence of the 
individual dominions. c.f. S.A. House of Assembly Debates 
Vol. 7, Coll. 4296-8 (May 28th 1926). 
Keith, op. cit., pp. 161-170. 
5. Hertzog believed that the question of a republic should be 
shelved until greater unity was attained in South Africa. 
c.f. Mansergh, N., Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, 
1931-39, Oxford University Press, London, 1952, Vol I, p.226. 
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fears for Union Sovereignty continued to be subjugated by 
the interests of Fusion, Malan became the chief spokesman 
for those who saw the destiny of the nation outside the 
Commonwealth. 
Malan's tactics were based on the need to persuade 
Afrikanerdom that Hertzog had deserted the Nationalist cause, 
and in this course he had the support of the intellectual and 
cultural leaders of Afrikanerdom and the core of Afrikaans 
Calvinism. 1 Malan's policy was not merely a variation of 
Hertzog's "South Africa First". It was more openly hostile, 
for he believed that independence and sovereignty were 
imcompatible with Commonwealth membership. His republicanism 
tended to be exclusivist racially, secessionist as far as the 
Commonwealth was concerned and isolationist in foreign policy 2  . 
At first glance, the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent 
Statute of Westminster robbed the republicans of their raison 
d'etre. They had been concerned with full equality for 
South Africa, but almost immediately raised other questions 
1. Kruger, (The Generals) op. cit., p. 180. 
2. Mansergh (Survey Vol. 1) op. cit., p. 226. 
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specifically concerned with amendments to the Constitution. 1 
The Statute led to the Status of the Union Act 2 and the 
Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act, 3 the former ensuring 
that the King must act on the advice of His Ministers for 
State for the Union, and the latter formally placing the 
conduct of foreign affairs under the complete control of the 
Union Government. 4 
The Nationalists' preoccupation with the legal aspects 
and implications of Commonwealth membership (at least until 
1953) forced successive parliaments to concentrate on four 
major aspects of membership : 
(i) the right of secession; 
(ii) neutrality; 
(iii) the divisibility of the Crown; 
(iv) republicanism. 
1. For a summary of the diametrically opposed interpretations 
of the Statute by Hertzog and Smuts. See Mansergh, 
(Survey Vol. 1) op. cit. p. 224. 	For a description of the 
ambiguity of the impact of the Statute upon South Africa, 
see Marshall,op. cit., p. 144ff. 
2. No. 69 of 1934. Mansergh (Docs. Vol I) op. cit. pp. 4-6. 
3. Mansergh (Docs. Vol. I) op. cit., pp. 9ff. 
4. Mansergh, (Survey, Vol I) op. cit., pp. 23 -25. 
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This concentration tended to obscure the positive benefits 
of membership such as consultation, economic concessions 
and defence co-operation. It was also instrumental in 
creating the obvious tension in parliamentary debates concerning 
the symbols of nationhood - flag, anthem and the right to 
declare war. Republicanism was upheld as the only complete 
means of resolving any doubts about sovereignty. 
The first flag debate may be taken as a clear example 
of the intensity of emotion l involved in the republican issue 
Malan asserted that "in settling the flag question, we settle 
the race question, we facilitate the settling of all other 
problems and questions in South Africa" 2 . In other words, 
the imperial connection was the divisive factor in White 
South Africa. "The Union Jack", declared Malan, "reminds 
us of the past and it reminds of the past in such away that 
whether it is right, or whether it is wrong, it is in any case 
1. See for example, Dr. Malan's introduction to the Second Reading of the Nationality and Flag Act (1926) South African 
House of Assembly Debates Vol. 7, col. 4031 "that the 
absence of a South African national flag, one common 
South African national flag, and the presence of two or 
more other flags, which practically have the practical 
effect of dividing the people - that that position 
darkens and confuses every other issue in the country." 
(25/5/26) 
2. Kruger, op. cit., (Parties) p. 127. 
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a fact, that to a large section of the population, it will 
stand for domination and conquest and defeat ... If we 
eliminate the Union Jack then we shall eliminate something 
that would remind us that we are not a free country." 1 
A similar bitterness was shown in the controversy which 
followed the first official playing of "Die Stem" in public. 
Hertzog stated quite categorically, that "God Save the King" 
had never been the national anthem of South Africa. It was 
simply "an invocation to the Almighty" to be playedibn 
appropriate occasions" 2 and that regardless of its legal 
status, "Die Stem" would be supplementary to it. 3 Thus 
the dual acceptance of a dual symbolism for state occasions 
in South Africa, although so often a compromise, did succeed 
in highlighting the Nationalists' claims that South Africa 
1. Ibid., p. 129. In the same speech, Malan continued : 
"So far as we are unwilling to adopt an altogether new 
design we have already made a concession, but further, 
if it is so, as we represent, that we are the party 
standing for secession; that we do not wish to recognise 
in any way that we belong to the British Commonwealth 
then by adopting a clause in this Bill, in which we 
specifically make mention of the relationship between 
South Africa and the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
in agreeing to display on certain occasions the flag 
of the Empire, is that not a concession that is worth 
something to our English-speaking South African friends?“ pp. 130-131. 
2. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 31, coll. 292ff - (18/2/1938) 
3. Pirow, op. cit., p. 203. 
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would ever be a divided nation while the trappings of monarchy 
remained important to one section of the White community. 
Republicanism received a tremendous boost from the 
celebrations of the Great Trek anniversary in 1938. The 
fervour, and indeed fanaticism engendered by the celebrations boded 
ill for the continuance of the Commonwealth connection. In 
the following year, the long debate which preceded the 
announcement of South Africa's entry into the Second World War, 
dispelled any semblance of restraint which may have been 
operating under Fusion, and once more the country was at war 
with itself along racial lines. 
For a time dissension within the ranks of Afrikanerdom 
kept Smuts relatively secure in Parliament, but for the duration 
of the War he faced overt hostility from those Afrikaners who, 
as well as being traditionally anti-British were, in many cases, 
pro-German2 and were quite convinced that Germany would win 
the Wax. 
The basic causes for dissension among the Opposition were 
concerned with the Ira of republicanism to be attained and 
the tactics which were to be employed to expedite the creation 
of the republic. Throughout the War the Opposition stressed 
1. Mansergh (Survey Vol I) op. cit. p. 385. 
2. N.B. the proliferation of Nazi-type organizations in 
South Africa during the 'thirties - the Ossewabrandwag, 
the New Order etc.41939) 
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the claim that South Africa's participation was due to the 
imperial connection (as in the First World War) and that 
sovereignty in this case was just a sham. 
In July, 1940, Hertzog, in an open letter l , called upon 
Smuts to abandon the struggle, and Dr. Malan demanded a 
Republic of South Africa as the only means of dissociating 
South Africa from the certain ignominious fate of the Empire 2  . 
In Malan's Republic, the English-speaking South Africans would 
either be absorbed, or enjoy some ill-defined but inferior 
status3 . 	He declared : "Afrikanerdom is now unanimous on 
the breaking of the British connection and the establishment 
of a republic." 4 
	
The Draft Constitution5  for the Republic 6 
(published in Die Burger) caused many more moderate Afrikaners 
1. Kruger (The Generals) op. cit., p. 196. 
2. Paton (Hofmeyr) op. cit., p. 338. 
3. Paton, op. cit. p. 79. 
4. Mansergh N. Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs (1939-52) Oxford University Press, London, 1953; (Vol. 2) quoting Cape Times, 25/3/41, p. 155. 
5. See Appendix. C. pp. 230ff. 
6. This was subsequently repudiated by Malan and by Verwoerd 
as a viable basis for the establishment of the Republic 
of South Africa. 
South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 98, col. 4150 
(18/9/1958). 
- 57 - 
to give temporary support 1  to the United Party, enabling 
Smuts to give unstinted aid for the Commonwealth War effort. 2 
At the close of World War II, Smuts was in much the same 
kind of situation in his domestic politics as he had been in 
1919, his grand view of world order once again contrasting 
with the "little South Africa" policies of the Opposition. 
While he believed that the Commonwealth had been "the sole 
refuge of the world in mortal peril", the Nationalists claimed 
that membership of the Commonwealth had involved South Africa 
in a war of Britain's making. Twenty-five years after 
Hertzog's visit to the Treaty of Versailles Conference in 
the attempt to gain a republic, the Nationalists were more 
vocal, and even more disenchanted with "imperialism" 3 ; increasing 
support was being derived from the consolidating cultural and 
political institutions of Afrikanerdom. 
1. In the 1943 Election, 650,000 voted for Smuts and 350,000 
against him. This Election entirely eliminated the New 
Order, Afrikaner Party and some Independent candidates 
sponsored by the O.B. 
2. Smuts left no room for doubt about his faith in the 
Commonwealth after the War. c.f. Smuts, J., Jan Christiaan 
Smuts, Heinemann & Cassell, Cape Town, 1952, pp. 441-49. 
3. When a Royal Visit was first proposed in 1946, General Kemp 
typified the Afrikaner reaction : "The position of the 
Afrikaner and the republican is clear. Those of us who 
took part in the South African Wax, or whose forebears took 
part, and who have since striven and are still striving 
for a Republic in South Africa, and other pro-republicans, 
cannot take part in a festivity which will strengthen 
monarchy in this Union." 
Smuts, op. cit., (Smuts) p. 501. 
It might also be noted that the monarchy had no sure hold 
on all English-speaking South Africans. 
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In the campaign preceding the 1948 Election, Pt. Malan 
toned down his republican propaganda and laid the main 
emphasis of the campaign on the "Black Peril". 1 For the 
first time in the history of the Union, the new Government 
was comprised entirely of Afrikaner ministers 2 . The 
Election had at last made the Afrikaners "masters of their 
own house" 3 and the republic would be established "when the 
time was ripe". The question was no longer if but when 
the republic would be established. 	From the constitutional 
triumph of the Afrikaners4 , the debates about the desirability 
of a republic gave way to the considerations of the 
technical means of how the Republic was to brought about. 
1. Paton, op. cit., p. 493, quoting Hofmeyr : 
"The determining factor in this Election has 
undoubtedly been the appeal to colour prejudice. 
That it should have succeeded as it has done, 
puts us in a very bad light in the eyes of the 
world." 
2. Ibid., p. 80; P.  492. 
3. Vatcher, op. cit., p. 138, quotes Malan : 
"South Africa belongs to us once more." 
4. Smuts alluded to Malan's Government : "this blight ... this Broederbond Government. Smuts (Smuts) op. cit. 
p. 521. 
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The second period in the development of republicanism 
in South Africa (1948-61) coincides with the development 
of the new Commonwealth, initiated by the membership of 
Coloured nations on the basis of equality with the White 
members. Until 1948, the questions of republicanism and 
secession were inseparable for the Afrikaners but the 
Commonwealth was about to undergo perhaps the greatest 
feat of adaptation to date. The old Afrikaner concepts 
used in anti-Commonwealth propaganda were to be seriously 
threatened by Indian membership in the Commonwealth. 
Unenamoured of any change in the notion of a "White 
Commonwealth" and almost completely disenchanted by India's 
vendetta in the U.N., the South African Government nonetheless 
anticipated some advantage to be gained in the separation 
of republicanism and secession. It was hoped that the 
appeal of a republic could be widened and that the retention 
of Commonwealth membership would be beneficial for South 
Africa, already deeply concerned about Communism on the 
continent. 
Although it may be reasoned that Malan's support for 
India (in a lengthy and somewhat revolutionary speech) 1 was 
based not so much on faith in a multi-racial Commonwealth, 
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but more upon a desire to keep India out of the Communist 
camp, his speech does highlight the fact that the Afrikaner 
could now see that the old acceptance of the common 
allegiance to the Crown as an obligation, of membership had 
lost its validity. 1 	In a negative sense, General Smuts, 
in his anxiety that India should not be regarded as a 
precedent2 in the future development of the Commonwealth, 
acknowledged the distinction between republicanism and 
secession and advised his colleagues in Parliament to treat 
India as a case apart, not as an example to follow3 . 
Despite the fact that the distinction between 
republicanism and secession was acknowledged by the Afrikaners, 
they now began to look upon the achievement of Constitutions 
by Ireland, India and Pakistan, through their own respective 
Parliaments, as a direct contrast to South Africa (and the 
other White dominions) who although enjoying autonomy for 
a far longer time, nonetheless owed their Constitutions to 
the Imperial Paxliament4. (The fact that they were also enacted 
in Dominion Parliaments, was conveniently ignored or discarded) 
1. South African House of Assembly Debates Vol. 68, col. 5661 : (12/5/1949) "... and if no obstacles are placed in the way of the exercising of members' rights to self-determination, 
if a population, the population of a constituent member 
decides to become a Republic, the Commonwealth as such, 
will raise no objection .... as long as that is the case, 
I have no objection to remain.“ 
2. Vol. 68, col. 5573 (11/5/1949) 
3. Ibid., Col, 5574. 
4. Cowen Z. The British Commonwealth of Nations, Cheshire, 14e1bourne„ 1965, pp. 11-12. 
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Many Afrikaners believed implicitly that the new Coloured 
nations had received their complete independence and 
autochthony before South Africa l. For this reason they 
re-affirmed their determination to remove all ties with Britain. 
The republican movement gained great impetus in the passing 
. of the South African Citizenship Bill 2  which 	"common 
citizenship" on the grounds that a common allegiance was no 
longer an essential condition of Commonwealth membership . 
Thus Strydom was able to assert with confidence that "the 
Nationalist Party's policy was to establish a Republic of 
South Africa, separated from the British Empire and the 
British Crown. That is the position, the question is only 
how and when".4 	Many Nationalist spokesmen reiterated 
the theme that a republican South Africa would resolve the 
internal racial conflict which would never be resolved 
"while the body politic in South Africa is identified with 
its original form of Government". 5 
1. Mansergh (Survey Vol. II) p. 389. See also Cowen, op. cit., 
p. 21 on the varying significance of the written  statement 
of independence. 
2. No. 44 of 1949. Kruger (Parties) Op . cit,-- pp 200 ff. 
3. Mansergh (Survey Vol. II) p. 389. 
4. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 68, Col. 5605 
(11/5/1949). 
5. Ibid., coll. 5609ff. 
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The Citizenship Act was followed closely by the Removal 
of Appeals to the Privy Council' and the Royal Style and 
Titles Bill which reflected Malan's unswerving desire for a 
republic. South Africa deliberately omitted "by the grace 
of God" and "Queen of the United Kingdom" in the specific 
attempt to stamp the Nationalist concept of the divisibility 
of the Crown on the Royal Title itself 2 . Malan's awn 
attitude to the Crown is seen in one of his speeches in the 
House 
"That means that we in South Africa have nothing 
to do with the actions or decisions of the Queen 
advised by Her Ministers in any other part of 
the Commonwealth. The Crown was not only 
divisible, but has now been divided, and the 
constitutional significance of that, is this, 
that the kingship as far as South Africa is 
concerned, has now come exclusively under the 
control of South Africa herself." 3 
The most obvious ties with Britain having been severed, 
from 1953 onwards, a slightly changed emphasis is discernible 
	
\•■•••••■■••■ 	
1. Privy Council Appeals Act, No. 16, 1950. Mr. Swart 
regarded tr-us as "the fulfilment of a life's work". 
Kruger, (Parties) op. cit., pp 209ff. 
2. Some die-hard republicans scorned the anachronistic nature 
of the title "Queen of South Africa" c.f. Mansergh (Eocs.) 
Vol. III p. 29. 	Survey Vol II, p. 372. 
3. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 82, Col. 53, 
(7/7/1953). 
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in the parliamentary allusions to republicanism, as events 
outside South Africa show her vulnerability in an increasingly 
hostile world. The republic becomes desirable not only as the 
means of welding the two White races in South Africa, but more 
definitely as the means for ensuring White survival. Five 
recurring themes are dealt with intermittently in the Debates 
from 1953 onward : 
(i) that South Africa may, as a Republic stay inside 
the Commonwealth 1 ; 
(ii) that at the moment, Commonwealth membership 
allowed South Africa a greater freedom than 
she would enjoy in isolation2  ; 
(iii) that a Republic would essentially unite South 
Africa3 ; 
(iv) that the establishment of a Republic would, by 
cutting the remaining ties, practical or 
psychological, strengthen the White community's 
claims to be a permanent group in South Africa 
with no alternative home4 ; 
1. Ibid. Vol. 82, col. 60; vol. 84, col. 47, (2/2/541 
2. Ibid. Vol. 84, Co].. 47, (2/2/54) 
3. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 3651, (8/4/54) 
4. Ibid. Vol. 100, C01. 2901 (20/3/59) 
(v) that South Africa, as a republic within the 
Commonwealth would retain the right to 
withdraw as soon as the disadvantages out- 
weighed the benefits of membershipI 
As well as the need to respond to the new dangers to 
South Africa's security on a Black continent, and its connot4tions 
with the desirability of a republic, a new alignment of forces 
is seen. The old dissenting factions of Afrikanerdom have been 
partly submerged by an increasingly obvious United Party-Nationalist 
confrontation2 for, by 1953, membership of the politically-
conscious sector of Afrikanerdom was becoming synonymous with 
support of the Nationalist Party. The English-speaking Members 
of Parliament (i.e. the United Party) persisted in regarding 
propaganda for a Republic as a "mischievous matter°. 
1, /bid. Vol. 85, Col. 4518 (4/5/54) 
2. Ibid. Vol. 84, Col. 257; "The United Party is the 
Commonwealth Party just as the Party on the other 
side is the Republican Party of South Africa." 
Mr, J. Strauss) 8/2/54. 
3. Ibid. vol. 91, col. 4111 (23/4/56) Mr. Mitchell, 
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They were convinced that the Nationalists paid only lip-service 
to the notion of a Republic within the Cormonwealth and that 
this would be but a transition stage preceding the attainment 
of the Republic outside the Commonwealth' . They demanded 
definition of the "broad will" of the people - the avowed basis 
for the establishment of a Republic, regarding the "simple 
majority" of the Nationalists as a breach of faith 2 . 
Mr. DuPlessis, on behalf of the Government, in a speech 
delivered in the House of Assembly on 23/4156 considered the 
six most frequently repeated queries of the United Party 
(i) what is the motive for gaining a Republic? 
(ii) how is it to be achieved? 
(iii)on what basis? 
(iv)what would be its attitude to the outside world? 
(v) what would be its relationship with the Commonwealth? and 
(vi)when would the Republic be achieved? 
He then proceeded to deal systematically with these questions - 
his answers giving little comfort to the Opposition. The 
Nationalist Party would obtain unity for South Africa on the 
basis of equal treatment of English-speaking and Afrikaner groups. 
It would be a purely democratic Republic, gained by a special 
mandate from the people. The Republic would favour the 
1. Ibid. Vol. 91, Col. 4094 (23/4/56) 
2. They favoured a 2/3 majority for the declaration of a 
Republic. c.f. Vol. 84, Col. 43 (2/2/54). 
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the maintenance of friendly relations with Africa, Western 
Europe and U.N.O., if there was no interference with South 
Africa's domestic policies. The question of Commonwealth 
relations was "a separate question from that of the Republic" 
and the Republic would be achieved only when the Government 
felt confident of a "safe majority". 1 
The debates on the second Flag 2 and Anthem3 bills 
showed that the Boer War legacy was still uppermost in the 
minds of some Nationalists, many of whom equated the English-
speaking group with a fifth column inside South Africa. Old 
recriminations against the group's "superiority" were coupled 
with the inevitable accusations of a dual loyalty 4 . 
The Government, obviously not prepared to take a 
referendum on the Republic until it could be certain of victory, 
embarked on a policy of removing the last vestiges of symbolic 
dependence on Britain. 
1. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 91, 
Col. 4118, (23/4/56) 
2. Ibid. Vol. 91, Coll. 4198ff. (24/4/56) 
J • - 
	Ibid. Vol. 91, Col. 4199 and Vol. 94, Col. 5239 
(24/4/56 and 2/5/57). 
4. See for example South African House Assembly Debates  Vol. 91, Col. 4213 (24/4/56). "The fact that official 
Opposition are forever and consistently placing the 
interests of Britain before the interests of South 
Africa is the greatest possible cause of the germs 
of dissension and strife in this country." (Van Den Berg) 
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The traditional enmity for the Union Jack was again paraded 1 
in the Flags Amendment Act (1957), the necessity for which 
was alluded to by the Prime Minister. He believed there were 
three major reasons for not delaying the Flags Bill : the 
"vast majority" of the population wanted one flag; there was 
a pressing need to expedite co-operation between the two 
races; and, finally, that "as the flag was the strongest 
outward symbol of nationhood, national unity must therefore 
grow under one flag 2". 
The one comfort for the anti-republicans was the 
Government's denial that the Draft Constitution (1942) 3 for 
the Republic would form the basis of the impending Constitution. 
Dr. Verwoerd stressed this strongly : "it will not form the 
basis of any republican constitution drawn up in the future. 
More plainly and unequivocally I cannot put it." The 
Nationalists remained adamant in their insistence that the 
decision to remain in the Commonwealth would be made immediately 
1. Ibid., Vol. 93, Col. 2075, (Minister for Justice) 
"We who went through the Anglo-Boer War saw our flag 
being taken away and the Union Jack hoisted over us." (1/3/57) 	\ 
2. Ibid., Vol. 93, Col. 487. (1/2/57) 
3. See Appendix C. p. 23 0 . 
4. South African , House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 98 9 Col. 4151 (18/9/58). 
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prior to the referendum so "that the best interests of the 
nation might be served". 1 The Prime Minister had already 
adumbrated the possibility that a Labour Government in Britain 
could well precipitate South Africa's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth2 , and this was but one of the obvious causes of 
the hesitancy of the Government to commit itself prematurely 
to Commonwealth membership. While being uncomfortably aware 
of the British Government and the Labour Party's increasingly 
vocal support for a multi-racial Commonwealth, the more positive 
attraction of secession as the culmination of the Nationalists' 
fight for independence exerted a strong influence on the Party. 
One is led to the opinion that the South African Government 
would have retained membership if a measure of support had 
been forthcoming from Britain, only so that apartheid (or 
"separate development") might be more firmly established under 
the republican constitution. 
By 1960 the time was opportune for the establishment of 
the Republic. The Prime Minister made the appeal for everyone 
to disregard party allegiances "to co-operate to achieve 
something which will put an end to the 150 years' struggle 
between South African nationalism and what is, to some extent, 
a foreign nationalism°. He believed that his Government's 
1. Ibid. Col. 4161 (18/9/58) 
2, Ibid. Vol. 103, Col. 107 (20/1/60) 
The developments within the Central African Federation were 
increasing hostility between the British Labour Party and 
South Africa. 
3. Ibid. Vol. 103, Col. 104 (20/1/60) 
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traditional "consideration of South Africa's interests" 
would be sufficient reassurance for those who feared the 
loss of Commonwealth membership. 
On the other side of the House some members were either 
more aware of, or more concerned with, the mounting Commonwealth 
hostility to South Africa's (Racial policies and voiced the 
doubt that South Africa's choice of a Republic within or 
outside the Commonwealth would, in fact, have much bearing on 
the Commonwealth's attitude to South Africa. Mr. Mitchell, 
while criticizing the Government's tardiness over announcing 
the decision to remain in the Commonwealth, laid a pertinent 
charge at the feet of the Government : "May I suggest to the 
Prime Minister, that when he is not prepared to say when the 
referendum will be held, it is because he is still hoping that 
circumstances beyond our borders will provide the right 
climate, at the right moment for his going to the country on 
the question of the republic, believing that the natural 
resistance to interference from outside will suing the whole 
mass of people in his favour in regard to that particular 
question." 1 
1. 	Ibid. Vol 103, Col. 113. (20/1/60) 
- 70 - 
Verwoerd's sincerity on the matter of retaining the 
Commonwealth connection is more than suspect. In the light 
of the Nationalists' consistent campaign, the most probable 
attitude to maintaining the Commonwealth connection would be 
to regard it simply as an interim measure before the attainment 
of the ideal. The Prime Minister's own affirmation that 
South Africa was merely following in Ireland's footsteps by 
way of the Status Act, the Flags Acts, Privy Council and 
Citizenship Acts, lends weight to the assumption that 
Ireland's example would be followed to the bitter end. Eight 
years previously (1952) Die Transvaler had printed the 
following comment on the theme of following Ireland : "But this 
we can only do by casting the dead hand of the British from us. 
How ? By establishing a Republic outside the Commonwealth 
Only then will we be single and pure 1 ." 
Again in a leading article in Die Transvaler 2  (quoted by 
Steyn) "The Nationalist Party will go forward step by step 
towards the republican form of government for South Africa, 
and a republic which, in the meantime, remains a member of 
the Commonwealth, can be regarded as an interim step towards 
our ultimate goal." 
1. Quoted by Sir De Villiers Graaf. Ibid. Vol. 103, Col. 293. 
2. Die Transvaler - 12/5/49. Cited South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 104, Col. 3070 (9/3/60) 
3. Like the Irish until 1948, the South Africans until 1961 were 
determined on complete severance from the Commonwealth, partly 
because of territorial ambitions. (Northern Ireland/the 
Protectorates). 
- 71- 
Verwoerd himself had left no room for doubt about his lack 
of sentiment for the Commonwealth : "Membership of the 
Commonwealth when viewed soberly, is not based on any 
sentimental reason ... on the other hand ... we believe 
that on sober, commonsense grounds, the Commonwealth is 
of value to us today." 1 
Pro-Commonwealth citizens could not claim to have been 
misled about the Government's ultimate objective. 	Yet it is 
P9,ssib1e that Verwoerd himself may have been sincere in 
desiring to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth for 
perhaps a few more years. After all, there was very little 
need for the Nationalists to be hypocritical on this score; 
they had progressed gradually to their penultimate aim, so 
presumably a few more years in the Commonwealth "for South 
Africa's interests" may well have been the projected course 
of action. 	(Always providing that the Commonwealth did not 
interfere in South Africa's affairs.) 
On the other hand, there was ample warning of the 
inevitability of hostility at the 1961 Conference. Abundant 
evidence may be found in the various Party Debates of the 
White Commonwealth, that a day of reckoning was at hand in 
1961. It is clear that the 1960 Conference should have 
1. 	Ibid. Vol. 104, Col. 3777 (21/3/60) 
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indicated to Verwoerd that if it were expedient for South 
Africa to remain a little longer in the Commonwealth, then 
the controversial question of the Republic should have been 
postponed, as indeed Malan and Stri.j.lom had found it necessary 
to do, despite their own personal fanaticism. In many ways 
the 1960 Conference seems to have been the moment of decision 
for the Nationalists; either they must shelve the issue of a 
Republic indefinitely and perhaps remain as a monarchy in the 
Commonwealth for a few more years, or else they must go ahead 
with the referendum and, in giving the Commonwealth a pretext 
to discuss South Africa, risk political isolation and possible 
economic retrogression. As the past decade has clearly shown, 
emergent nationalism does not always place immediate economic 
considerations at the head of a list of priorities. 1 In many 
ways, Verwoerd's decision is a reflection of the concept of 
independence before all else. The Republic had been the 
Utopia of the Nationalists for so long that not even the threat 
of ostracism could, at this stage, stop the juggernaut. 	It is 
difficult to make an accurate estimate of the proportions of 
emotion and calculation involved in the decision to proceed 
with the plans for the Republic after the 1960 Conference. 
1. c.f. Mansergh (Docs. Vol. III) op. cit. p. 160. 
R.A. Butler : "The financial and economic consequences for 
Nyasaland will be serious and substantial. The Nyasaland 
Government are fully aware of them and are ready to adopt policies to minimise them." 
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One mi‘.,ht postulate the theory, with the wisdom of hindsight, 
that the South Africans had been reassured that their economic 
connections with the Commonwealth (and this means mostly with 
Great Britain) would not be disturbed 1 and, as this factor had 
been the over-riding factor for keeping South Africa in the 
Commonwealth for many years, it may well have been the 
determining issue. One must also observe that an assurance 
of this kind from Britain would have let both sides off the 
hook as far as the Commonwealth was concerned. Britain had 
long been embarrassed by South Africa in the Commonwealth and 
South Africa had long been disenchanted by the Commonwealth. 
If economic links could be maintained, then withdrawal was 
obviously the most satisfactory means of appeasing South 
African Nationalism and assuring Commonwealth cohesion. 2 
1. One must keep in mind the fact that South African 
national income rose from £693 million in 1946-47 
to £2535 million in 1962-63. 	(For greater details 
pertinent to this point see Austin D., Britain and 
South Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1966, 
especially chapter 5.) 
2. Although South Africa is outside the Commonwealth, 
Britain is still her chief trading partner - 2/3 
of all foreign investment is British, 5% of all British 
manufactures go to South Africa; £60 million dividends 
per annum go from South Africa to Britain; London 
remains the centre of the world's gold market. c.f. 
Ingram, D., Commonwealth for a Colour-Blind World, 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1965, p. 197. 
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(II ) COLLISION POINT : 1960. 
The contention that Louw and Verwoerd could have 
misinterpreted the strength of Commonwealth opposition to 
South Africa is not well-founded on the evidence available 1 . 
On the other hand, there is some credibility in the charge that 
1Verwoerd deliberately failed to inform the electorate-at-large 
about the gravity of the opposition in the Commonwealth 2 . 
Afro-Asian hostility had long been articulate and was perhaps 
accepted as the norm in South Africa, but the attitude of 
the White Dominions hardened perceptibly at the 1960 
Conference and in the months which followed it. 
1. See for example the letter from Menzies to Verwoerd 
(2/7/60) "My awn anxiety arises from the fact that 
I do not regard it as quite certain that an application 
by a Republic of South Africa will be accepted by all 
Prime Ministers. If one or two of them dissent, 
the well-established rule of unanimity would put you 
out. I am afraid in particular of what the attitude 
may be of Nehru and Nkrumah.” 
Menzies R.G., Afternoon Light, Cassell, Melbourne, 
1967, p. 201. 
2. Cope, J., South Africa, Ernest Benn Ltd., London, 
1965, p. 136. 
Cope asserts his belief that the referendum would not 
have been successful had the public been adequately 
informed of "the critical atmosphere" left by the 
1960 Conference. Cope also makes the point that as - Malan 
and Strkpom had been prepared to shelve the issue for 
less cogent reasons, then Verwoerd could have done 
so, had he really wanted to remain in the Commonwealth. 
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A sample of the Parliamentary debates of the respective 
Dominions, when viewed against the background of the 
communique, leaves little doubt about the tenor of the 
Commonwealth as a whole. Canada and New Zealand were 
categorically opposed to South Africa's racial policies 
and in both countries there were no significant cleavages 
on party lines2 . In Canada, Mr. Pearson saw the policy 
of "separate development" as being "particularly offensive 
to the other members of the Commonwealth, especially those 
in Africa and Asia, who make up 4/5 of the people of the 
association." 3 Mr. Diefenbaker, reporting after the 1960 
Conference, claimed that multi-racialism in the Commonwealth 
had been accepted in theory by all the Western world, except 
South Africa; and that the refusal to accept this concept 
would mean "losing the struggle against Communism by default." 4 
1. See Canada, House of Commons Debates, (Vol. 4 - 1960) 
p. 3900, Mr. Diefenbaker : (Mr. Louw) "..recognised 
that of all those present there, no-one in the informal 
meetings or elsewhere, could give support to racial 
discrimination in a multi-racial Commonwealth." 
2. J.D.B. Miller in Britain and the Old Dominions p. 259, 
discounts Verwoerd's claim that extreme liberals in 
Canada were calling the tune. The evidence in the 
Parliamentary Debates would suggest that their influence, 
if any, was marginal. See also Mr. Holyoake in New 
Zealand House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 223, P.  1099, 2/8/60). 
3. Canada, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 3 - 1960, p.3322. 
4. Ibid., Vol. 4 - 1960, p. 3901. 
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In the New Zealand House of Commons Mr. Nash spoke 
for his country : "I would affirm that the legislation in 
the Union ,f South Africa, in keepinc one section of the 
people at a lower level than others, is blasphemy. It 
is a complete denial, I would say, to the established 
Christian faith1 . 11 
Although the South African Government could look with 
some justification on Mr. Menzies as its lone champion, a 
closer examination of views of influential Australians 
other than Menzies reveal a far greater disparity of opinion 
about South Africa than perhaps was present in any other 
country of the Commonwealth. The Parliamentary debates 
which followed the news of Sharpeville show clearly that 
Menzies's reliance on "no interference in domestic affairs" 
enjoyed anything but unanimous support in Australia. 2 
Britain, although not so openly hostile to South Africa, 
when compared with New Zealand and Canada, had long been 
committed to the principles encompassed in "the wind of change" 3 
speech, which had been simply a reiteration of an old theme 
in more portentous surroundings. It should have been obvious 
1. New Zealand House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 323 
(2/8/60) p. 115. For Mr. Nash's reference to the 
1960 Communique on multi-racialism, Vol. 323 p. 1104 
2/8/60. 
2. c.f. Australia, House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 26, 
pp 779ff (Mr. Calwell), pp 789ff (Mr. Whitlam.) 
3. See Appendix ID, p.p. 312-17 
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that, for Britain to save face before the Afro-Asian world, 
South Africa, if necessary, must appear to be sacrificed on 
the altar of multi-racialism if she could not conform to the 
world's pronounced acceptance of multi-racial equality. 
The South African Opposition at least was aware of the 
dangers involved if the referendum proceeded. As Mr. E.G. 
Malan put it : "I regard this is a plan to force South Africa 
out of the Commonwealth which is being hidden from the public 
of South Africal ." 
Verwoerd's words after the 1961 Conference 2  ring with 
great irony when one considers the historical struggle of 
the Afrikaner for a Republic : "I may say here in parenthesis 
that the question of a republic or a monarchy was never 
discussed or regarded as being of any importance. All that 
happened was that everybody said it had nothing to do with 
this matter, that we were perfectly free to change our form 
of government and that was not the basis of any arguments 3 ." 
1. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 1 04, Col. 3806 (21/3/60) 
2. For a detailed account of the proceedings of both 
the 1960 and 1961 Conferences, see Menzies, (Afternoon 
Light) op. cit., pp 194ff. 
3. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 107, 
Col. 3490 (23/3/61. 
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Por leee the controversy dividin: Mite South Africa, 
-611 repulican iacue had no direct relevance fox the countries 
of the Cermonucalth. ..;Ilet was important to them -South 
Africato racial policy - was, in fact, not nearly such a 
cause for controversy within .:Jouth Africa itself. In fact, 
the feaz of submersion by an antipathetic Black majority was 
the major unifying force in South Africa. 
It seems clear that the Conmon:Joalth as a whole could 
not take full cognizance of the complenity of C-outh Africa's 
racial problems. They were more concerned with the sense 
of permaeeaca of Mate superiority 1 in a world that was moving 
rapidly in the direction of removing (at least by legislation) 
racial inecuality. not one of the coloured members of the 
Commonwealth showed that it accepted the two basic premises 
of "separate development" - that the White South Africans were 
entitled to a permanent stake in their country, and that 
"separate develops2ant" was a conscious attempt to develop all 
sections of the racially-complex community. Apartheid was 
equated with racial exploitation and therefore it rust be 
destroyed. 42v3n those states not yet within the Commonwealth 
had shown their hostility towards South Africa, and if we can 
1. 	See for =ample Commonwealth Surnz (1961) Nkrumah 
"I an not happy in a way. Even if they had shown 
any sign of moderating their apartheid system we 
shculd have cone along with then." p. 364. 
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take Nyereres word1 that it would be impossible for 
Tanganyika to share membership with South Africa, conditions 
within the Commonwealth of the future could certainly only 
deteriorate for the South Africans. 
w Thus a portion of the Conference communique read : 
"The Prime Minister of South Africa informed the 
other Prime Ministers this evening that, in the 
light of the views expressed on behalf of other 
member governments and the indications of,stheir 
future intentions regarding the racial policy 
of the Union Government, he decided to withdraw 
his application for South Africa's continuing 
membership of the Commonwealth as a republic" 2 . 
Verwoerd returned to a hero's welcome in South Africa with 
the opinion "what happened in London was not a defeat but a 
victory 	something greater than we could have expected has 
3" happened 	We have freed ourselves from the Afro-Asian states . 
1. Article first published in The Observer (London) 7/3/61. 
Reproduced in Nyerere J. Freedom and Unity, Oxford University 
Press, London, 1967 (See Appendix D p. 3 24) 
2. Mansergh (Docs., Vol. 3) op. cit. p. 365 (1961) 
3. Hepple Alexander, Verwoerd, Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1967 p. 8, quoting Cape Times, 21/3/61. 
CHAPTER 	POUR 
BANTU NATIONALISM 
If you could see me die 
The millions of times I have been born 
If you could see me weep 
The millions of times you have laughed 
If you could see me cry out 
The millions of times I have kept silent 
If you could see me sing 
The millions of times I have died and bled... 
I tell you, European brother 
You would be born 
You would weep 
You would sing 
You would cry out 
And you would die 
Bleeding 
Millions of times like me !!! 
J. Craveirinha 
"Song of the Negro on the Ferry" 
Mphahlele Ezekiel, (Ed.) African Writing Today Penguin, 
Narmondsworth, 1967. p. 315 
In order to form a coherent assessment of the pressures of 
multi-racialism (inasmuch as they influenced the decision to withdraw 
from the Commonwealth) an examination of the development of Bantu
nationalism must be made. The complexity of the movement, with its 
vastly different cvertones and appeals to the diverse groups within 
Bantu society2 , forms a stark contrast to the clearly defined 
nationalism of the Afrikaner, although its amorphous nature lid not 
detract from the pervading fear of the Bantu which increased in 
proportion to Bantu political activity. 
Emphasis in this chapter is given to three aspects of the 
nationalist movement :- 
(i) the importance of the differing social and economic 
divisions apparent among the Bantu; 
(ii) some of the special grievances of the nationalists; and 
(iii)the two most important institutions of the nationalist 
movement. 
1. I have used the term "Bantu" in preference to "African" merely to distinguish South African Black nationalism from the 
nationalisms of other African countries and peoples. The Bantu 
in South Africa, prefer the term "African" and my choice of 
"Bantu" is simply to avoid confusion in this thesis. 
2. 1966 Yearbook of South Africa„ p. 61. The Bantu groups of "Nations" recognised by the Republic are :- 
Xhosa 	 3,134,265 
European descended 	3,067,638 
Zulu 2,788,415 
Cape Coloured 1,488,267 
Bapedi 	 1,188,859 
Sotho 1,156,436 
Tswana 886,240 
Shangaan 	S 	518,775 
Asians 477,414 Smaller Bantu national units 	1,134,819 
15,841 9 128 
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Perhaps the most divisive force in Bantu nationalism 
is the division of the population, (on grounds other than 
ethnic groupings) on economic lines, drawn by the demands 
of mining, industry and agriculture. These provide the 
greatest sources of employment for the Bantu l, and subject 
them to vastly different experiences from those of the 
tribal environment in the Reserves, which are, in general, 
poverty-stricken areas, unable to support their own 
population2 . 
Unlike the social structure in the Reserves, where 
tribalism is dominant, and the role of the chief still meaningful, 
life at the mines and in the urban areas is dominated by a 
westernized money-economy, which replaces the communal integrated 
co-operation in the tribal structure with an individualistic 
materialism and the desire to purchase the luxuries of the 
White community. The urbanization of the Bantu has caused 
the movement of large numbers of people from an environment 
of local isolation, traditionalism and political apathy. The 
old elites of chiefs and headmen are no longer as meaningful 
in the urban context 3 but the problem of tribalism within the 
urban setting remains one of the most divisive factors in 
Bantu nationalism - despite the preoccupation of the press 
1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 39 
2. Carter, op. cit., p. 20 
3. The American Political Science Review,"Social Mobilization and Political Development", Karl Deutsch, vol. 55, 1961, P. 493. 
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with "nationalism" " . Tribal fights still take place on the 
Reserves and in the mines2  and tribal customs such AS lobolo are 
retained in urban areas, despite the impact of the urban economy 
and the increasing savoir-faire of the urban Bantu3 . 
The increasing rate of urbanization has developed a type of 
westernized tribalism which is manifest in the growth of voluntary 
associations of Africans in towns. It has also caused alienation 
of many Africans, who cannot find an adequate substitute for 
tribal life to provide themselves with the social security and 
sense of belonging, inherent in an integrated unit. The newly-
urbanized African finds himself in a hostile environment of 
restrictions and regulations, low wages and very little community 
backing and he must obviously be quite bewildered by the revolution 
of social values4 . 
This process of urbanization has been cumulatively absorptive 
of a large proportion of the Bantu male population. In 1904, 15% 
of the Bantu population was urban 5 ; and by 1961 the proportion was 
32%6 and on the increase. The social adjustment of the urban Bantu 2:,4c,t 
requires an effort to compromise between three societies - the urban 
township, the European society and the tribal society, and this 
adjustment is further complicated by the fact that many of the urbanized 
1. De Ridder, J.C., The Personality of the Urban African in South 
Africa, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, p.173. 
2. Marquard, op. cit., p. 40. 
3. Reader, D.H., The Black Man's Portion, Oxford University Press, 
Cape Town, 1961, P. 87. 
4. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 155. 
5. Hunter, op. cit., p. 108; 
6. Ibid. p. 98. 
- 85 - 
Bantu have left their families at home on the Reserves. 
The disruption of family life and the escapist activities 
in the cities, tend to degrade the African's integrity, and 
significantly, his "worth" in the eyes of the White population. 
As well as the Bantu who still retain family ties within 
the Reserves, there has emerged a growing number of urban Bantu, 
who have only a very tenuous link with the Reserves and for whom 
tribal life has very little relevance - despite the Government's 
persistence in regarding them as a temporary labour force l . 
For these Bantu, some, three generations removed from the 
Reserves, European social divisions of class operate 2 	The 
chief criteria of class are education and wealth as expressed 
in the ownership of western luxuries3  , and the whole social 
structure of urban Bantu is rapidly approximating western 
institutions4 . For the Bantu who is  both westernized and 
urbanized, life is perhaps more frustrating than for those 
who have retained their tribal culture. Education does not 
automatically open the doors to social advancement within the 
whole society of South Africa - this is to a large degree 
controlled by his "nuisance-value" (or lack of) to the Government 5. 
0.11171211■11•111MINEOW 
1. Giniewski, Paul, Bantustans, A Trek Toward the Future, 
Human & Rousseau, Cape Town, 10-61777-55. 
2. Marquard t op. cit., p. 52. 	De Ridder, op. cit., p. 27. 
3. UNESCO : Social Implications of Industrialization and 
MgazaiMinn Africa South of the Sahara. International 
African Institute, London, 1956, p. 724. 
4. Ibid., p. 743. 
5. See for example, Mandela, Nelson, No Easy Walk to Freedom, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., London, 1965. 
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It is little wonder that the educated, professional Bantu - 
the potential nationalist spokesman1 - feels bitterly the 
evils of racial discrimination and makes this discrimination 
the key to his nationalist demands2 . 
The Bantu who live on the Reserves form another grout? who 
view nationalism from a very different aspect. The total area 
of the Reserves is about 13% of the Republic and about 7, ^I. t%4  
of the total population of the Reserves live on communally-
held land which is impoverished by primitive farming methods, 
soil erosion and the cultural-religious importance of the 
quantity of cattle owned. 5 They have been referred to as 
"rural slums" 6 and they provide huge reserves of manpower 
for the mines and factories. The economy of the Reserves 
is largely a simple agricultural subsistence economy which 
cannot support the population. 
1. The Australian Journal of Politics and History, "Non-Western Intelligentsias as Political Elites", vol. 6, 1960, 
Harry J. Benda, p. 205. 
2. De Ridder, op. cit., p, 127 
3. 3,651,000 in 1957, Marquard, op. cit., p. 37. 
4. Ibid. p. 39. 
5. Carter, op. ci., p. 20. 
6. Giniewski, op. cit., p. 50. Mbeki, Govan, The Peasants' Revolt, Penguin Books, 
Harmoncisworth, 
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At least 25% of the amount needed to keep the people at 
bare subsistence level comes from outside earnings l and 
there is a constant interchange of population (usually 
male) between the Reserves, the cities and the nines. 
Tribal loyalties are strong and the traditional role 
of the chiefs is still recognised, although they are now 
subject to a magistrate, who is vested with "all the 
authority of the White upper class of South Africa" 2 . 
Despite this restriction, the chiefs still symbolize 
tribal traditions and values and the recognition afforded 
them by traders and missionaries adds to their status. 3 
Their value for co-operation with the Government has been 
recognized by the Nationalist Party, who do not hesitate to 
depose those who are critical of the policies of apartheid. 
Those chiefs, who, like Nalitanzima, seem to espouse apartheid 
policy, to the detriment of Bantu nationalist aims, receive 
a blistering attack from the nationalists. Mantanzima has 
been termed the "classic collaborator" 4 and Mbeki rather 
cynically draws attention to the fact that for the first 
time in South African history, the Government is paying a 
Black man more for his services than it pays some of its 
White employees. 5 
1. Carter, op. cit., p. 20. 
2. Gluckman, Max, Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa, Cohen 
and West, London, 1963, p. 171 
3. Ibid. p. 175, 
4. mbeki, op. cit., p. 146. 
5. Ibid. p.p. lol ff. 
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The opportunities for self-advancement and the direct monetary 
rewards for collaboration with the Government, may in fact, 
invite so many abuses of power 1 that the Nationalist Government 
policy may suffer a complete reversal, because of the destruction 
of the prestige of the role of chief. Mbeki sees the plight of 
the Reserves as “pathetic" and it is interesting to note that the 
most effective open rebellions against apartheid, have occurred 
in the Reserves, where the people are less-politically mobile, 
but at the same time, are less conscious of the armed might of the 
Government, which must be the ultimate victor against any 
nationalist uprising2  . The pondoland Rebellion harassed the 
authorities for some time, and sounded an aminous new note in 
the claims of the nationalists. 
The Reserves showed their rejection of the notion of 
Bantustan development in the defeat of Matanzima's programme 
in the 1963 Transkei elections4 , and although the specific 
claims of the Reserve nationalists differ considerably from 
those of the urban nationalists, they both have in common a 
resentment of the grinding poverty 5 of the Black African, and 
an intense hatred of Government interference in everyday life 6 . 
1. This is what happened to the Hottentot chiefs in the 17th and 18th centuries. c.f. Walker B.A., A History of Southern Africa, 
Longmans, London (3rd Bd.) p. 70. 
2. The American Political. Science Review, op. cit., p. 502, (Deutsch) 
3. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 60. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 171. 
4. Legum, op. cit., p. 193. 
5. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 122. 
6. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 157. 
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In the Reserves, tribal structure and security are being 
eroded by Government interference and the influence of 
Christianity, and in the urban areas, by the impact of a 
western economy. In both cases the Bantu are being 
forced to replace their shaken tribal loyalties with some 
other form of social orientation which will provide them 
with security. 	Nationalism appears to fill the vacuum for 
many. Alienated individuals become potential demonstrators 
and participants in riots against a State which refuses to 
grant them political safety-valves l. Nationalism must 
eventually blur tribal loyalties which remain the persistent 
divisive factor in African nationalism', despite the tendency 
of many White South Africans to fear the African "mass" as a 
distinct, cohesive entity. Far from this, divisionseven 
occur within tribes, regarding the degree of westernization 
desirab1e3 , and the divisions between Christian and Pagan 
in the towns as well as in the Reserves, decrease the 
unifying force of urbanization4 . The language barriers 
are formidable, and are likely to be perpetuated by the 
segregation of residential areas and schools on an ethnic 
basis. Yet, in spite of these great forces which retard 
1. The American Political 
(Deutsch) 
2. UNESCO report, op. cit 
Science Review, op. cit., p. 499 
•9 P. 743 (Hellman) 
Cape Town:7762. 
4. 	De Ridder, op. cit., p. 
Town, Oxford University Press, 
160. 
3. Mayer, P. Xhosa in the 
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the growth of nationaLism, the Black South Africans, 
as well as becoming aware of their economic role in 
South Africa, are becoming increasingly more aware of 
their emergent political rights as human beings, rather 
than as labour units. 1 
This awareness takes shape in the voicing of specific 
grievances in the nationalist struggle against White supremacy, 
which is the unifying cause in non-European nationaliem2 - 
although the African National Congress consistently denied 
that the objective of seeking removal of White supremacy 
was tantamount to Black racialism3 . Thus the nationalists 
have claimed that there is a major difference between 
South African Bantu nationalist objectives and ideology, 
and those apparent in other African states. Hodgkin 
admits that factors common to all African nationalisms, 
will be modified by varying colonial experiences and 
different stages of economic development. 
1. 	Reader, op. cit.. p. 33 
Z. 	Ibid. p. 173 
3. Benson, Mary, The African Patriots, Faber & Faber, London, 
1963, p. 293. Sithole, N., African Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 
Cape Town, 1959, p. 24. De Beer, Z.J. op. cit., p. 10. 
Hodgkin, T. Nationalism in Colonial Africa, Frederick 
Muller Ltd., London, 
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In the case of South Africa, the most salient of these 
variant factors appear to be :- 
(1) the country was not settled extensively by 
Africans, before the arrival of the Whites; 
(ii) the White population is at the same time, 
more numerous and entrenched in its only 
homeland; 
(iii)the processes of civilization have had far 
longer to form patterns of religious, 
cultural and economic integration, end 
(iv) the existence of the many racial groups, 
which has complicated the more obviously 
convenient Black-White confrontation. 1 
Thus we find that the traditional nationalist demands 
claim no more for the Black man than the benefits enjoyed 
by the Whites. These claims have centred around a more 
equal distribution of the 1and2 , higher wages, the repeal 
of the pass laws, and more recently, universal suffrage 3 - 
1. De Beer, op. cit., p. 11 
2. cf, Smuts, J.C., Africa and Some  World Problems, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1930. "In not setting 
aside sufficient such areas (native reserves) 
in South Africa in the past we committed a 
grievous mistake, which is at the root of most 
of our difficulties in native policies." p. 
3. De Beer r. op,. cit., p.13. 
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on the basis that the interdependence of the racial groups 
in South Africa, should eliminate the great disparity 
between living standards of the White and Black population 1  
For although the Bantu comprise 16 million of the population, 
(approximately 73% of the total) they still enjoy only 32% of 
the net national income2 	The low wages cause a constant 
restlessness among the Bantu and this leads to job changeability 3 
in the constant search for higher wages4. The consequences of 
this are the wastage of trained labour and the system of dual 
morality, in which many Bantu justify stealing from employers, 
as a means of redressing exploitation 5. The wages system 
for the urban Bantu, remains based on the understanding that 
his family is able to eke out an independent existence back 
home on the reserve6 . 
The conditions of urban African life are conducive to 
the promotion of crime and the "tsotsis" exemplify the 
delinquent results of the clash of societies 8 4, 
1. Mbeki, op. cit., p. 71. 
2. Newsletter, Dept. of Information -S.A., July, 1964. 
3. Reader, op. cit., p. 81. 
4. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 156. By law they are forced to 
return to the reserves at the end of one year and then 
apply for re-entry and a new contract. 
5.* 	Reader, op it • 	p. 81. 
6. Marquard, op. cit., p. 39. De Ridder, op, cit„ p. 155, 
7. 1 in every 236 Bantu in gaol in 1963. (Kohn op, cit., p. 65) 
8. De Ridder op. cit., p. 157. 
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Other more embracing facts are revealed in any comparison 
of living standards for groups in South Africa. The 
Tomlinson Commission Report cites a 20% death-rate for 
Bantu children in their first year 1 , while life expectancy 
charts show for Bantu - 36.4 years and for White South 
Africans - 66 years2 . 
The Bantu intelligentsia maintains that the disadvantages 
of being Black are most clearly seen in the field of education, 
which features high on the list of nationalist grievances. 
While apologists for apartheid show that South Africa is spending 
more money per head of population than Uganda, Nyasaland, or the 
British Protectorates3 ; Bantu nationalists claim that the only 
relevant comparison lies in the analysis of spending for the 
different racial groups within South Africa. 
In 1960, statistics cited at a Conference on Education 
in Natal, showed the per capita spending for White children to 
be £67 per year, and for Bantu children, E8 per year. The 
comparative teacher:pupil ratios were 1:24 and 1:45 respective1y 4 . 
1. U.G. 61/1955. Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic 
Development of the Bantu Areas within the Union of South 
Africa, p. 72. 
2. Mbeki, op. cit., p. 71. 
3. Boydell, Thomas, The Beloved Country, The Nasionale 
Boekhandel Bpt., 1959, P. 177. 
4. Macmillan, Hey, Macquarrie, Education and Our Expanding 
Horizons, University of Natal Press, 1962, p. 221. 
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Quite apart from the physical disabilities of the Bantu 
education system, the nationalists have attacked the whole 
concept of separate aims for Bantu education, ' interpreting 
the Government's desire to co-ordinate Bantu education with 
the "aims of the Bantu community" as the equivalent of imposing 
"permanent inferiority" on the Bantu people 2  The ethnic 
differences among the Africans are stressed and perpetuated by 
the system which promotes mother-tongue instruction for the 
different tribal groups in the attempt to resuscitate "outmoded 
tribalism". 
The Government believes that educated Bantu are "the class 
which has learnt to believe that it is above its own people and 
feels that its spiritual, economic and political home is among 
the civilised community of South Africa. 311 Tabata asserts that 
in the bid to eliminate successors to this "class", the three 
"R's" are almost crowded out of the curriculum by the religious 
instruction, manual work and singing lessons, on the basis that 
it would be absurd to teach a Bantu child mathematics. 4 
1. Tabata, I.B., Education for Barbarism,Pall Mall, London, 1960, p. 6. 
Mandela, op. cit., p.x. 
2. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 57. 
3. Tabata, op it p. 10. - quoting Bantu Education. 
4. Ibid., p. 56._ 
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The mere fact that the ability to rise above manual labour 
entails knowledge of at least one of the official languages, 1 
leaves little prospect for the graduate of mother-tongue language 
schools. The Government statistics on Bantu education show 1897 
students in all the universities and university colleges - in 
1964 the total population of 14 million Bantu 2 . 
On the other hand, the Government claims that the transfer 
of Bantu education to its control has resulted in a great 
expansion of educational activities. It has doubled the number 
of pupils attending Bantu schools 3 , despite the fact that its 
expenditure is pegged at R13 million and that Africans must 
bear the cost of any expansion themselves4. South Africa 
has the highest literacy rate in Africa 5 and despite the 
experience in Morocco, where a bid to remove French as the medium 
of education failed because of the pupils/ inability to cope 
with Science and Mathematics in the mother-tongue6 , the 
Nationalists claim that the use of mother-tongue instruction 
is justified by the UNESCO experiment in the Philippines 7. 
1. Apartheid in South Africa, United Nations Office of Public 
Information, p. 24. 
2. Reports on the State of South Africa, No. 28, cited in Bantu 
Education, Vol. IX, No. 9. 
3. Apartheid in South Africa, (U.N.) op. cit., p. 24 
4. International Review Service, Vol. X, No, 82. 
"Apartheid in South Africa" - A.G. Mezerik. 
5. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 172, gives the U.N. figure - 63%. 
6. Shepherd G. The Politics of African Nationalism 
Praeger Paperback, 1962, p, 25, 
7. Bantu Education Journal, Vol. IX, No. 9 (Kotze), Vol. X No. 1 (TG725a) 
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The Biselen Commission Report proposes as the major aim of 
Bantu education, "the creation of opportunities for the spiritual, 
moral, intellectual, physical development of each individual, 
within the framework of the community" 1 
It appears that the Bantu nationalist leaders differ with 
the Government in their definition of the role of the African 
in the community-at-large. There is no doubt that they see in 
their educational system, regardless of the numbers it 
accommodates, a cynical and sinister attemptyto perpetuate 
their inferior social and economic status. Because the 
educated elite is by far the most articulate group within the 
nationalist body, the bitterness of the quv.sticn of education 
seems personal and increasing. 	It is indeed reminiscent of 
the history of Afrikanerdom's fight for its own C.N.O. schools 
in the fact of both systematic and insidious campaigns of 
Anglicization. 
The next most pressing area for nationalist grievances 
lies in the general question of the distribution of land. This 
falls into specific problems - the development of the Bantustans; 
the Group Areas Act, and the pass system, the policing of which, 
leads to the most obvious humiliations of apartheid. 2 . 
1. Lantern, Vol. XI. 
2, "The Freedom Charter" Mbeki, op cit., p. 154 
- 97 - 
The Bantu "homelands" consist of 260 small, separate 
areas throughout the country and comprise 13% of the total 
area of South Africa - the amount allotted to the Bantu by 
"history"1. This has long been the subject of dispute by 
Bantu leaders, and as early as 1913, a delegation was sent 
to London in protest against the Land Act of 1913, and another 
delegation was sent to Versailles in 1919 2 	The present 
distribution of the land means that within the "White areas" 
(where nearly 2/3 of the Bantu live and work) the Bantu 
are regarded as "migrant labour"3 , enjoying neither political 
rights nor the right of free-hold ownership. Thus while the 
removals of Bantu from congested slum areas have decreased the 
crime rate4 and have led to the development of vast new townships 
1. Mbeki, op. cit., p. 16. 
Luthuli Let My People Go:, Colins, London, 1962 p. 206. 
"There is no hope in the Bantustan Act for any African. 
There is not intended to be any". 
(Mr. Lawrence, MP, South African House of Assembly Debates 
Vol. 105, Col. 8314 (20/5/60) refers to the Bantustans 
as"the Shangri-la of the heated brain") 
2. Ngubane, op. 	86 Of ,0 0 
Roux, op. cit., p. 111. 
3. Hunter, op. cit. p. 102. 
4. De Ridder, op. cit., p. 28. 
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like Soweto1, Bantu nationalist leaders view the lack of 
freehold rights as one of the major discriminatory practices 
on the grounds of colour2 . 
The Group Areas Act has resulted in many cases of 
individual hardship in the separation of families and in the 
curtailment of individual movement 3 . Further, the restrictions 
and enforcement of the laws concerned * have caused widespread 
resentment and frustration4 and have increased the under-current 
of anxiety and insecurity within the Bantu personalitv 5, The 
constant brushes with the police on the matter of passes 6, often 
for unnecessary and humiliating demands, have caused a 
traditional struggle against the pass system to emerge. 7 This 
also had its beginning in 1913 and the common resentment felt • 
by the majority of the Bantu, has caused demands for the 
abolition of the pass laws to feature prominently on the programme 
of the African National Congress. 8 
11111•11111•1111111■MIIIIIIi011116 
1. Soweto with a population of 711,000 is the largest city in 
the Republic - Newsletter, Department of Information 
October 1964, 
2. Marquard t op. cit., p. 52 
3. Nyubane, op. cit., p. 62. 
4. Reader, op, cit., p. 74. De Bidder, op. cit., p. 157. 
5. De Bidder, op. cit., p, 170 
6. Roux, op. cit., p. 116. See also Wkosi Lewis, Home and Exile, 
Longmans, Green & Co., London 1965, especially Chapter 2 - 
"Apartheid - a daily exercise in the absurd." 
Mbeki, op. cit., p. 127. 	Ngubane, op, cit., p. 243. 
8. Roux, op, cit. p, 117. 
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Thus the pattern of nationalist grievances displays the 
recurrent theme of resentment against discrimination and the 
inequalities due to race - the one unchangeable human 
characteristic. The inequalities are many - political, social 
and economic, and they are highlighted by the growing trends 
of urbanization and westernization and by the consequent growth 
of awareness of the disadvantages of a black skin in the many 
diverse manifestations of apartheid. 
Because of this growing urbanization, one puzzling fact 
concerned with African nationalism is revealed. The movement 
has failed to attract mass support 1 	Given the great 
variety in development and education, some grievances still 
remain common to all Black men in South Africa. Yet their 
nationalism continues to be very much a movement of the 
intelligentsia, after more than half a century of organization 2 . 
The nationalist movement has been dominated institutionally 
by the African National Congress (A.N.C.), which from its 
inception in 1912, until the late 1950's, espoused three 
basic principles - non-racialism, non-tribalism and non- 
violence. Two strands of thought have always been discernible 
in the A.N.C., the moderate-favouring conciliatory and 
1. Ibid. p. 116, 
2. Peit,E4Ward, South Africa : The DumisL.21_Its  
African National Congress, Oxford University 
Press, London 1962, p. 1. 
- 100 - 
constitutional tactics; and the more radical and assertive, 
the proponents of which have become more vocal and influential 
as the Nationalist Government refused to compromise with 
the Congress and as the legislative programme of apartheid 
began to escalate. 
For almost half a century, the A.N.C. remained steadfast 
in its demand to share in the Government of the whole country, 
accepting the permanent participation of the other racial 
groups in South Africal, and rejecting the racialist theory 
as a valid reaction to Afrikaner herrenvolkism 2 	Unlike 
many other nationalist movements in Africa, the A.N.C. 
maintained that its policy was not to oust the Europeans 
from South Africa, but to bring changes to the existing system 
so that the Bantu could gain a share in political power3 . 
Moderate leadership has been characteristic of the A.N.C., but 
the futility of moderation has been keenly felt by men like Luthuli : 
"who will deny that thirty years of my life have been 
spent knocking in vain, patiently,moderately and 
modestly at a closed and barred door? What have 
been the fruits of moderation? The past thirty 
years have seen the greatest number of laws 
restricting our rights and progress until today, we 
have reached the stage where we have almost no rights at all .4 
1. Legum, op. cit. p. 174 
2. Benson, op. cit. p. 293. Kohn, op. cit., Ia. 67 Ngubane op. cit., p. 92. 
3. Sithole, op. cit., p. 379. 
Moraes, The Importance of Being Black, Macmillan CO., New York, 1965, pl. 370. 
4.  
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That this obvious desperation penetrated the ranks of the 
Congress is reflected in the change of attitude, and in the 
rise to leadership and popularity of more radical spokesmen, 
such as Neslon Mandela and Govan Mbeki. The most dramatic 
evidence of the reversal of general principles of operation, 
was the formation of the "Spear of the Nation" as an 
organizationally independent body, committed to the use of 
violence as a key tactic. This was a public admission that 
the A.N.C. accepted the conviction that the rigours of 
apartheid would not be ameliorated by peaceful persuasion or 
• by western pressure on the Nationalist Government. 1 
This changed attitude of the A,N.C., had been fore-
shadowed by the hiving off of the Pan-African Congress in 
1958, principally because of disagreement on tactics and 
also on the role of non-European allies in the nationalist 
struggle against White supremacy. Robert Sobukwe, the 
emergent leader of the PAX., stated : "...the Africans 
are the only people, who, because of their material position, 
can be interested in the complete overhaul of the present 
structure of society."2 
1. 	Legum, op. cit., p. 177. 
Analysis" - June 1963, p. 
"South Africa: Information and 
9 . 
2. 	The New African, October, 1965. p. 187 
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The PAX. denounced the A.N.C.'s retention of the principle 
1 of multi-racialism as pandering to racial bigotry, and as 
such, was simply a brake on the dynamism of nationalism. 
It formulated a four-point plan for the development of South 
Africa, on the principle of "Izwe lethu" - the land is ours :- 
(1) Complete socialization. 
(ii) Redistribution of "usurped" land from the 
Cape to Luanda. 
(iii)A new process of naturalization for foreigners. 
(iv) No man should be denied citizenship on the 
basis of colour alone. 
Sobukwe's new hard-line nationalism also contended that the 
test for deciding a citizen's right to claim Africa as his 




"The Freedom Charters' Mbeki, 
Shepherd, op. cit., p. 126, 
op. cit., p. 187 (Nkoana.) 
op. cit., p. 154. 
The New African, 
3. Ibid. 
2_2 
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The rapid growth of popularity for both Sobukwe 
and the P.A.C., and the impact of Sharpeville, 1 when viewed 
with the Pondoland Rebellions 2 and the brief, if somewhat 
abortive history of Pogo3 , show the fading attraction of the 
ideal of a multi-racial nation. The banning of both the 
A.N.C. and the P.A.C. has removed the political safety-valves 
open to the majority group within the population, who have neither 
efleetivg trade union organization, nor parliamentary 
representation. The imprisonment or exile of the Bantu 
leaders has, on the one hand, temporarily emasculated the 
nationalist movement, but on the other, has widened the spheres 
of influence for the leaders in exile, and has provided the 
martyrs4which are apparently necessary for the success of an 
emergent nationalism. 
To conclude then, it is necessary to describe the 
formidable barriers which prevent the development of a 
mass Bantu nationalist movement in South Africa. 
1. Ibid., p, 209. (Sobukwe). 
N.B. Since Sharpeville, military expenditure alone 
has been increased five-told by the Nationalist 
Government - to E157 minion in 1966 - 20% of the 
country's total budget. 
The Observer (London) September 11th, 1966. p.11 
2. South Africa : Information and Analysis, November 1962 
3. See Australian Outlook, op. cit., Fryer, 1:14 188. 1 and The Australian _Journal of Politics and Historz, op. cit., De C;;Figny, p. 355. 
4. Cf. "Torture in South Africa : Extracts from the Report of  the U.N. Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the 
Republic of South Africa - 8/12/64 A5825" - Transition No.19,1965. 
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This development is retarded by the wide gap between the 
educated, highly articulate, but small, professional elite, 
and the great mass of unskilled workers and peasants 1 , 
because of the lack of an appreciable commercial class and 
the restrictions on the trade union movement, It is also 
greatly hampered by the inevitable closeness of the bans 2 , 
the necessity to work underground, and the persistent tendency 
for inter- organization conflict to erupt along tribal lines 3 . 
Bantu nationalism must somehow blur the sharpness of these 
divisions and formulate the conscious will to be a nation, 
that the mass of Africans in South Africa seem to lack. 
It is clear that the nationalist movement lacks mass support 
from the failure of the civil disobedience campaign in 
June 1952,-  
The highly-efficient South African police force 6, the 
severe penalties involved and the natural disinclination to 
strike because of poverty, are further crippling limits to 
1. Carter, op. cit., p. 358. De Bidder, op. cit., p. 174. 
The Journal of International Affairs, vol XVI, no. 2., 1962, 
-54,7-731:34. 
"From Tribalism to Nationalism in Tropical Africa", L.W. Doob. 
2. Hodgkin, op, cit., p. 184. 
3. UNESCO Report, op. cit., p. 724 (Epstein) 
4. The Journal of International Affairs,op. cit., Doob, p. 153, 
5. Australian Journal of Politics and History, op. cit., De Crespigny, p. 350. 	Ngubane, op. cit. p. 81. 
6. Ngubane, op. cit. p. 133. 
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the amount of effective action available to influence the 
trend of Nationalist policy. At the moment Government action 
is successfully forestalling the tendency of industrialization 
to create a politically mobile mass. 1 
There is obvious bitterness between the A.N.C. and the 
PAX., with the former accusing the latter of racialism2 
and the P.A.C. alleging strong Communist collaboration with 
the A.N.C. and a general charge of "non-Africanism" 3 . 
Yet both bodies claim that their objectives are not aimed 
at the removal of the White man, but the removal of White 
supremacy4. 	The European settlers naturally find some 
trouble in divorcing the two. 5 
1. Hunter, op. cit., p. 263. 
2. Shepherd, op. cit., p. 127. 
3. Legum, op. cit., p. 178. 
4. Lutuli, A. op. cit., p. 116 The New African, October, 1965, p. 209 
Sithole, op. cit., p. 24. The New African, op. cit., p. 209 (Sobukwe) 
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One must be wary of under-estimating the potential force of 
the Bantu nationalist movement 1 	The increasing economic 
integration2 and the resultant urbanization 3, despite the Bantustans, 
will extend further the influence of the western money economy, which 
must in turn, expand the politically-relevant strata of the population 4 
and make it more receptive to the force of nationalism. The 
supreme difficulty for the Bantu leaders in South Africa has been, 
and will continue to be the problem of reconciling tribalism and 
nationalism. From the viewpoint of the Afrikaner, Africans remain 
of the State but never conceivably of the Nation, and as their 
numbers increase so does their potential threat to Aftikanerdom which 
has formulated for them an unacceptable definition of their role in 
South Africa. The unacceptability of this definition had been 
acknowledged by both the Commonwealth and the U.N. prior to 1961. 
Mounting pressure within the Bantu movements heightened their impact 
on both the Commonwealth and the U.N., making the Afrikaners 
increasingly sensitive to interference by both these organizations 
and as a concomitant, making Bantu nationalism more appreciative 
of its world-wide support. 
1. Spottiswoode, op. cit., N.B. "Those who deny the existence 
of Bantu nationalism on the force of the argument that 
political consciousness is to be found in only a small and 
negligible minority of detribalized leaders are confusing 
nationalism with a formulated political development". (Coetzee,p.69 
2. Carter, op. cit., p. 118. 
3. Moraes, op. cit., p. 372. 
4. Reader, op. cit., p. 33. 
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CHAPTER 	FIVE 
AFRICA 	AWAKENS 
I'll talk no more, 
I'll listen to nobody's talk, 
I'll wait no more; 
I'll lead myself towards the goal, 
Though countless hurdles cross my path 
. And danger lurks on every side, 
I'll go forward and do and dare. 
On library doors 
I'll knock and gain entrance; 
Of:the strength 
Of nations past and present ,I will read, 
I'll brush the dust from ancient scrolls, 
And drinking deep of the Pyrrhean stream 
Will go forward and do and dare. 
I'll sail the seas 
And learn the might of God and man, 
Behind my name 
To tie a string of alphabets, 
Melting bubbles will not end all. 
I'll come back home with strong arms bared, 
I'll go forward and do and dare. 
Dennis Osadebay. 
"Young Africa's Resolve". 
O'Donnell, op. cit. p. 348 
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African' nationalism shares certain characteristics with 
Afrikaner nationalism, despite local variations resulting from 
diverse historical experience and economic developnent2 . The 
chief force for cohesion among the various African nationalisms 
is found in the display of anti-whitism and anti-colonialism, 
although these are not powerful enough to dispel the divisive 
effect of tribalism, which remains the chief barrier to the 
universal acceptance of membership of either national states 
or pan-African federations. Consequently, many African 
nationalist leaders tend to emphasize and exaggerate those 
features which are common to the phenomenon of nationalism 
throughout the entire continent. Despite the fact that 
generalizations about the development of the nationalist 
ideologies must necessarily be viewed cautiously, some factors 
may be discerned which have a bearing on South Africa's 
decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth. 
Perhaps the most constant demand of the nationalists 
has been for racial equality and this has usually been 
linked with claims for economic justice and political 
independence. African nationalism has often been fostered 
1. I have used this term to encompass all forms of African 
nationalism outside South Africa. 
2. Hodgkin, op. cit., p. 56, cites the following as some 
of the most important factors inducing variability in 
African nationalism : (1) the extent and type of economic 
development; (2) the development of airports and other 
speedy means of communications; (3) the nature and degree • 
of western civilisation; (4) the policy of the colonial 
government in regard to Asian and European settlement; and 
the importance of external influences, e.g. the U.N., Islam. 
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by a resentment of white superiority as expressed in economic 
and political control which, in turn, generated exploitation 
and social discrimination. Demands by nationalists which 
include higher wages, higher prices for farm products, and a 
heightened appreciation of the urgency of the need for 
industrial development, have been precursors to claims for 
a greater share in the profits of natural resources than the 
White man had previously seen fit to allocate. Thus, social 
rights, racial equality, political freedom and independence 
have been inextricably woven into the process of achieving 
national sovereignty. Quite often the amalgam of all these 
claims has resulted in the espousal of socialism as a panacea 
for all the troubles of the immediate post-independence era, 
and this, in turn, has promoted a spirit of fellow-suffering 
in Africa that has no counterpart in the newly-emergent nations 
of Latin America or Asia. 
One of the most commonly supported nationalist concepts 
(again with local variation of emphasis) has been that of 
negritude, which fosters a pride in Blackness, and has exerted 
great influence upon various cultural movements. It is based 
largely on the belief in the desirability of being Black - for 
so long the criterion for discrimination and exploitation by 
Europeans. The concentration on the virtues of being Black 
has two corollaries, viz., a tendency towards hostility to 
Whiteness, and an intense and pre-occupied searching for 
"African-ness" in an attempt to reveal., a history and culture 
to rival that of the European. Cultural achievements and 
priorities which differ from those of the European are upheld 
as being eminently desirable; this leads to the dial temptation 
to espouse doctrines of Black supremacy and to attempt to 
suppress, or at least to minimize, European influences. 
Although negritude is seen in varying degrees either as a 
sub-conscious or a deliberately self-conscious element in the 
cultural activities of the nationalists, there is ample 
evidence to show that it is a widely-used tactic in the battle 
for compensation for years of racial humiliation and degradation 2  . 
Other common defence-mechanisms are seen in the 
development of certain post-independence slogans which have been 
formulated and adopted as a kind of pejorative shorthand for use 
in the castigation of former colonial powers and their allies. 
Often they have been necessary to promote some form of 
political cohesion in states which too often have shown the 
disadvantages of ethnic disunity and economic non-viability 
immediately after the attainment of independence. "Anti-
imperialism" and"anti-colonialism" (or"anti-neo-colonialism") have 
become commonplace political jargon since the arrival of the new 
1. Shepherd, op. cit., p. 11 See articles such as 
"Education and African Culture" and "Ideas WE Must Fight" 
in The Spark, Ohan).15/2/63. 
2. Kaunda K. and Morris, Black Government, United Society 
for Christian Literature, Lusaka, 1960, p. 95. 
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African states (Even Russian neo-colonialism has been 
held as a danger for the new states to fear.) These " 'isms" 
have been synonymous with, or at least inter-changeable with, 
accusations of White racialism and have been consistently used 
in the U.N. proceedings since the advent of the numerical 
superiority of the coloured nations. They have innumerable 
definitions and are used in a wide range of connotations, 
usually concerned with charges of political meddling or economic 
exploitation by the former colonial 'Powers. 
Quite often these slogan insults have been important 
unifying factors in states which were haphazard products of 
the nineteenth century colonial map-makers. As may be seen 
in all modern nationalisms (not the least obvious example 
being Afrikaner nationalism) a sense of grievance has helped 
to coalesce diverse strains in the nation and the threat of 
neo-colonialism has been a psychological stimulus to maintain 
the continuation of the nationalist dynamic, which may well 
have waned disastrously upon the achievement of independence. 
Thus, to recapitulate, anti-Whitism, or more positively, 
negritude, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, socialism and 
a feeling of solidarity based on a history of past racial 
exploitation have been the common threads in the pattern of 
nationalism in Africa. 
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From the general significance of anti-colonialism and 
anti-imperialism, one is inevitably brought to the specific 
consideration of South Africa against this background. 
Apartheid is, to the Africans, the most classic and formidable 
example of colonialism and imperialism in their most highly 
developed forms. As African states were individually 
divorced from the political trappings of colonialism, they 
were brought collectively to consider South Africa as a living 
and apparently permanent denigration of the concept of racial 
equality. From the historical viewpoint, South Africa was 
an accident; an unfortunate anachronism swimming frantically 
(and somewhat successfully) against the mainstream of 
historical development. As such, she became the target 
for the most strongly articulated aspirations of the African 
nationalists both within the Commonwealth and more particularly 
in the U.N. 
A study of South Africa's attitudes and responses to the 
various African independence movements (especially in the 
context of the Commonwealth) revealed many themes which were 
not reflected in the respective responses of the colonial 
Powers in Africa's decade of independence. 
The concurrent emergence of what has been termed "white 
guilt" as well as the general acceptance of the concept of 
racial equality within the Commonwealth, was a fact not 
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apparently appreciated by the policy makers in South Africa, 
for the country seemed to be strengthening its resources to 
perpetuate White supremacy. From the inauguration of the 
"new" Commonwealth, South Africa had had markedly reserved 
views on the virtues of Commonwealth membership 1  , and as 
the admission of India to the Commonwealth all but coincided 
with the electoral success of the National Party in South 
Africa, the warring factions in the Commonwealth were soon 
to be articulated. 
To gain a spectrum view of the development of attitudes, 
opinions and responses to the political events of the African 
continent in the years following 1948, in order to isolate 
consistent themes which led to the complete rift in the 
Commonwealth in 1960, I made a survey of the Debates of the 
South African House of Assembly. In the following section, 
I have deliberately avoided discussion of the U.N. interference 
in South Africa's affairs, and also the question of 
republican membership of the Commonwealth. 	(These have 
been considered in other sections.) 
1. 	Despite the publicity accorded Dr. Malan's rather 
revolutionary speech on the occasion of India's ehtry 
as a republican member into the Commonwealth, c.f. 
South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 68, 
Coll. 5551-65 (11/5/49), he was not long in showing 
his disenchantment of the idea. c.f. Vol. 82, Col. 1Q5, 
(8/7/53) "Some of us regret it (India's admission) 
today". Again in Vol. 85, Col. 4533 (13/5/54) - "I 
was disappointed in my expectations. And not I alone, 
but everybody is disappointed." 
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A number of significant themes persist in the Debates. 
The first of these is the comparative lack of interest in the 
indigenous peoples of Africa as political factors at least 
until the mid-fifties. Any discussion before this tended to 
be in the form of oblique and nebulous warnings of the "Black 
Peril" type which, in fact did not differ substantially from 
those voiced many years prior to the Second World War. It is 
as if the failure to include the Bantu as an integral part of 
the South African nation, led the South Africans (particularly 
those on the Government benches) to disregard the indigenous 
peoples in all African countries, in favour of negotiations 
with those colonial Powers who were interested in the 
continent. Another major theme which persisted throughout 
the period, with varying degrees of emphasis, was that South 
Africa was being systematically persecuted by a campaign of 
distortion and dishonesty in the world press '. This very 
widely-held belief tended to make the South African Government 
completely hostile to any critical suggestions that apartheid 
may well be a disruptive issue in international relations. 
This led to the third major theme in the debates - the refusal 
of the Government to admit publicly that apartheid was the 
chief tension-making factor in South Africa's external relations. 
1. 	See for example South African House of Assembly Debates, 
Vol. 68, col. 5716, (12/5/49), Vol. 85, Col. 4388 (3/5/54), Vol. 95, col. 7627 (10/6/57) (this also refers specifically 
to distortion by the British Labour Party.) and Vol. 97, Col. 2363 (18/8/58). 
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(No doubt this was largely due to their reluctance to fall 
into the trap of self-contradiction in the issue of the 
"domestic jurisdiction defence" in the U.N.) The final 
theme which dominated the earlier part of the period 
1948-60 was the fear of Communism and its destructive 
potential within South Africa and the continent as a whole. 
Thus a tendency of the South Africans to identify every threat 
of trouble with the Communist menace caused the passing of 
the Suppression of Communism Act in the interests of the 
country's security1  . 
In some ways the Debates of the period reflect in microcosm 
the bewilderment of the whole Western world at the speed of 
political events in Africa. It is significant that in 1948, 
early murmurs of apprehension about possible self-government 
for Ghana2 led Dr. Malan to canvass the possibility of a 
Pan-African charter involving the interests of all the European 
Powers in Africa3 to forestall the development of an African 
nationalism which would embrace 120 million adherents. The 
te Water appointment of Mr;aCO as a roving ambassador to "sell" 
1. Second Reading, Ibid. Vol. 73, Coll. 8909 ff. (14/6/1950) 
2. Ibid. Vol. 64, Coll. 1311-12 (1/9/4 8 ) 
3. Ibid. Vol. 68, Coll. 5689-90 (12/5/1949). 
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apartheid in Europe showed no immediate success, but it was 
symptomatic of the Nationalists' desire to remove persistent 
charges of Nazism which were a carry-over from World War II, 
and which did little to expedite closer relationships with the 
nations of Europe. 
From 1953 onwards, as the broad trend of British policy 
was discerned, the Debates reveal a growing consensus of 
opinion regarding the undesirability of granting independence 
to Black African states, for this was simply opening the doors 
for Communist infiltrators2 . Both Government and Opposition 
speakers alike expressed the opinion that Black Africa would 
need the guidance of the White man for generations to come. 3 
Malan probably spoke for the majority of the Parliament, in 
his summary of the Government's attitude to the prospect of 
self-government for the Gold Coast; 
"Personally I have no doubt about its failure. It 
is unrealistic and must, in my opinion, be a 
repetition of an idealism which will end in tragedy, 
because the facts are not taken into account. It 
is a case where the good principle of democracy, 
wrongly applied, makes itself ridiculous. "4 
(12/j749) 1. Ibid., Vol. 68, Col. 5716.7 See also Cope, p. 191 (1'IY .  
2. Ibid., Vol. 75, col. 6798 (16/5/1951) 
3. c.f. Ibid., Vol. 78, Col. 4354, "The Africans are just like 
children striving for a new way of life. We must have 
patience with them and we should try to lead them." 24/4/1952 
4. Ibid. Vol. 75, Col. 6878, See also Mr. Lawrence (U.P.) 16/5/1951 
"We feel that the (British) Labour Party was precipitate 
in according that measure of self-government to the Gold 
Coast which was given it by its new constitution." 
- 118- 
The elections on the Gold Coast were held to be a British 
concern, but Malan objected to the statement that the Gold 
Coast might eventually attain' full Dominion status within 
the Commonwealth. He believed that the policy would result 
in the disappearance of the White man from the greater part 
of Africa1  . His objection, he claimed, was based not on an 
objection to the principle of granting gradual self-government, 
but on the low level of civilisation and sense of civic 
responsibility in the relevant colonies2. The Commonwealth's 
position would soon become untenable - the admission of the 
Asian members had already created great difficulty in 
Commonwealth relations, because they were so much at variance 
with Western civilisation3 . Great stress was placed on the 
low level of education standards within the British colonies 4 
and members showed an eagerness to consolidate the White man's 
stand against the British policy in Africa 5. 
1. Ibid., Vol, V5, Col. 6818 (16/5/51). 
2. Ibid., Vol. 75, Col. 6820 - malan described the granting 
of self-government to the Gold Coast with its 90% 
illiteracy rate as a "precipitate action" (16/5/1951). 
3. Ibid., Vol. 75, col. 6821 (16/5/1951) 
4. See for example, the references to Nigeria in this context, Vol. 759 col. 6852 (16/5/1951). 
5. E.g. in Vol. 75 9 Col. 6797, Welensky quoted as expressing regret that "the Empire should be liquidated 
in this way." (16/5/1951). 
- 119 - 
Once again the ubiquitous threat of Communism was raised; 
Ghana was becoming "the gateway to Africa for the Russians" 
and "a nail in the coffin of the Commonwealth" 1 
The eruption of the Mau Mau in Kenya brought home to 
the South Africans the force of anti-Whitism and the necessity 
for keeping nascent nationalism in check. It also intensified 
the fear of the Bantu within the Union. The march by the blacks 
towards independence was a sobering thought for the Nationalists 
who had long lived with the fear of submergence by the Bantu. 
The claim that the black nations of Africa were too backward 
for independence was repeated long after it was clear that a 
policy orientated to a refusal to acknowledge emergent black 
governments was no longer compatible with the changing 
acceptance by the world of the new Africa. It was this stubborn 
refusal to come to terms with what was fast becoming a fait 
accompli which led to a growing gulf between the South Africans 
and the British. 
Expressions similar to "Dark Africa is on the move" 1 
recur frequently in the Debates, causing more liberal speakers 
such as Mrs. Ballinger to repeat many warnings that South Africa 
by isolating herself from her own Bantu population, was leaving 
herself vulnerable to nationalist extremists. 2 
1. Ibid., Vol. 
2. Ibid., Vol. 
3. Ibid., Vol. 
(28/4/1952) 
75, Col. 6797 - Mr. Rel. (16/5/1951) 
71, Col. 3684, Mr. DuPlessis. (27/3/1950) 
66, Col. 3182(31/1/49), Vol. 78, Cal. 4488-89 
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Subsequent advice that the Government should heed the Bantu 
nationalist claims brought forth only pessimistic responses 
from Malan that "What is happening in West Africa ... should 
serve as a pointer and a warning to us in South Africa 1 ." 
Yet the refusal to acknowledge the wisdom or perhaps 
the inevitability of the emergence of African states did not 
imply that the Government was unaware of South Africa's 
increasing isolation. It is characteristic that the Government, 
in the early and mid-fifties, continued to look for liaison 
with the colonial Powers who were far from eager to ally 
themselves with South Africa. 
The early references to the proposal of the pan-African 
charter were given a more detailed character by Mr. Durrant 
in 1954. His motion2 to effect the establishment of the 
organisation outlined the following broad aims : 
(1) to centralize spheres of development; 
(ii) to combat Communism; 
(iii) to exchange information on Europeans; 
(iv) to provide adequate measures of defence 
against an aggressor; 3 and 
1. Ibid., Vol. 71, Col. 4221 (13/4/50) 
2. Ibid., Vol. 84 1 Col. 2163 (16/3/1954) 
3. This reflects the realization of the significance of the 
non-inclusion of South Africa in NATO. (c.f. Vol. 82, 
Col. 2172, 24/8/53). In Vol. 88, Col. 4049 (18/4/1955) 
Mr. Tighy advocates a common defence policy for all 
Europeans in Africa ... "One for all, all for one." 
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(v) to stimulate trade and industry. 
It may be assumed from the ensuing discussion that both sides 
of the House envisaged this organization as being comprised 
exclusively of the colonial Powers and South Africa 1  and it 
is but another example of the differing policies of those 
people who actually lived in Africa and those who were 
geographically, if not politically, remote. From the 
earliest Nationalist proposal for a pan-African alliance, the 
whole concept had been inimical to the emerging political 
pattern of Africa yet, even as late as 1956, the South 
Africans had certainly not abandoned hope on this issue. 
Official renunciation did not come until a few weeks before 
the Suez crisis2  . 
1. Probably with headquarters in South Africa. Ibid., Vol. 
85, col. 4385 (3/5/1954) 
2. Ironically, the Suez crisis which so gravely disrupted 
Commonwealth relations in 1956, evoked no heated response 
in South Africa, the Opposition maintaining that Nasser 
had taken upon himself the role of the leader of the 
movement "to win Africa for the Africans" in order to 
drive the Europeans from Africa. Eayrs maintains that 
if the Asian members of the Commonwealth had left as 
they had threatened, this would have suited South 
Africa admirably. c.f. Eayrs James, The Commonwealth 
and Suez, Oxford University Press, London 1964, pp. 395-6. 
See also South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 93, Col. 54 (22/1/1957). 
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The statement by the Minister for External Affairs was 
cited in Parliament : "Circumstances are not favourable, but 
all my plans have been shelved and I blame the British 
Government. 	It would appear that Suez subsequently 
dispelled any lingering tendency for Britain (or France) 
to remain in Africa and that the only pan-African charter 
would be solely for members of a predominantly Black Africa. 
As the policies of the colonial Powers became increasingly 
orientated to withdrawal, Afro-Asian interest and solidarity 
had become more pronounced. The Bandung Conference (1955) 
highlighted, at least for South Africa, the need for White 
solidarity not only in Africa but in the whole ambit of 
international affairs. 	The Conference was seen as the 
forerunner of a direct East-West confrontation to which "the 
European World cannot remain indifferent." 2 	The concern 
with the more general ramifications of the Conference tended to 
obscure the great divisions already discernible within the 
Afro-Asian group. 3 	Its prominence in the U.N., an organisation 
1. Ibid., vol. 93, col. 582 - duPlessis quotes statement of 
Minister for External Affairs - dated (14/8/56) - (4/2/57) 
2. Ibid., vol. 88, coil. 4112 and 5129. (19/4/1955) and (5/5/1955) 
3. See for example, Jansen, G.}., Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment,  
Faber and Faber, London, 1966, especially chapters 5, 
"The Afro-Asian Group in the United Nations", and 10, 
"The Waxing and Waning of the Bandung Myth - 1955-1960." 
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traditionally hostile to apartheid, added new dimensions to both 
the Union's sense of political isolation and direct confrontation 
by an increasing number of foes. It was forcefully argued by 
Dr. Friedmann that the Western Powers would "certainly not 
lift a finger to preserve South Africa as the last stronghold 
of White baasskap." 1 
The publication of the Freedom Charter 2 in the same year 
as The Conference in Bandung gave added intensity to the 
programme of instituting new defence measures for internal 
security, as Members pondered on the fact that new Black 
Governments would involve new Black armies on the continent 3 . 
A sense of urgency was now discernible in the field of 
propaganda warfare, with the Minister of External Affairs 
announcing a re-organisation of the Africa section of his 
Department, and at the same time claiming that his Department 
was not averse to making contact with the non-White self-
governing states in Africak . 
1. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 88, Col. 
4114 (19/4/1955) 
2. evil; pp - 295-96 - The Spark Ghana (February 15th 1963) (The Conference) - "authentic expression of the new 
African confidence". 
3. S.A. House of Assembly Debs. op.cit. Vol. 90, Col. 165, 
Vol. 91, Col. 4097 - (19/1/56), (2/4/56). 
4. This Announcement appeared in Die Burger, 31/12/55. 
- 124 - 
More pleas for a united Parliamentary front in external 
affairs were also followed by the expression of hope by the 
Minister that, on the basis of mutual acknowledgment of each 
other's right to exist, South Africa and the new states 
might co-operate against the common enemy - Communism'. 
This theoretical "co-operation" was, of course, 
impracticable, largely because the problem of effecting the 
exchange of diplomats remained a disproportionately strong 
barrier to South Africa's free movement in African politics; 
for, while the Government remained unable (Or unwilling) to 
yield to pleas for greater co-operation between the races 
within South Africa, it could not resolve its dilemma 
regarding intra-Africa co-operation. So, while the Government 
persisted in Parliamentary kite-flying about South Africa 
affording the link between the Western Powers and the indigenous 
peoples, south of the Sahara, the Opposition, with corresponding 
persistence (if little effect), demanded to know exactly how 
this might be achieved, particularly with the absence of 
direct contact with states such as Ghana, Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somaliland and Tanganyika 2 . 
1. South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 84, Col. 2163 (16/3/1954). 
2. Ibid., Vol. 97 1 Coll. 2431 and 2483 (18/8/1958) and (19/8/1958) 
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Talking about the desirability of co-operation did 
nothing to allay the general fears in South Africa that 
the colonial revolution would eventually result in the 
cultural extinction of the White South African, who was 
now able to articulate his fears in terms of the emergent 
Black governments and in the increasing effectiveness of 
the A.N.C.'s peaceful demonstrations in South African cities. 
South Africans continued to claim that the world press - 
in a campaign of distortion and inaccuracy, (which matched 
the tenor of the corresponding campaign in the U.N.) was 
proving the greatest barrier in the development of South 
Africa, Africa and the Commonwealth, but even prior to 1950 
it had been clear to many observers both in South Africa and 
outside it, that apartheid, however well it may be justified, 
would become the most divisive force in Commonwealth relations 1 . 
South Africa was forced to take a close view of the 
development of British policy in other parts of Africa. 
Britain's attitude to the Central African Federation caused 
great concern in the Union, which suspected that the British 
were anxious to forestall any closer liaison between South 
Africa and the Federation Europeans. Dr. Hertzog believed 
that the British policy would eventually bring about the end 
c.f. Round Table, Vol. 41, "Dr Malan and the Commonwealth" 
p. 219. 
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of European civilisation in Africa and he was concerned at 
the invidious encroachment of Black power on the continent. 1 
(It is interesting to note that the hitherto exclusive Afrikaner 
nationalism was flexible enough to include the White settlers 
in Rhodesia and the Portugese colonies in Africa, for the 
purposes of some propaganda. This phenomenon was not unmarked 
by antipathetic African nationalists. See The Spark, Dec. 12/62, 
p.4.) Hertzog's fears were shared by many other Members who 
began to question frequently the validity of the Commonwealth 
connection on grounds other than those based on republicanism 2  . 
As Mr. Abraham put it : "I trust that if that day comes, when 
in the Commonwealth of Nations, non-European states will be 
allowed to be on an equal footing with the European states of 
the Commonwealth, to such an extent that they will have a majority 
vote in the councils of the Commonwealth, the hour will have 
struck for South Africa to get out of the Commonwealth.° 
1. The time-lag in the appreciation of the development of the 
Africans is made obvious in many relatively trivial 
statements in the House. E.g. a typical example of this may 
be found in the reaction to this statement made by a Member 
of the House of Commons and quoted in the South African 
Parliament : "I look forward to the day when we will have in 
this future imperial army, Native officers and European 
sergeant-majors." S.A. House of Assembly Debs. op. cit., 
Vol. 85, Co].. 4428 (3/5/54T- 
2. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 4431 (3/5/54) 
3. Ibid. Vol. 85, Col. 4465 (3/5/54) South Africa's exclusion 
from various defence pacts such as NATO, had lent a certain 
amount of attractiveness to membership of the Commonwealth, 
which for purposes of expediency, diverted some of the 
attention from the anathema of the monarchy, c.f. Mansergh, (Survey, Vol. 2,),op.; -cit. p, 362. 
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Mr. duPlessis in July, 1958 quoted Patrick Gordon Walker's 
information regarding the fact that Nigeria, the Gold Coast, 
the Caribbean Federation, Malaya and the Central African 
Federation would soon be applying for membership in the 
Commonwealth, and there seems at this stage to be an 
increasing, if no less-reluctant acceptance that a colour-
dominated Commonwealth was imminent 1 . 	This stimulated the 
Opposition to demand a more intensive incursion into African 
diplomacy2 for South Africans, unlike the colonial Europeans, 
had no other home to which they might retreat, and must 
therefore find a means of co-existing with the "new" Africa 3  . 
Opposition Members were well aware that almost every nationalist 
leader in Black Africa, from Nkrumah to Nyerere, had made 
vociferous and consistent denunciations of apartheid. While 
the development of British policy in Africa had shown the 
pressure of demand and response in the creation of a new 
liberalism towards African demands, there was no liberalism 
obvious in the reaction of the White South Africans. On the 
contrary, their responses exhibited the tendency towards greater 
repression in their dealings with the nationalists in their own 
country, as more voices were added to those denouncing apartheid. 
1. Ibid. Vol. 97. Coll. 127 and 2361 (10/7/1958) and 18/8/1958) 
2. Ibid. Vol. 97, Col. 2430 (18/8/1958) 
3. Ibid. Vol. 97, Coll. 2431 and 2483 (18/8/1958) and 19/8/1958). 
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The Afro-Asian conferences had already cemented a spirit of 
solidarity among the peoples of Africa. Nkrumah, among others, 
saw apartheid as being detrimental to the Commonwealth's 
continued existence1 and Sekou Tour, with somewhat different 
emphasis, saw apartheid policy as the strengthening force in 
the formulation of resistance and determination in the struggle 
against "shameful racial segregation" 2 . 
The great disparity in the responses of South Africa and 
Britain to the same events in Africa was also mirrored in 
another disparity between the interpretations of the same 
events by South Africa on the one hand, and Black nationalists 
on the other, (particularly in reference to Kenya and 
Central African Federation), 
The year 1958, stands out in the history of the parliamentary 
exposition of the policy of ilpartheid. The Prime Minister 
likened the policy of Separate Development to the development 
of the Commonwealth - the Bantustans corresponding to the 
various nations in the process of the development of self-
government 3  . 	He implied that the Bantustans might develop 
1. Quigg, op. cit., quotes Nkrumah, October 1958, p. 276. 
2. Ibid., p. 318. 
3. S.A. House of Assembly Debs. op. cit. Vol. 98, Coll. 4148 etseq - Speaker, Dr. Verwoerd. In Col. 4157 (18/9/1958) 
"The establishment of the authorities on the basis of his 
(Bantu) background of self-government linked with a 
progressive development in his own areas to the stage of a 
territorial authority is what we can foresee and promote 
today." Cf. Appendix D pp. 3(g-11. 
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as rapidly and as radically as the British colonies had done 
since 19491 . This new interpretation of apartheid should 
have been a major sop to the criticism of the outside world, 
but the economic unfeasibility of the Bantustans tended to 
derogate from any merits of the policy as a whole 2 . The 
world press continued its unsympathetic, or, in fact, hostile 
reaction to the Union's racial policies - causing much obvious 
concern about the economy of South Africa 3 and also 
accelerating the development of Bantu nationalism. 
The Accra Conference gave new impetus to the embryonic 
pan-African spirit and subsequent attacks on South Africa and 
on remaining colonial Powers showed a remarkable hardening 
of approach by the African nationalists. The change in the 
tone of Dr. Hastings Banda's anti-British utterances is noted 
by Griff-Jones as evidence of this tangible hardening : 
Dr. Banda, July 1958 : "I am not anti-European, 
still less am I anti-British." 
Dr. Banda, December 1958 : "In Nyasaland we mean 
to be masters and if that is treasonable make the most of it."4 
Kenneth Kaunda gave added weight to the new "hard-linen nationalism: 
1. Ibid. Vol. 98, col. 4157 (18/9/1958) 
2. Ibid. Vol. 98, Coll. 4177 etseq, and Vol. 99, Coll. 85-7 
(18/9/1958) and (28/1/1959) 
3. Ibid. Vol. 99, Coll. 86 and 1322 (28/1/1959) and (23/2/1959) 
4. Griff-Jones, Britain and Nyasaland, Allen and Unwin,. 
London, 1964, p. 235. 
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"We do not need to find grounds for unity as does the 
multi-racial party. Our unity is already there in the colour 
of our skin and in our common suffering." 1 
The speeches and writing of Azikiwe 2 and Awolowo3 left no doubt 
about Nigeria's attitude to apartheid, and Mboya 4 and 
Kenyatta5 showed that the Commonwealth would soon be no longer 
permitted to classify apartheid as a domestic issue. 
Never before had so many countries stood on the verge of independence 
and, if there were many dissimilar circumstances involved, all 
of them were joined by the strongly emotive ties of Blackness 
and anti-colonialism. What better personification of the 
system of racial exploitation than South Africa? Verwoerd's 
new exposition of apartheid, although in theory and adjustment 
of Sittildoinv ,s old policy of "baasskap" to a recognizable 
adoption of the U.N. Charter principle of "equality of peoples 
great and small",failkti to make any inroad on the mounting 
conviction of coloured people, that the White South Africans 
must be made to accept and acknowledge their pariah status. 
1. Kaunda and Morris, op. cit., p. 93. 
See also Kaunda K., Zambia Shall be Free,Heinemann 
Educational, London, 1962, p. 101, Art."2 (3) and (5) 
2. Tilman R.O. and Cole, Taylor, The Nigerian Political Scene, 
Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1962, p. 115. 
See also Azikiwe, Zik Cambridge University Press, London, 
1961, pp. 154ff. In 1947-8, Zik in many speeches accused 
Britain of "adherence to the antiquated ideas of imperialism 
and the herrenvolk". 
3. Awolowo, Awo, Cambridge University Press, London, 1960, p. 308. 
4. Mboya, T., Freedom and After, Andre Deutsch, London, 1963. 
5. Kenyatta, J., Harambee! Oxford University Press, 1964 
PP. 46-50. 
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Despite the drift and vacillations in the Tory Government's 
African policy, Macmillan, in 1958, while on a Commonwealth Tour, 
extolled the virtues of the new Commonwealth "as a great 
practical working example of inter-racial co-existence." 1 Yet 
Britain herself faced almost insuperable racial problems in 
unravelling the complexities of the Central African Federation. 
It was not until she felt the combined effect of the mounting 
tension in Nyasaland in 1958-59 and the impact of the Devlin 
Report2 that she rejected categorically the possibility of a 
political volte-face in Africa3 . 	The Freedom Charter of 
the regional grouping of PAFMECA (later to become PAFMECSA) 
left no doubt about the concerted African nationalist attitude 
to both the Central African Federation and the racial policies 
of the Union4 . 	Increased propaganda bombardment, including 
high power radio transmitters, caused a great deal of anxiety 
in South Africa5 . 	Members of the Opposition made repeated 
.1111•■•■■• 	 
1. Commonwealth Survey 1958, p. 158 
2. Mansergh, op. cit., (Docs., Vol. 3) pp. 133-140. 
3. Franklin Harry, Unholy Wedlock, Allen and Unwin, London, 
1963, p. 144. See also Ingram, D., Partners in Adventure. 
4. See for example, Cox, Richard, Pan-Africanism in Practice, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1964. 
Included in Appendix D. 
5. S.A. House of Assembly Debs., op. cit. Vol. 97, coll. 2402 
and 2432 etseq. (1 / /195 ) 	-/ 
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pleas that South Africa should not isolate herself from the 
developments in Africa, and emphasised the need to retain 
Commonwealth ties lest she become "a lonely little republic 
in dangerous isolation". 1 Optimism about South Africa's 
role in African affairs was well on the wane by 1958, kept 
alive by half-hearted statements by Government spokesmen. 
Considerable alarm was expressed by the Opposition that the 
Afro-Asian Conference at Cairo had classified apartheid most 
definitely as "colonialism" according to the Conference 
definition, and that this rendered both South Africa and her 
Allies extremely vulnerable to international pressure 2 . 
Apartheid had thus succeeded in antagonising the majority of 
the world's people outside the Union, and within the Union, 
had succeeded in establishing a united Bantu nationalism with 
diminishing inclination to co-operate with the Whites 3 . 
A new tack in the strategy of the Opposition is seen 
in the emergence of a greater emphasis that South Africa's 
domestic policies were inextricably woven into the thread of 
1. Ibid., Vol. 98, Co].. 4135 (De Villiers Graaf) (18/9/1958) 
2. Ibid., Vol. 96, Col. 81 (22/1/1958) 
3. Ibid., Vol. 96, Col. 608, Major van der Byl quoting Professor Pistorius (30/1/1958) 
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African history and could not be disengaged1 , for the Cold 
War was being waged for the "political soul" of the people 
of Africa. Apartheid was described by the Opposition as 
the greatest bar to amicable relations with other states in 
Africa but the persistent administrative difficulties 
involved in the exchange of representatives could not easily 
be resolved2 , despite constant Opposition niggling on this 
point 3 . The Government continued to claim that South African 
participation in bodies such as RAMA and CCTA was far more 
beneficial than diplomatic exchanges4 and that the newly formed 
Africa Institute5 would provide the means for greater under-
standing between South Africa and the rest of the continent. 
1. See for example the speech by Mr. Durrant, S.A. House of 
Assembly tbs. op. cit., Vol. 100, Col. 2932 (20/3/1959) 
"... it is fundamental ... to remember in developing any 
foreign policy, that we cannot legislate in isolation, 
because what we do here within our borders, has 
repercussions in Africa and what happens in Africa is 
bound to have repercussions in the life of our country." 
2. Ibid., Vol. 101, Col. 5465, Mr. Greyling (6/5/1959) 
3. Ibid., Vol. 101, Coll. 5502 and 5510 (11/5/1959) and 
(11/5/1959) 
4. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5536 (19/4/1960). 
These claims were somewhat deflated by Mr. Durrant's 
figure for the annual expenditure - £29,000. 
Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5664 (20/4/1960) 
5. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5537 (19/4/1960). 
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Opposition disillusionment in the years 1958-60 destroyed 
any shred of truth in the Government's assertions that the whole 
Parliament was united in its stand on international affair. 
With the Opposition's lack of commitment to the infallibility 
of apartheid they were more able to acknowledge its importance 
in international affairs. As Mrs. Suzman exclaimed : "I want 
to know what sort of a mad defiance campaign does this country 
think it can carry on against the rest of Africa, against the 
Bast, against the Iron Curtain countries and now even against 
the Western democracies1"1 
The long drawn-out publicity of the South African Treason 
. 	2 Trials was exacerbating the increased tension within the 
Commonwealth regarding the admission of Ghana to the 
Commonwealth. The British Secretary of State for the Colonies 
had announced the desire of the British Government that Ghana 
should achieve her independence within the Commonwealth, 
although it was maintained that this question of full membership 
1. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5680 (20/4/1960) 
2. See an interesting article in Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 1.30011 (1961) "The South African Treason Trial" 
PP. 217-40 (Thomas G. Karis). 
NB. the concern at this time, that the Bantu were so 
sufficiently well-disciplined that for many weeks thousands 
had walked 18 miles each day during the bus boycott. 
S.A. House of Assembly Debs., Vol. 93, Coll. 739 et seq. (6/2/1957) 
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must be answered only by all the members of the Commonwealth 1 . 
The South African Prime Minister persisted in referring to the 
"precipitate action" of granting self-government to the Gold 
Coast, reminding the British that although this was their 
business, it also had grave repercussion in South Africa. 
(Shades of the "wind of change") 2 . 
The admission of Ghana caused a stock-taking of the 
advantages of Commonwealth membership - one member could show his 
lack of apprehension of the climate of hostility engendered by 
apartheid by asserting that South Africa had been a great asset 
to the Commonwealth, for, with its own racial policies, it had 
shown the Commonwealth how it might overcome its own racial 
problems: 3 	The Opposition urged the Prime Minister to attend 
the forthcoming Conference4 because of the increasing tendency 
for the world to isolate South Africa. 	(Even the U.S.A. with 
a quickening interest in Africa had shown no desire to openly 
co-operate with South Africa. 5 
1. Mansergh(Docs., Vol. 30p. 40 and p. 50 (Lord John Hope). 
2. South Africa:, House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 94, Col. 5213 
(2/5/57). 
3. Ibid., Vol. 94, Col. 5265, Mr. Greyling. (2/5/1957) 
4. Ibid., Vol. 94, Col. 5416 (6/5/1957) 
5. Ibid., Vol. 95, Col. 7618 (10/6/1957) - reference to Mr. Nixon's visit to every African state except South 
Africa and the Rhodesias. 
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The observation may be made that, once the South African 
Government had accepted the inevitability of Ghana's membership . 
in the Commonwealth, it embarked on a policy of deliberately 
down-playing its significance. 	In a great show of spirit, 
Mr. Pouch warned Ghana that she was still a back-bencher 
amongst the states of Africa, apparently to quell any incipient 
delusions of grandeur amongst the Bantu in neighbouring 
protectorate51 . On a more official plane, the Government 
chose to send a "public servant" 2 , toGhatials iiaiguration an action 
condemned by the Opposition as flying in Vac; face of the much-
repeated Government claim that South Africa should becomea 
bridge between Africa and the West. 3 
Just how fax come opinion among South African 
Parliamentarians varied from the spirit of Maci'allan's policy 
is reflected in the following extract from a speech by a 
Government camber : "Ue know that these concessions to political 
demands involve the dishing out of political baksheesh to 
power-drunk Blacks."4 On the other hand, it cannot be doubted 
1. ibid. vol. 54, Col. 5463 (6/5/1957) 
2. Mr. Waterson's term - Ibid. Vol. 95, Col. 7618. He comments 
on the fact that the U.S.A. sent Mr. Nixon and the U.K. sent 
a Secretary of State. (10/6/1957). 
3. Waterson again. "... the rest of Africa and the West will 
eventually combine to isolate us." Ibid. Vol. 95, Coll. 7620 and 7664 (10/6/1957) and (10/6/1957) 
4. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 3044 (9/3/1960) 
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that some members of the Opposition were able to view 
external affairs with great elasticity and perhaps more 
realism. 	This extract from Mr. William's speech is typical 
of the views of those South Africans who were not irrevocably 
committed to apartheid; " ... and no matter haw courageous 
and how right you may think you are, if, in the historical 
background you are out of phase with the world, then you are 
in danger." 1 
Increasing hostility towards South Africa as shown by 
British Labour circles, and the obvious lack of an inter-
national means for South Africa to combat hostile propaganda 2 , 
contributed to the growing sense of impotence in the battle 
to defend apartheid. As the independence movements progressed 
to their rapid climax of self-government in the period 1959-60, 
the traditional threads of debate in South Africa tended to 
recur with greater frequency. These may be generally defined 
as follows : 
(1) the concern at the mushrooming of Black states 
all over the continent; 
1. Ibid., Vol. 105, Col. 5640 (20/4/1960) 
2. Ibid., Vol. 99, Col. 85, Vol. 100, Col. 2894 
(28/1/1959) and 20/3/1959). 
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(2)anxiety at tha much-publicized, and perhaps 
over-emphasized Afro-Asian solidarity movements; 1 
(3) the tendency to identify, or confuse African nation-
alism with Communism; 2 
(4) the stress laid on the desirability of becoming 
a republic, in order to substantiate clains to 
being a permanent White community in Africa; 3 
(5) the increasing tendency for erstwhile allies 
to register their disapproval of South Africa 
in the U.N.; 4 and 
(6) the lesson to be learned from the fate of the 
Uhite mn in countries such as Nenya with the 
implication that any concessions to the aantu 
,nould bring about a blood-bath in South Africa. 5 
The intensification of the feeling of hostility from the world 
in general d10 nothing to abate the absolutism of apartheid 
theories. In fact it succeeded in hardening the resolve of 
the Nationalists, ideologically attracted to the path of 
righteousness in the face of overwhelming odds, and 
1. Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2906 (20/3/1959) 
2. Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2922 (20/3/1959) 
a. 	Ibid. Vol. 100, Col. 2901 (20/3/1959) (Dr. Vexwoerd) 
4. Ibid. Vol. 99, Col. 2896 (20/3/1959) and Vol. 101, 
Col. 5519 (11/5/1959) 
5. Ibid. Vol. 101, Col. 5430 (5/5/1955). 
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succeeded in including many hitherto non-Nationalists in the 
development of the "laager mentality". Thus the difference 
between the macrocosmic views of the colonial peoples able 
to return home to Europe, and those of the South Africans - 
a people who, since Smuts, had had no Weltanschauung, but 
who were interested simply in preserving their national 
identity. South Africa's domestic affairs were inter-acting 
with international events over which she had no control and, 
in many ways, the pressures of multi-racialism within the 
country, the threats from other African states, the hostility 
in the U.N. and the wavering sympathy of the Commonwealth, 
fostered the birth of a far wider concept of South African 
nationalism than Afrikanerdom had previously tolerated. 1 
From the viewpoint of a country besieged, South Africa 
saw seventeen new states emerge in 1960 (including Nigeria), 
and Tanganyika and Zanzibar were hovering on the brink of 
. Commonwealth membership2  . The South African Government 
continued with its gloomy prognostications about the future 
of nationalism on the continent, preferring to dwell with 
masochistic interest on the brutalities and excesses in the 
1. In the context of fighting Black domination, the Nationalists 
were able to see a collective fate of European civilisation 
in Rhodesia, Kenya, the Portugese Territories and the Union 
which transcended political barriers. c.f. Ibid. Vol. 85, 
Col. 4528 (4/5/1954), Vol. 88, Col. 4158 (19/4/1955), 
Vol. 91, Col. 4427 (26/4/1956). 
2. Commonwealth  Survey, op. cit., 1960, p. 1208 
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Congo as evidence of their fears. 
Macmillan's much celebrated "wind of change" speech, 1 
was, in a sense, the point of culmination forthe collision forces 
operating between Britain and the Union in the vital issue of 
African policy-making. In many ways, the speech said nothing 
that the British Government had not said many times before 
regarding its attitude to Africa and the Commonwealth. 2 
Its significance lies in the fact that it was unmistakeably 
an ultimatum issued by a British Prime Minister in the South 
African Parliament - complete anathema to the Nationalists 
and psychologically devastating for a people who resented 
British meddling almost as much as they feared the "Black 
Peril". 	Despite this, the immediate reaction amongst the 
White South Africans was not really as marked as the reaction 
among the African nationalists both in South Africa and 
elsewhere, for within a few days the speech had been translated 
and circulated to nationalist cells throughout the country. 
Within six weeks of the speech, the tragedy of Sbarpeville 
exploded on the tense country. A spectacular sequence of 
events focussed the attention of the world on South Africa 
1. Included in Appendix D pp. 3112-17. 
2. It is interesting to note the dia-hard Tory reaction 
to this speech. See for example, Lord Kilmuir, 
Political Adventure, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, IMOMM!■ 0••••• 1962, pp 314-17. 
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for a prolonged length of time 1  . More riots in Johannesburg 
and Langa, followed by the attempt on the life of Dr. Verwoerd, 
ensured that the world's interest was maintained 2  . Tremendous 
revulsion was expressed by many Governments throughout the 
world, some of them entering the circle of critics for the 
first time. With critical observers within the country adding 
to the furore3 , the whole colour problem was laid bare to the 
already sensitive conscience of the Western world and the ever-
ready condemnation of the non-Western nations. Even the most 
fanatical supporter of apartheid could not ignore the fact 
that the world had chosen to interpret Sharpeville 4as dramatic 
proof of the intention of the Government to maintain White 
supremacy in South Africa. It was this sense of the obvious 
permanence of apartheid that succeeded in alienating even 
those countries strugglin3 with multi-racial problems within 
their own borders. 
1. Calvocoressi P., South Africa and World Opinion, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1961, pp 2-8. 
2. See for example, Reeves R.A., Sharpeville,Gollanoz, 
London, 1960 
3. For a detailed summary of events in South Africa 
immediately prior to and following Sharpeville see Sachs, B.S., 
Ana....toi_n eid, Collet's Publishers, London 1965, 
pp. 305 -333. 
4. Reeves op. cit. p. 78. "History, I believe, will recognise that 
Sharpeville marked a watershed in South African affairs. Life 
can never be quite the same again for any racial group in the Union •.." 
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It was in this unprecedented limelight, with so many 
new states at the point of independence /, the fate of the 
Central African Federation in the balance, and the whole 
world aware of the "battle of the minor in Africa, that the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London, primarily to 
discuss the admission of the Republic of Ghana to the 
Commonwealth. 
U.N. precedent had already established, at least for the 
majority of the members of the Commonwealth (as well as all 
the aspiring members), that apartheid was not simply a 
domestic issue, and it was with this in mind with the 
publicity surrounding Sharpeville adding to the indignant 
righteousness of some of the members, that the Commonwealth 
adopted a more uncompromising stand on the question of 
racial policies in the Union. 2 For the first time, the 
Commonwealth acting as a concert of nations made it 
unequivocally cleat to the world that it was an association 
based on the ideal of multi-racialism. It seems almost 
	
1. 	Between 1947 and 1961, the Arab, Asian and African 
States, taken together, increased from 25 to 47 per cent 
of U.N. membership. 
J.D.B., The Politics of the Third World, (RIIA) 
Oxford University Press, London, 1966. 
2. 	It is noted that purists insist that discussion took 
place only after the acquiescence of Mr. Louw. 
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incredible that a South African representative, could, at 
that stage, sincerely believe that he might be able to 
persuade the Commonwealth that apartheid was not without 
some merits in the attempt to solve the tremendous problems 
of South Africa's multi-racial society. South Africa, 
already judged by the U.N., the world press and Afro-Asia, 
must now be judged by the Commonwealth which had hitherto 
upheld as a virtue the fact that it was not a court. 
The 1960 Conference in London showed that there was no 
lingering doubt that South African racial policies were 
inimical to the spirit of the Commonwealth and there seems 
no justification for the claims that the Commonwealth had not 
made its collective will clear on the principle of racial 
equality. The South African Nationalists should not have 
interpreted events in the previous decade in any other way. 
They could not interpret the mood of the Conference in any 
terms of ambiguity. Theijusticeof apartheid was no longer 
relevant in the context of Commonwealth discussions)  
South Africa was faced with the invidious choice that had 
been latent since 1948, either to amend her racial policies 
and thereby destroy the Nationalist conception of South Africa 
1. 	N.B. Ghana's and Malaya's action in boycotting South 
Africa July 29th 1960. See Rubin, Leslie, and 
Pauli Murray, The Constitution and Government of Ghana, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1961, p. 152. 
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as a nation-state, or to maintain apartheid without the 
forum provided by Commonwealth membership and attempt to 
bolster the exclusive nationalism of Afrikanerdom by 
emphasizing the isolation of the nation by universally hostile 
forces. Thus the traditional threat from the Bantu within 
the country had been augmented by the growth of a continent-
wide militance which had become increasingly articulate and 
had reached a position of dominance in the councils of the 
Commonwealth. 
South Africa had become the test case of the sincerity 
of those who expounded a belief in the concept of racial 
equality in a colour-conscious world. 
That Britain remained at least mildly hopeful that 
South Africa might be kept within the Commonwealth was not 
in any sense an equivocation on this issue of multi-racialism, 
but rather a forlorn hope that the South Africans might 
respond to the offer for a compromise in the period before 
the following Conference. 	Macmillan's speech in Oslo in 
June, 1960, adequately summarized Britain's attitude : 
"We must make terms with change, not battle with it uselessly. 
The result of failure in the exciting task ahead in Africa, 
might be that it would become a terrible danger, not only 
to ourselves, but to the whole free world." 
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South Africa's point of reference for "terrible dangers" 
lay much closer to home; her definition of failure in the 
task of Africa was clearly divergent from that of the British 
and her concept of Commonwealth (for long dominated by self-
interest) could no longer embrace the desirability of 
continued membership. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE INDIANS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
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Another complicating factor in South Africa's relations with 
the Commonwealth has been the existence of a large group of Indians 
within the Union. This chapter is concerned only with the South 
African Indians as an out-group impinging on the security of the 
white South Africans, Chapter 7 deals with the international support 
given to the Indians and its bearing on South Africa's decision to 
withdraw. 
Of the five racial groups in South Africa, the Indians are by 
far the most complex in stratification and segmentation l. Numbering 
approximately half a million2 they are divided along religious and 
linguistic lines which are correlated with socio-economic status; 
the most profound cleavage is that between Muslims and Hindus, the 
former being, generally, the wealthier 3 . The religious groups are 
further sub-divided along linguistic lines4, which make inter-group 
contact and inter-marriage difficult and rare. Another divisive 
factor is the distinction between "indentured" and "passenger" Indians - 
the latter considering the former socially inferior. Western criteria 
of status too, are being increasingly applied - education, income and 
occupation are growing in importance as determinants of social group 
membership5 
Unlike the Coloureds, the Indians have a language and a 
religious and cultural difference which accentuate their ethnic 
differences in the South African society. They resist assimilation, 
	AMMINIMINEW 
1, Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op, cit. p. 65. 
2, 3% of the total population of South Africa. 
3. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit. p. 65. 
4. Gujarati or Urdu-Muslims; Tamil, Hindi, Teluga and Gujarati - Hindus. 
5. Van den Berghe (South Africa) op. cit. p. 66. 
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at least to the obvious extent of retaining the Indian languages 1 , 
despite the widespread knowledge of the two official languages 2 . 
The retention of allegiance to two world religions has 
retarded cultural assimilation3 , and despite the almost complete 
acculturation of the younger, professional elite, certain aspects 
of the Indian way of life (cooking, family and kinship structures 
and dress for women) have shown great resistance to change 4. The 
European stereotype of the Indian is based on the small merchant 
class5 , but the majority are unskilled labourers, with a number of 
small traders and a few wealthy property owners and merchants 6 . 
Their unassimilable qualities have largely determined the progress 
of their political development and have caused them to be treated 
as "outlandish" elements by successive South African Governments 7 
which, until 1961, sought to reduce the Indian population to the "lowest 
possible minimum" by a policy of repatriation (regardless of place of 
birth) to India8 . 





2. In 1951, only 21% spoke no European language - 
English - Van den Berghe, op. cit., p. 43. 
3. U.N. Report op. cit., p. 45. 72.7% - Hindus; 4.9% Christians. 
• 4. Van den Berghe, op nit -op p. 44. 
5. Ibid., p. 67. 
6. Legum, op. cit., p. 200. 
7. Kruger D.W., South African Parties and Policies  Bowes & Bowes, London, 1960, p. 407. 
8. Dvorin B.P., Racial Separation in South Africa, 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952, p. 157. 
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This use of the notion of an alternative homeland for Indians l 
has undoubtedly caused the hardening of prejudice against 
Indians since the earliest days of their permanent settlement 
in South Africa. 
Indian settlement in South Africa originated under the 
indenture system for sugar plantation workers, which began in 
1860. A committee inquiring into the possibilities of a 
sugar-cane industry was told in 1852 that it was impossible 
to rely upon the Kaffir-population to supply a permanent and 
effective supply of labour. This could be ensured only by 
the introduction of "foreign free coloured labour" 2. This 
was despite the fact that the Native races then out-numbered 
the Whites by about ten to one3 . When in the 1860's the 
British settlers in Natal began to cultivate sugar, Asians were 
brought in as indentured labour4. Many stayed on after completing 
their indentures as free labourers, small farmers, shopkeepers, 
traders and domestic servants. By 1885, however, the European 
settlers in Nate.] were showing opposition to free Indians 
becoming rivals and competitors in agricultural pursuits5 . 
1. As in the case of the Bnglish-speaking group. 
2. Roskam, K.L., aptartheid and Discrimination, Leyden, A.W. 
Sythoff, Amsterdam, 1960, p. 43. 
3. Roux, op. cit., p. 101. 
4. Marquard t op. cit., p. 85. 
5. Roskam, op. cit., p. 43. 
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This opposition took practical shape in the form of discriminatory 
legislation, which began with the law excluding Indians from 
citizenship rights in the Transvaal in 18851. In 1893 a tax 
was levied on every Indian worker wbo had completed his 
indenture, and on every Indian woman and Child over 16 years 2 
This had the objective of forcing the Indians home and was 
followed, in 1896, by the exclusion of Indians from the 
franchise of Nata13, The British administration under 
in the period following the Boar Wax, did not remove the colour 
bar from the gold-mines in the admission that they could not 
defy popular feelindl• Pass laws were enacted in the Transvaal 
in 1906 and this provoked a protest campaign, led by Gandhi, 
which caused great consternation in the South African Government 5 . 
The Indian Government stopped the recruitment of labour and the 
South African Government took immediate action tc prohibit free 
immigration, in the realization that another complicating factor 
in South Africa's already complex society 6 would be intolerable. 
1. 	Roux, op. cit., p. 102. 
2, 	The annual tax was £3 - equivalent to six months' wages. 
3. Marquaxd, op, cit., p. 86. No Indians have ever been allowed to settle in the Orange Free State. 
4. Hearne, op. cit., p. 29. 
5. Roux, op. cit., p. 104 
6. Marquard, op. cit., p. 86. 
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The "coolie problem" grew after the cessation of 
immigration from India and, by 1924 it was acute, particularly 
in the Transvaal, where property values were lowered by proximity 
to Asian slums. This gave rise to the proposal of a Class 
Areas Bill for the segregation of Asians. This was net by 
furious opposition, but was followed by an even stronger measure 
in 1926 which, in turn, led to the Cape Town Agreement, providing 
assisted repatriation to India and better conditions for those 
who remained 1 
The consistent policies of successive governments in 
South Africa who regarded the Indians as being a foreign element 21 
led to the harshness of the legislation which followed the 
failure of the repatriation scheme. The Smuts Government, 
despite the passive resistance campaigns in Natal, and bitter 
opposition in the U.N., passed the "Pegging Act" in 1946. This 
restricted land purchase by Indians and was the fore-runner to 
the even harsher Group Areas Act of 1950 which was used as a 
lever to encourage Indians to leave the country 3 
1. Van den Berghe, op. cit., p. 32. 	See also Bailey Lord, An African Survey, O.U.P., London 1945 pp. 324-5. 
2. Marquard, op. cit., p. 86. 
3. Legum, op. cit., p, 202 (quoting Professor Pistorius.) Also - U.N. Security Council, Report of the Special 
Committee on the Policies of A theid of the Government 
genocide" (Dr. Dadools term). 
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Their economic position was particularly vulnerable, and 
economic ruin for the whole community was forecast 1. Of 
the total population of Indians in the Transvaal (48,892) 38,367 
were faced with eviction2. Indian traders were faced with the 
complete removal of their custom and were to be forced to trade 
in restricted areas. 
The official attitude of regarding Indians as aliens was 
not reversed until 1961, when they were formally admitted to 
the plans of apartheid3 . A Department of Indian Affairs was 
established4 and Indians were given much the same machinery 
for political expression as the Coloureds. The Indian Council 5 
was to consist eventually of elected representatives with 
legislative and administrative powers in respect of all matters 
directly affecting the Indian community. 	wto would consult 
with the Government and with Ministers on all matters of 
importance to the Indian community such as opportunities for 
employment, industrial development and the development of 
local government 6 
1•1•111•1._, 	110011111•11■••■■••■•■ 
1. Carter, op. cit., p. 365. Leg, op. cit., p. 201. 
2. Roux, op. cit., p. 372. 
3. Van den Berghe, (SouthHAfrina) op. cit., p. 152. 
4. Marquard t op. cit., p. 88 
5. The first meeting was on March, 1964, with 21 222912122 advisers. 
6. Legum, op. cit., p. 201. 
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Although the Indians may be approximated with the Coloureds 
as far as political and economic status are concerned, they are 
differentiated in their social status by the European attitude 
to them. The Indian stereotype is that of a sly, dishonest 
competitor, whose intelligence, greed and high birth-rate pose 
dangerous threats to peace in South Africa 1• The economic 
basis for European prejudice against the Indians holds true in 
the case of the African antipathy for them also 2. This flared 
into open violence in the Durban riots of 1949, which created 
as Indian mistrust of the excesses of African nationalism. The 
Indians, traditionally competitors for the African market, have 
now assumed the position of scapegoat - usually ascribed to the 
Jewish community in some other Western societies 3 . For such a 
long time regarded as unassimilable, they still retain the stigma 
of being a foreign element in South Africa. European hostility 
to them has been increased by India's attitude to South Africa 
in the U.N. 	This has re-inforced charges that the Indians 
have another loyalty to another homeland and as such are 
potentially subversive elements in the Republic 4. 
1. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit., p. 152. 
Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op • cit. p. 211. 
2. Van den Berghe, (South Africa) op. cit., p. 169. 
3. Dvorin, op. cit., p. 158. Carter, op. cit., p. 361. 
4. Ibid., p. 158. 
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How have the Indians responded politically to the long history 
of discrimination and alienation in South Africa? The parent 
body of Indian political associations is the Natal Indian 
Congress, established by Gandhi in 18961. He introduced the 
tactic of passive resistance against the pass laws in the 
Transvaal in the period 1906-14 and gained a measure of relief 
without intrinsically changing the pattern of discrimination. 
In 1920, the South African Indian Congress was established, 
composed of the provincial Indian Congresses of Natal, the Cape 
and the Transvaal. Until 1943, it was controlled by moderates, 
who favoured the gradual development of the Indian community 
towards full citizenship rights and equal economic ogportunity2 
However, the left-wing elements of the Congress had gained ground 
during the thirties3  , and Dr. Dadools joint protest with the 
African and Coloured communities against the "servitude scheme" 
strengthened a hope for the effectiveness of Non-European co-operation. 
1. Morrell, M., Action, Reaction Counteraction, 
1963, p. 5. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Roux, op. cit., p. 330. 
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Their invidious position as scapegoat for both European 
and African economic ills, and the widespread fear that they 
may be replaced by African labour i have held back any firm 
growth of Non-European unity, 2 although Gandhian techniques 
influenced all liberatory movements, at least until the late 
1950*s. It is at the policy-making level that the Indian 
political leaders could influence the Non-European Unity 
Movement, which with African numerical strength3 and Indian 
funds and organization4 could mitigate the mutual distrust 
and obscure the organized separateness of apartheid. The 
"Pegging Act" brought to the forefront the militant intellectuals 
of the Indian Congress and changed the emphasis of the move-
ment to the furtherance of Non-European unity, with the 
objective of gaining political rights for all the coloured 
races of South Africa by means of passive resistance Umpaigns 
I, 	The Indian National Congress has tended towards greater 
co-operation with the A.N.C. - De Beer, op. cit., p. 22. 
Neame, op. cit., p. 96. 
2. Carter, op. cit., p. 365. 
3. 0vorin, op. cit., p. 166. 
4. Carter, op. cit., p. 363. 
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against discriminatory legislation. 1 
This take-over by the militant group precipitated the 
founding of the South African Indian Organization in Natal in 
1947. It differed fundamentally from the Congress in that it 
shared Golding's view on co-operation with the Government. It 
is significant that its leaders are, in general, the better-off 
traders, who have a vested interest in maintaining some aspects 
of the status quo2  • Thus the dilemma faced by all the Non- 
European political organizations - co-operatior or non-co-operation 
with Government. The appeals to India3 have also had an ambi-
valent reaction upon the Indian political movements - they provide 
them with an international forum for voicing demands and 
grievances, but they endorse the charges of disloyalty and political 
treachery laid against them by the Whites. 	Officially 
admitted to the plans of apartheid in 1961, the Indians now 
maintain their official status on a level between Coloureds and 
Bantu, but also retain their "alien" qualities for other South 
Africans who view with concern the economic activities of other 
Indian groups in East Africa. 
1. Harrell, op. cit. , 	 5 esp ,411 
N.B. U.N. S/6073, op. cit., p. 37. "The Indian people had asked for no special privileges and had thrown in their lot 
completely with the other oppressed people in the struggle 
for human rights, for justice and for liberty." 
2. Van den Berghe, (Caneville) op. cit., p. 211. 
3. Carter, op. cit., p. 363. 
CHAPTER 	SEVEN 
INDIA VS. 	SOUTH AFRICA 
The moral massacre, the murder, the rape of religion 
Many were the agonies borne to spawn the child 
That had been kicking the womb 
For a century and a half 	 
The maggoty corpse rotting in the well, the stenching camp, 
The shivering refugee and the violated virgin. 
Death Disease Destruction 
We know that there were no anaesthetics; 
The Caesarean was painful. 
But was that labour worth it after all ? 	 
Ask the starving Kisan, and the struggling baboo in the city office; 
Or question the politician who betrayed them with a kiss. 
The fact, of course, is this : 
In spite of the rickets the teething child shows promise. 
A decade is nothing in the history of a people. 
Let us wait for the morrow. 
Reginald Massey. 
"The Child" 
O'Donnell, op. cit. p. 386. 
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A purely arbitrary distinction may be made between the 
internal manifestations of the "Indian problem" in South 
Africa and its external or international concomitant - the 
problem with India, although South African statesmen have 
found this distinction to be anything but clear-cut, especially 
in the years following World War 11.1 The chief feature of 
the problem with India has been the inter-action of the U.N. 
and the Commonwealth revealing both the confusion arising 
from dual membership and the widely varied approaches and 
attitudes of the respective members. As the South Africa-India 
issue in the U.N. has been dealt with in detail by T.B. Millar 
in The Commonwealth in the U.N. (Sydney University Press, Sydney, 
1967), I have avoided the duplication of most of the details. 
For the purposes of this thesis, general observations may be 
drawn in order to reveal the fact that the intra-Commonwealth 
concern for the racial policies in South Africa, although not 
being displayed openly in Commonwealth proceedings, was 
certainly being developed and perhaps exacerbated in the 
United Nations. The seeds of dissension for South Africa in 
the Commonwealth had been planted early in the U.N. and were to 
be carefully nurtured by a decade of anii-colonialist revolution. 
1. See for example, Smuts, quoted in Louw, E.H., The Case for  
South Africa, Macfadden Books, New York, 1963, p. 23: 
"In South Africa, the Indian problem would never have attained 
its present dimensions, or even reached the U.N., if it had 
not continually been exploited from India, as a political 
weapon and as a means to further India's political aims." 
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As the Afro-Asian group representation increased in the U.N., 
so also did the force and effect of India's campaign against 
South Africa. 
The U.N. proceedings reveal the contrapuntal attitudes 
of South Africa and India towards the functions and the purpose 
of the U.N.: India's generally a-legal outlook 1  clashed with 
South Africa' steadfast concentration on the legality (or 
otherwise) of the issues before the U.N., or on its subsequent 
activities2 . The Indian delegation self-consciously avoided 
every temptation to build the U.N. on legal rather than "moral" 
or idealistic grounds. On the other hand, South African 
delegations persisted in the use of legal arguments in a field 
where sentiment and lofty ideals (or at least lip-service to 
them) were to prevail. 
Another major consideration which must be taken into 
account in a description of the India-South African confrontation 
is the increasing tendency for India to proclaim herself the 
spokesman for the liberated ex-colonies and those countries 
still struggling under the yoke of imperialism, particularly 
in Africa and Asia. 
1. Berkes R.N. and Bedi M.S., The Diplomacy of India, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1958, p. 23. 
2. Mr. Louw in U.N.O. referred to as a "bull in a china shop" - 
Lawrence, South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 68, 
Col. 5677, (12/5/49). 
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This tendency brought the attendant result that South Africa 
was to be closely identified with the colonialist Western 
Powers. As the most blatant "European" exploiter of native 
peoples in Africa, she became the ever-convenient scapegoat 
for the sins of colonialism and imperialism. Her racial 
policies, then, enjoyed the ambivalent position of being a 
source of acrimony for the Afro-Asian nations and a tremendous 
source of embarrassment for the West which was increasingly 
anxious to avoid the interminable charges and confrontations of 
the anti-colonialists. Thus South Africa found herself in 
a cleft stick, particularly as those Western Powers without 
an economic interest in South Africa were tending to show a 
mounting sympathy with the anti-South African bloc. 
The actual campaign "to compel South Africa to submit to 
the pressure of so-called 'world opinion ,1" embodied two major 
tactical approaches. The first was the earlier concern shown 
only for the treatment of Indians in South Africa. This gave 
way to the more general consideration of all the racial policies 
of the Union after the 1948 Election had spot-lighted apartheid 
in South Africa. From the First Session, India raised the issue 
annually, with the South African delegation stubbornly refusing 
to recognise the legality of any discussion of her racial policies, 
claiming that any such discussion contravened Article 2 (7) of the 
Charter for long a matter of grave concern for South Africa. 
1. Louw, E.H., The Case for South Africa Macfadden Books 
New York, 1963, p. 19. 
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The first case submitted by the Indians against South 
Africa, under Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter, was based 
on three main issues : 
(i) That the South African Land Tenure and 
Indian Representation Act of 1946 resulted 
in the complete segregation of the Indians 
in commerce and places of residence. This 
was considered to be a uni-lateral repudiation 
of the Cape Town Agreement 1 , and, therefore, of 
international concern. 
(ii) This same Act was a violation of the U.N. Charter 
provisions concerned with human rights and freedoms 2 . 
(iii) A situation had arisen which was likely to impair 
the friendly relations between India and South 
Africa3 . 
The vexed question of the Cape Town Agreement was doomed to a 
future of repetitious charges and counter-charges. The South 
Africans categorically rejected the treaty status of the 
Agreement, preferring to describe it simply as the formulation 
of "mutually acceptable policies"4 . 
1. see Hailey; -cfp. cit., pp. 324-5. 
2. United Nations Bulletin, 1946, P. 31. The Act was referred 
to by Mrs. Pandit as the "ghetto lam". 
3. Ibid, p. 31. 
4. Louw, op. cit., p. 27. (Australia supported this stand, see 
U.N. Bulletin, 1950, p. 682). 
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Resolution 44 (1) 1 rejected South Africa's application of 
Article 2 (7) of the Charter2 , the interpretation of which 
has been a source of dissension throughout the history of 
the U.N.3 
After only three years of membership in the U.N., South 
Africa was, as early as 1948, showing an almost cynical 
dissillusionment. Ma py South Africans believed that the U.N. 
had developed "into a gigantic grouse against the White world" 4 
and that it had become a major irritant in Native relations 5 in 
South Africa. Very early demands for South Africa's withdrawal 6 
from the U.N. culminated in the "token representation" of 1956-587. 
In the Sessions following 1948, the Indian delegation 
increasingly assetted that some humanitarian questions were of 
interest to all mankind and that apartheid was one such question. 8 
1. On December 12, 1946. (32:15:7) 
2. On August 31, 1948. For a discussion of this rejection see 
South  African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 70, Col. 1290 
(14/2/7)-- 
3. Corresponding dissension has also been raised in the 
Commonwealth since 1950. c.f. Millar, T.E., 
The Commonwealth and the United Nations, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1967, p. 146. 
4. South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 70, Col. 1493 (16/2/1950) 
5. Ibid., Vol. 70, Col. 1494 (16/2/1950) 
6. Ibid., Col. 1493, Vol. 82, Col. 57 (7/7/53) "The U.N. will break down the Commonwealth". (The Prime Minister). 
7. Louw, op. cit., p. 33 (27/11/56). 
8. Millar, op. cit., p. 146. 
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By 1952, the fact, if not the legality l of the annual discussion2 
ofapartheid, had been established. India was now constantly 
seeking justice for the "long-sinned-against millions" 3 , and 
South Africa's stolid assertions that the U.N., by permitting 
interference in South Africa's affairs, was sowing the seeds 
of its own dissolution4 , lacked the emotional attractiveness 
of the Indian claims. 
With the increasing emphasis on "fundamental human rights" 
South Africa's attitude vacillated between the legal-literal 
interpretation that "human rights were left uncertain, vague 
and nebulous concepts in the Charter, and that members could 
not, therefore, be said to have undertaken any obligations in 
respect of them" 5 , and secondly, the rather unconvincing 
ideological stance that differentiation between the races in 
South Africa did not constitute a violation of the human rights 
and fundamental liberties enunciated in the Charter 6 . 
1. At the first Session, both U.K. and the Netherlands had also 
been concerned with : 
(a) "Whether there were international obligations and if so, 
whether they had been violated 
(b) The correct interpretation of Article 2 (7) of the Charter 
U.N. Bulletin, 1946, p. 7. 
2. Excluding only the Fourth Session. 
	
3. 	Berkes and Bedi, op. cit., p. 30. 	Also Nehru's speech says 
much the same though in the context of the Commonwealth. 
Nehru, J. India's Foreign Policy 1940-61, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Delhi 1961, p. 133. 
4. It is interesting to note the change in the 20th Session - 
c.f. Millar p. 141. Also the warning by GAU in 1967 that 
the world must treat the Biafran revolt purely as a domestic 
concern for Nigeria. 
5. 	U.N. Bulletin, Vol. 9 0 (1950) p. 681. 
6. 	Ibid., p. 685. 
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Either claim was too inadequate to prevent the discussion of 
South Africa's policies for the acceptance of "humanity" and "morality" 
in international politics was by far out-weighing the desirability 
of legal considerations, particularly in any instance of White 
domination. The change in approach to the U.N. is revealed 
clearly by the White Commonwealth countries. In the early 
years of the U.N., they had supported South Africa's objections 
to the illegality of discussion of her domestic affairs but, 
by 1953, they had recorded their opposition to any policy of 
racial discrimination and by 1956 only the U.K. and Australia 
were left as embarrassed supporters 1 . 
With the growing consciousness of the potential force of 
Afro-Asian co-operation in the U.N., Western dismay at South 
Africa's intransigence became more justified2 . The Afro-Asian 
Conference in Bandung (1955) showed "special consideration of 
the Union of South Africa and the position of people of Indian 
and Pakistani origin" 3 and incited Nehru to state that 
1. It is difficult to determine how much of the U.K.'s support 
was derived from the embarrassment of repeated references, 
by India, to Lord Salisbury's nineteenth century assurance 
that Indian migrants to South Africa "would be free men in 
all respects, with privileges no whit inferior to those of 
any class of Her Majesty's subjects resident in the 
Colonies, 'See Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 1, (1955) p. 242. 
2. Millar, op. cit., p. 156. 
3. Statement in the Lok Sabha on the Conference (3074/55). 
Nehru, op. cit., p. 275. See also Foreign Affairs Record, 
Vol. 1, p. 218. See also Minister of External Affairs in 
South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 91, Co]. 4402, 
(26/4/1956) "....Bandung Conference shall not be under-
estimated. 
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"there is world-wide opinion today against the Union of South 
Africa" 1 . 
It was ironical that South Africa, with her immovable 
insistence on legalism in the U.N., should see Menon, armed 
with Oppenheimer's definition of Article 2 (7) : 
"The exclusion of the right of 'intervention' on 
the part of the U.N., must be interpreted by 
reference to the accepted technical meaning of the 
term It does not rule out action by way of 
discussion, study, inquiry, recommendation, 
falling short of that type of intervention". 2 
Thus in a sense a coup de grace had been delivered and world 
opinion,of apartheid needed only the impetus of Sharpeville 
for a nuanimous condemnation of South Africa. 
Nehru's campaign in the U.N. throws into relief his 
cautious appraisal of the Commonwealth in the period 1947-61. Because 
of the honoured convention that the internal affairs of member 
countries were sacrosanct in Commonwealth meetings 3  it was obvious 
that India's Commonwealth association could not achieve the 
international forum for expediting the attainment of self-respect 
1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 544. 
2. Quoted in Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 5, 1959, P. 461. 
3. Observed by the Commonwealth with Nehru's concurrence 
in 1951 on the question of Kashmir. 
See Menzies s op. cit. (Afternoon Light) p. 194. 
- 167 - 
for the coloured peoples subordinated by colonialism. From the 
point of decision to remain in the Commonwealth, Nehru appreciated 
that the benefits of Commonwealth membership would be more 
abundant if political dissension was referred to the world 
body and not to the Commonwealth itself. His assurances made 
to the Indian people about retaining Commonwealth membership 
in 1949 abound with phrases concerning both India's historic 
mission1 and the "distasteful" 2 policies of some members of the 
Commonwealth. It is obvious that he meant to reconcile these 
policies and the sense of mission : 
"We stand for the freedom of suppressed nationalities 
and for the ending of racial discrimination. I am 
convinced that the Sovereign Indian Republic, freely 
associating herself with other countries of the 
Commonwealth, will be completely free to follow this 
policy, perhaps in an even greater measure and with 
greater influence than before." 3 . 
1. Nehru - Opening speech at the Asian Conference 1947 - 
"Standing on this watershed which divides two epochs of 
human history we can look back on our long past and look 
forward to the future .... Asia after a long period of 
quiescence has suddenly become important again in world 
affairs." 
Mansergh N. The Commonwealth and the Nations, (R11A) 
Oxford University Press, London, 1948, p. 100. 
2. Nehru. op. cit., p. 133. 
3. Ibid., p. 133 (10/5/49). 
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Re-iterating this theme, he justified his refusal to bring the 
issue of the South African Indians within the ambit of Common-
wealth discussion. This might have meant that the Commonwealth 
would have come to be considered as some kind of superior body, 
"which sometimes acts as a tribunal, or judges, or in a sense 
supervises the activities of its member nations. That would 
certainly have meant a diminution in our independence and 
sovereignty, if we had not accepted that principle. Therefore 
we were not prepared, and we are not prepared to treat the 
Commonwealth as such, or even to bring disputes between 
member-nations of the Commonwealth before the Commonwealth 
body" 1 
This extract raises a number Of interesting questions. 
Were the Indians after independence able to enjoy a greater 
sense of objectivity in their U.M. membership - completely 
free of any direct historical backwash (associated for some 
with Commonwealth membership) with accompanying fears of 
Impaired sovereignty?2 	Was the refusal to see in the 
Commonwealth an avenue for chastising South Africa simply a 
foreshadowing of intensified Indo-Pakistani disputes and 
their potential for disrupting the flow of Commonwealth aid, 
consultation and co-operation? 
1. Ibid., p. 139 (It is interesting to note that R.G. Menzies 
said much the same in the Smuts Memorial Lecture in 1961. 
The context was no longer valid.) 
2. Ibid. p. 158. 
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Was it simply based on the correct appraisal that South Africa 
and the "White lobby" were still the predominant forces in 
the Commonwealth? Whatever the reasons, it is clear that 
India sought the means of retaliation against South Africa in 
the U.N. and not in the Commonwealth. The wider forum and 
the greater support in the U.N., were able to bring about the 
transformation of the Commonwealth so that Nehru's patience 
would not long be tried by "distasteful" policies. By the 
mid-fifties, Nehru was able to predict with some accuracy that 
the nature of the emerging Commonwealth would be such that 
South Africa would either have to conform or to withdraw 1 . 
Mounting pressure on the White Commonwealth members in 
the U.N. 2 and on pro-Commonwealth Indians in the Lok Sabha 
forced the Commonwealth to re-appraise itself as an entity, 
for the forces opposing South Africa were questioning the 
validity of India's claim to speak for dependent peoples 
while she remained associated with South Africa3 . As we 
have seen in other sections in this thesis, the year 1960 
was the flashpoint in the concern for racial problems in 
South Africa. 	The emotional and somewhat over-played 
• 1. Nehru, op. cit., p. 157, Speech in Lok Sabha on 
Citizenship Bill 5/12/55. 
2. Indian  Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 5, (1959) p. 48. 
3. Ibid., Vol 6, (1960), p. 27 (Speech in Lok Sabha). 
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reaction to Sharpeville ensured that any remaining half-hearted 
Western support for South Africa would be dissipated. At 
the U.N. Seminar on Human Rights, 1India lost no opportunity for 
lambasting South Africa for "contravening the human rights and 
human civilization" upheld by the Charter of the U.N. 2 	Thus 
the outspoken attitude of Commonwealth members to South African 
racial policies at the Conference in London 3 (3-13 May, 1960) 
received the endorsement of the international body within a 
few short days. 
Nehru's long campaign had now succeeded in amalgamating 
the Commonwealth and the U.N. in a general disapproval of 
South Africa. 	The U.N. had been instrumental in hastening 
the evolution (perhaps revolution) of the Commonwealth although 
it was unable to change the rigidity of the policies of the 
member it was anxious to castigate and/or reform. 	The 
Commonwealth's virtual ultimatum to South Africa at the 1960 
Conference had the effect of creating an ostensible cohesion 
or unanimity of members in support of the principle of multi-
racialism as the over-riding ideal of membership. 
11•11■11•1=1111■111*, 	 
1. Held in Tokyo, May 16 FF 1960. 
2., Foreign Affairs,Record, Vol. 6, 1960, p. 130 
3. See for example, Canada, House of Representatives Debates, 
Vol. 1 (1960) pP942ff, Vol. III (1960) pp3322-25, Vol IV 
(1960) pp3900ff, the multi-racial nature of the Commonwealth 
was accepted and endorsed. 
Australia. House of Representatives Debates Vol. 27 pp 779-96 and pp 1177-1216. 
4. T.B. Millar, op. cit., suggests that India was more concerned 
with achieving condemnation of South Africa, rather than achieving accommodation with her. p.145. 
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Thus Krishna Menon's statement in the General Assembly of the 
U.N. in the preceding year became applicable to the Commonwealth 
as well "....there is not a country in the world, including 
my awn, where there is not discrimination based on race, caste, 
creed or colour or whatever it may be .... But equally, there 
is not a country in the world except the Union which is not 
trying to get away from it. The difference between the 
apartheidists and the others is that the latter recognize it 
as evil and recognize the error and weakness that is theirs 
in still permitting it." 1 
International disparagement and ostracism for South 
Africa had been achieved in a revolution in the Commonwealth 
in less than a decade and one-half.But how little was achieved 
in either ameliorating the general rigidity of apartheid or 
in dissipating gravely cynical attitude of South Africans to 
the lofty ideals mouthed so glibly in the U.N. It is no 
wonder that the South Africans, especially the Afrikaners, 
tended to consolidate in the face of the campaign led by India. 
1. V.R. Krishna Menon's statement in the General Assembly 
of the U.N. (5/11/59) Foreign Affairs Record, 6'6 ) -12sp 461ff. 
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Again one must question the efficacy of the idea of using 
international isolation as a punitive measure. In terms 
of the improvement of material and political well-being of 
the IndiansI or, for that matter, any of the non-White groups 
in South Africa, the U.N. - Commonwealth campaign achieved 
nothing. Conversely, one must consider how much it succeeded 
in destroying the liberal forces at work in South Africa, and 
in contributing to the "lager mentality" and intransigence 
of the pariah. 
1. Ironically, in 1961 the Indians in South Africa were 
officially admitted to the plans of apartheid. 
CHAPTER 	BIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
"The silence of the winter night was broken in the early 
hours of this morning in cities, dorps and country places 
of South Africa, by the officially joyful ringing of bells. 
They are tolling in the hearts of all true lovers of the Union. 
Never has a republic been born under a less auspicious star. 
The South African Government leaves the Commonwealth, having 
already, thanks to those who have held power for the last 
thirteen years, lost the friendship and respect not only of 
British countries but of the world. The only questions being 
asked outside the Union now are how long will this racial 
tyranny last and how, if at all, can the transition to a 
happier, more just and stable state be made without bloodshed..." 
The Times, 31/5/61, Editorial' 
1. Evans Lloyd and Pledger Philip, Contemporary Sources and 
Opinions in Modern British History (Vol, II) Cheshire, 
Melbourne, 1967, p. 249. 
"So has our Republic come. Come from our God. Our altar 
was our bulwark. Our belief our shield. Our history was 
our conscience. Had it depended only on the ingenuity of 
our people, then would the ship of our people have sunk in 
the stormy waters of the Referendum on Wednesday, 5 October 
1960. But the boat has arrived safely. Arrived with its 
crews Just as the Ask of Noah arrived on the mountain top. 
The sun-tinted mountain top of our people's dream of freedom. 
Of this memorable occasion of the beginning of the Republic, 
David writes this very afternoon : 'The net has been broken 
and we have become free.' " 
Dr. G.J.J. Boshoff on the occasion of 
Republikeinse Dankfees, October 15, 1960.1 
1. Cited in Vatcher, op. cit., p. 172. 
- 176 - 
When reviewing and evaluating the various pressures 
operating on South Africa in the context of Commonwealth 
relations, three major issues arise : (i) multi-racialism; 
(ii) Afrikaner republicanism; and (iii) the significance of 
the enforced withdrawal - each of them playing a significant 
part in the formulation of South Africa's decision to withdraw. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the Commonwealth's criticism 
of South Africa was based on the apartheid policy, the most 
fundamental question seems to be whether the Commonwealth had a 
clearly articulated racial policy which enshrined opposite 
concepts to those underlying apartheid. If the answer to this 
question is positive, then Dr. Verwoerd should have been far 
less sanguine about the "formality of the acceptance" of South 
Africa's application for renewed membership following her change 
in constitutional status. 1 	It cannot be proved that the 
South African electorate fully appreciated (or had been 
encouraged to appreciate) the fact that multi-racialism had 
indeed become the driving force of the Commonwealth Association. 
Had the electorate shown awareness of this fact, then the 
collision between South Africa and the Commonwealth may well 
1. 	South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 104, 
Col. 3779 (21/3/60). 
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have been temporarily postponed. 	If, as the evidence 
suggests, 2 the Commonwealth Conference in 1960 emphasized the 
multi-racial spirit of the Commonwealth to Mr. Louw, then 
Dr. Verwoerd must be credited with having forced the issue 
of the republic to expedite the end of South Africa's involve-
ment in the Commonwealth : it must be remembered that this was 
the traditional objective of the National Party. 
Given the fact that the Commonwealth had expressed its 
belief in multi-racialism, a further line of enquiry must 
explore the distinction between the articulation of a policy of 
multi-racial equality and the actual execution of its practical 
applications. If, as it was stated, the most objectionable 
feature of apartheid was its permanence 3 then one must question 
the motives of some of South Africa's most bitter opponents. 
There is considerable evidence of widespread political and 
1. Dr. Verwoerd probably saw little prospect of peace for 
South Africa in the Commonwealth of the future, especially 
with the imminent arrival of more African states. 
cf. Padelford N.J. and Emerson R., Africa and World Order, 
Praeger, New York, 1962. pp. 27ff. 
2. Mansergh (Does. Vol III) op. cit., p. 362. Part of the 
1960 Conference communique reads - "The Ministers emphasized 
that the Commonwealth itself is a multi-racial association 
and expressed the need to ensure good relations between all member states and peoples of the Commonwealth". 
3. Cf. Mansergh (Does. Vol. III) op. cit., p. 373. 
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social discrimination in other Commonwealth countries such as 
Ghana1 and Ceylon, 2 to say nothing of the actual plight of 
India's untouchables. 3 Perhaps the greatest negation of the 
contention that it was the permanency of apartheid which 
alienated the Commonwealth, is the existence of the Malay-
Chinese "compromise" in Malaya. The "special position" 
privileges of the Malays, written into the Constitution, may 
not have introduced any precedent4 in Malaya, but they bear 
a marked resemblance in type to the "special privileges" 
enjoyed by the White South Africans . 5 Tunku Abdul Rahman's 
comment after the 1961 Conference : "It is a good thing that 
South Africa has left the Commonwealth of Iler cwn accord. 
With apartheid out of the way, the Commonwealth can now become 
1. Cf. Jahoda G., White Men, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1964. 
2. On the treatment of Tamils in Ceylon see Ingram (Commonwealth 
for a Colour Blind World) op it c__., p. 52. 
3, See for example, Mackenzie N., A Guide to the Social Sciences, 
Weidenfe1d and Nicolson, London, 1966. Chapter 3, 
"Social Anthropology" pp. 55-76 (F.G. Bailey) 
4. Mansergh, (Docs. Vol. III) pp. 206 ff. 
5. Ibid. p. 206. 
- 179 - 
a living force1" seems, at best, incongruau; at worst, 
hypocritical. 	Malaya's racial compromise appears to be 
as permanent as apartheid, even if one somewhat purblindly 
ignores (as did the Commonwealth) the South Africans' 
insistence on "separate development" which would lead 
eventually to a Commonwealth of South Africa. 2 	In this 
sense apartheid (at least in the sense of a policy of baaskaap) 
was certainly not permanent. One is led to the conclusion 
that there was a wide disparity between the exposition of the 
concept of multi-racialism and the execution of the implicit 
practical policies, and that there must have been a great deal 
of tongue-in-cheek speech-making on the theory of "unanimously 
accepted multi-racial Commonwealth". 
A closer analysis of the motives of South Africa's Asian 
and African opponents must necessarily appraise the effect of 
anti-imperialism and anti-whitism as self-consciously aggressive 
phenomena of Afro-Asian nationalisms at a time when imperialism 
and white supremacism were very much on the defensive. The 
1961 Conference took place within 15 months of Sharpeville 
1. Speech delivered 16/3/61 - cited in Commonwealth Survey, 
11620 P. 364. 
2. See for example Verwoerd's letter to Menzies 24/8/60 - 
Menzies (Afternoon Light) p. 202-3. 
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and immediately following the attainment of independence by 
seventeen African states, 1 all of them to some extent influenced 
by negritude and anti-whitism. It might well be argued that 
South Africa's racial policies put her beyond the pale, simply 
because they provided a most blatant example of European exploit- 
ation of coloured peoples. That the great pressure from countries 
not innocent of racial discrimination was strong enough to obscure 
or suppress South Africa's counter-charges, is, in effect, a fair 
indication of the apologetic posture of those suffering from 
"white guilt". 




ADMINISTERED BY STAT E DATE OF INDEPENDENCE 
Cameroun 1/1/60 20/9/60 France (U.N.) 
C A F 13/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Chad 11/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Congo 30/6/60 20/9/60 Belgium 
Congo 15/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Dahomey 1/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Gabon 17/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Ivory Coast 7/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Malagasay Republic 26/6/60 20/9/60 France 
Reniblic of Mali 20/6/60 28/9/60 France 
Mauritania 28/11/60 Olt 	 WA France 
Niger 3/8/60 20/9/60 France 
Nigeria 1/10/60 7/10/60 U.K. 
Senegal 20/6/60 28/9/60 France 
Somali 1/7/60 20/9/60 U.K. & Italy (U.N.) 
Togo 27/4/60 20/9/60 France (U.N.) 
Upper Volta 5/8/60 20/9/60 France 
- 181- 
The Afro-Asian pressure succeeded in destroying a cherished 
convention of the Commonwealth - that Conferences might not 
discuss the internal affairs of a member - and this reflects 
the influence of the U.N. on Commonwealth Affairs. The U.N. 
had long considered discussion of South Africa's racial policies 
as a "hardy perennial," despite Article 2 (7) 1 of the Charter. 
That this U.N. precedent was observed at the 1960 Commonwealth 
Conference (albeit with the token "acceptance" of Mr. Louw) 
adumbrated a new procedure for future Commonwealth meetings. 2 
The insistence that everyone pay lip-service to multi-racialism 
had so far transformed traditional proceedings in the Commonwealth 
that it was obvious that there would probably be future forays 
into domestic affairs. The Commonwealth was forced to face the 
fact that the old criteria of membership had been rendered 
obsolete by the spirit of multi-racialism, or perhaps more 
cynically, the verbal support of the concept. 
1. See Appendix "DP pp, 266- 68. 
2. N. B. Menzies's concern that this might happen : Australia, 
House of Assembly Debates, Vol. g/R 26, April 1960, pp. 639ff. 
"We may well find that, the door having been opened 
somebody will be willing to assert sometime or other in the 
same circumstances that we, in relation either to our own 
internal population or to the population of our Territories, 
are also subject to international condemnation and inter-
national jurisdiction." 
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So far, we have been concerned with the withdrawal as 
if it were solely a product of external pressure upon South 
Africa. A second consideration must be made that the decision 
to withdraw may have been inevitable in the more restricted 
context of Afrikaner - British relationships. It may be 
convincingly argued that the antipathy of the Afrikaner towards 
the British provided cogent enough reasons for withdrawal and 
that the external pressure may have been only marginally 
influential. The psychological forces at work in the ideolo-
gical basis of Afrikaner nationalism, when considered with the 
specific causes of collision, - the vexed question of the 
Protectorates, the Indian problem, representation of the Coloureds 
and, more recently, the ever-widening gap between the respective 
responses of the British and Afrikaners to the claims of African 
nationalists - were formidable barriers to an indefinite con-
tinuation of a political association in the form of the 
Commonwealth. The ethos of Afrikaner nationalism, centring 
around a people besieged, must have been an important factor 
in the making of Verwoerd's decision. 
The final issue raised by the study of the withdrawal is 
concerned with the use of ostracism as a punitive measure in 
the conduct of international affairs. There are two factors 
which arise in the context of South Africa and the Commonwealth. 
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The first is to consider the attitudes of those who sought 
to apply enforced isolation, ' the second is to review its 
effect upon South Africa. 
The immediate Commonwealth reaction to withdrawal was 
to express the belief that South Africa's departure would 
have a cathartic effect on the Commonwealth and would remove 
any lingering traces of overt or implied racial inequality 
(or more accurately, white supremacy). 2 	In one sense, 
this was an end in itself. South Africa's departure gave 
ample publicity to a moral victory of the coloured world 
over a European nation - and with the acquiescence of other 
Europeans.3 In another sense, the treatment meted out to 
1. For a brief resume of the reactions of Commonwealth 
leaders, see Commonwealth Survey  (1961) p. 364. For a more detailed information see Mansergh (Docs.Vol III) 
op. cit. pp. 365-400. 
2. The Spark (Ghana) 19/2/65 "We were in the forefront in 
making sure that it (the Commonwealth) was cleansed of 
the presence of the South African Government, and if it 
had not been for our determination, then no doubt South 
Africa would still be a member." 
See also Ngubane op. cit., p. 239 "Her virtual expulsion 
from the Commonwealth indicates that even within this 
family of nations which still has its Mating Hills and 
Naga problems, race oppression is strongly disapproved." 
3. Padelford and Emerson, op. cit., p. 29 "A consensus was reached in accordance with the way the minds were blowing." 
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South Africa would provide an object lesson to other potential 
transgressors - Australia in Papua-New Guinea, Australia and 
Canada in their immigration policies and Britain in her handling 
of the Rhodesian crisis. 1 	In other words, the Commonwealth 
had become a court, able to pronounce judgment on the domestic 
affairs of its members - in the interests of "racial equality." 2 
The ambivalent reactions of the British and the Australian 
Governments to the decision to withdraw shows their respective 
awareness of the dangerous new precedent, Australia, in 
particular, being uncomfortably conscious of the vulnerability 
•of the "White Australia" policies. The British seem to have 
been more concerned with preserving the best of two worlds, of 
retaining both their key position in a multi-racial association 
and the profitable economic relationship with South Africa. 
South Africa's withdrawal, then, from the British point of view, 
1. Mboya op. cit., p. 245. In the light of the "new" Commonwealth's determination 
to achieve complete racial justice in the context of its 
definition, the 1964 edition of the Commonwealth Relations 
List carries a somewhat vague and perhaps vain assertion : 
"There is no legal or formal obstacle to any member 
pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to that of any 
other member. 
Cf. Iarkman W.P. Unscrambling an Empire, Chatto and 
Windus, London 1966, p. 181. 
2. Balewa, Nigeria Speaks : The Speeches of Sir Abu Bakar  
Wawa Balewa, p. 91. "There is no question of such an 
action being interference in the internal affairs of 
another country - the policies at present being followed 
by the Government of South Africa constitute a threat 
to the peace of the world." 
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may be seen as a compromise : the gesture was made, the 
Commonwealth asserted the majority will and the coloured 
members were publicly appeased. 	On the other hand, South 
Africa's Commonwealth association had been for many years, 
largely a bi-lateral association anyway, and it seems clear 
that Britain had no intention of changing the essence of 
this, despite warnings from the Commonwealth that she must 
curtail her economic involvement with South Africa} (British 
investment has shown a steady annual increase, notwithstanding 
persistent threats of "imminent" revolution in South Africa. 2 
1, Cf. Kenyatta J., Harambee: : The Prime Minister of 
Kenya's Speeches, Oxford University Press, London, 
1964, p. 46. "Another crucial &atter which was 
emphasized by the African leaders 	(at the Commonwealth 
Conference in London, 1964) 004 was that of South 
Africa, We pointed out that some Commonwealth 
countries treated South Africa as though she was 
still a member of the Commonwealth despite her 
continued racial policies. We also called for a 
complete ban on the supply of arms, compliance with 
the U.N. resolution and application of economic 
sanctions," 
See also Burke Fred, Africa's Quest for Order, 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1965, p. 135 cites a 
similar warning given by Mboya in 1961. 
2. By 1963-4, South Africa provided a larger market 
for British exports than the combined Commonwealth countries 
rof ,,Serica- Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Kenya. (4225 million• compared with 
£175 million.) 
Cf. Austin, op. cit., p.39. South Africa takes 
5% of total British exports per annum, 
Cf. Ibid. p. 18. 
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What appears (to the "new Commonwealth") to be British 
cynicism in the question of trade nay, in fact, have been 
born of an enlightened evaluation of the inadequacy of 
ostracism with its implicit termination of dialogue to improve 
the living conditions of South Africa's non-European population. 
Alternatively, it may have been stimulated by a sincere desire 
to retain a multi-racial Commonwealth (for reasons of prestige, 
sentiment or idealism) while at the same time avoiding any 
major upset to an already precarious trading pattern. 
Appreciation must also be shown for the tremendous com-
plexity of attitudes involved for Britain in vocally subscribing 
to the ideal of multi-racialism and thereby removing one of the 
"old" Dominions from the Commonwealth and, at the same time, 
as the previous imperial mistress, being aware of the dragooning 
and bullying by states new to parliamentary democracy and 
international diplomacy. There is little wonder that to some 
die-hard imperialists in Britain the Commonwealth had assumed 
Frankenstein qualities. The Commonwealth as a whole had not 
remained universally faithful to either parliamentary democracy 
or independence of the judiciary, to name but two of the 
previously accepted tenets of membership, and it was clear that 
cohesion of interests and ideals would continue to wane as 
membership increased. In terms of national self-interest, 
Britain had very little choice (or, inclination perhaps) but to 
continue to enjoy the more tangible benefits of a bi-lateral 
economic association. 
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The African members of the Commonwealth have not been 
tardy in noting the fact that South Africa-British relations 
have not been transformed. 	Consequently, South Africa has 
remained, to some extent a Commonwealth problem. The Common-
wealth seems unable to force Britain to jeopardize her own 
economic positionl for the sake of an ideal, supported by 
questionable sincerity2. Britain's acquiescence in the en-
forced withdrawal may well have derived from the demand that 
justice must appear to be done. 
The final aspect from which to review the withdrawal is 
from its effect upon South Africa. Ironically, perhaps the 
most marked effect has been the closer social and political 
cohesion of White South Africans. They have tended to consol- 
idate against the hostility of the world. The English-speaking 
element has shown a more marked acceptance of the Afrikaner 
identification of "nation" with "state", as the exigencies of 
perpetuating White survival have militated against the historic 
factionalism of the European South Africa. 
1. The notable exception to this has been the arms embargo 
imposed by Britain upon South Africa and confirmed in 
December 1967, despite the great loss to British industry 
and export trade. 
2. Segal R. Sanctions Against South Africa, Penguin, HarmondswcaT7-174, includes an interesting collection 
of articles on sanctions against South Africa. 
- 188 - 
The results of the 1961 election l (Nationalists 53.5g of the 
popular vote) and the 1966 election 2 (58.52%) have demonstrated 
the willingness of a greater proportion of the population to 
throw in their lot with the Nationalists, who at least provide 
a coherent opposition to international hostility. The 
Nationalists' gesture of appointing two English-speaking 
ministers to the 1961 Cabinet is symptomatic of increasing 
goodwill on both sides. 
Another marked effect of withdrawal has been the increased 
spending on the para-military defence force, so that South 
Africa now boasts one of the best-equipped defence potentials 
on the continent. 3 
1. For an interesting analysis of this election see Political 
Science Quarterly (Vol. LXXV111 -1963) "The South African 
General Election of 1961" pp 86ff. - Newell M. Stultz and Jeffrey Butler. 
2. The Nationalists increased their seats from 102 to 126 
in this election. They received 758,345 votes - all other Opposition received 537,415. 
Cf. Africa Report (May 1966) "South Africa's Partition 
Election" p. 26 - Dennis Worrall. 
3. Since Sharpeville, military expenditure alone has 
increased five-fold to £157 million in 1965 (20% of 
the country's budget) The Observer, London, 
September 11, 1966. See also an article "Where 
Might is White" in Economist, August 7, 1965 
Supplement "A Survey of Southern Africa" p. vi. 
This defence build-up is seen by The Spark as having 
no other purposes than "to frighten the struggling 
African nationalists" (March 8, 1963). 
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Apartheid legislation has not declined, nor apparently has the 
Nationalist conviction that it will provide a valid and just 
solution to the country's complex racial problems. Conversely, 
the liberal opponents of apartheid have lost most of their 
legitimate channels for dissension, as the Governments' racial 
policy becomes increasingly identified with the only positive 
means of ensuring white survival. The traditional assertion 
by Nationalist leaders, from Hertzog to Verwoerd, that the 
attainment of a republic would result in a greater consolidation 
of White South African nationalism has been vindicated, 
whereas the political plight of the Bantu, Asiatics and 
Coloureds seems no whit improved by South Africa's withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth. 
Verwoerd had made other predictions about the outcome of 
withdrawal, which were perhaps more factual and less intuitive. 
These were largely in the economic sphere, both in the contexts 
of trade with and investment by Britain,' and in South Africa's 
1. Dr. Verwoerd in a speech delivered on 17th March 1961 : 
"Our trade and bilateral agreements need undergo no change. 
They include the maintenance of preferential trading 
agreements, South Africa's membership of the Sterling Area, 
defence agreements, etc. This is a comforting assurance. 
We need each other. With friendship and so many interests 
so intertwined to our mutual benefit this is a wise policy 
and will, I trust - and have reason to believe - become 
wise practice." 
Cited in Legum (Crisis for the West) op. cit. p. 124. 
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domestic development. Although he was well aware that Common-
wealth emotionalism and perhaps idealism over the concept of 
multi-racialism was against South Africa, in the economic sphere 
he could count on the considerable reliability of four signifi-
cant factors which were more relevant to South Africa's pros-
perity than was Commonwealth membership : 
(i) the relative stability of the British market; 
(ii) as well as the stability of gold and woo1, 1 the 
broadening basis of South Africa's economy, 
especially the increasing diversification in 
manufacturing; 2 
(iii)increasing foreign investment, e.g. by B.E.C. 
countries; and 
(iv) increasing South African investment abroad 
particularly in mineral development (e.g. 
Anglo-American (Orporation) 
That his predictions were logically based and accurately 
fulfilled may be seen in the official statistics of the net 
national income, 3 
1. Over 2/3 of the gold imported into Britain in 1963 came 
from South Africa. cf. Austin, op. cit., p. 158. 
2. By 1964, manufacturing was contributing 26% of G.N.P. 
3. Net National Income 
	
1956-57 	1957-58 	1958-59 	1959-60 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 
3471.2 	3574.7 	3713.9 	4034.8 	4617.4 	5070.4 5651.0 
(All in Rand millions) 
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in the geographical dispersion of income l and in the export 







(1966 South African Year Book) 
TOTAL 
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL INCOME 1955-64 
MINING MANUFACTURING TRADE 	OTHER 
1955 461.0 393.0 797.0 478.0 	1248.0 3377.0 
1956 476.0 454.0 864.0 504.0 	1322.0 3620.0 
1957 557.0 5010 9280 534.0 	1439.0 3959.0 
1958 4610 519.0 966.0 556.0 	1530.0 40320 
1959 450.0 557.0 993.0 538.0 	1636.0 4174.0 
1960 491.0 621.0 1058.0 572.0 	1749.0 4491.0 
1961 509.0 656.0 1123.0 593.0 	1831.0 4712.0 
1962  537.0 681.0 1228.0 635.0 	1956.0 5036.0 
1963 568.0 719.0 1399.0 7030 	2093.4 5481.4 
1964 558.9 764.1 1698.2 784.6 	2228.8, 6095.6 
2. 
South African Year Books (1963 p, 316 
(1964 p• 232 (1965 p, 233 
SOUTH AFRICA'S EXPORTS TO U.K. AND U.S.A. 
1959 1960 1961 1962 	1963 1964 
U.K. 219.4 223.1 249.9 241.9 	272.0 3010 
U.S.A. 70.5 54.5 68.4 78.3 	80.5 82.2 
(Al]. in Rand millions 
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Although the Commonwealth had maintained its cohesion 
as an association of nations upholding the principle of multi-
racialism, and in a sense, had achieved a political advantage, 
the South Africans could be pardoned for believing that the loss 
of membership would hold little sting for them. Their post-
withdrawal prosperity seems to bear out the contention that the 
Commonwealth over-estimated the value of isolation (which was 
never complete anyway) as a means of disciplining a member who 
refused either to conform or reform. 
Withdrawal from the Commonwealth as a response to multi-
racialism - and a bi-lateral response at that (both from the South 
African and the new" Commonwealth's respective viewpoints) held 
more vital significance for the Commonwealth for it forced a 
re-assessment of Commonwealth values to replace the old criteria 
of membership. The "re-modelled" association threatened to 
become increasingly irksome to Britain and perhaps the old 
Dominions. South Africa's withdrawal marked with dramatic 
emphasis the end of the White Commonwealth and the shifting of 
the political centre of gravity to the non-White members. 
If we accept two contentions that firstly the isolation 
of South Africa was an imposition by the "new" Commonwealth (and 
not an achievement by the Afrikaners) and secondly, that it was 
not simply an opportunity for re-stating anti-imperialism and anti-
whitism, then its short term effectiveness as a punitive tactic 
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was certainly miscalculated. I 	It solved no problems for 
anyone but White South Africans and created new ones for the 
non-European population in South Africa, for the Commonwealth 
and in the realm of international relations. The Commonwealth 
menace (inasmuch as it provided a venue of coincidence for the 
major traditional threats to Afrikaner nationalism) had been 
sidestepped and the values of Afrikanerdom were retained intact 
by the withdrawal. 	While it cannot be reasonably assumed 
that a Republic of South Africa is any safer in swimming against 
the tide of history, than in fact the Union was, it can be 
assumed that the republicans feel a greater security. They 
have asserted their national distinctiveness, consolidated 
their nation and are continuing to solve the problems of 
multi-racialism in their own way. 
1. Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates  (Fourth Session, Vol. 12, 1/8/63) p. 2430. M. Sule Abba Biu - "We thought that by expelling South Africa from the Commonwealth she would 
change her policy, but it continued and she even became more 
severe on the black people than she did before." 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX nAti  
A NOTE ON THE COLOUREDS. 
Apartheid had the deepest effect on the Coloureds in South 
Africa; a people1 who form a no-man's land in the international 
campaign against the racial policies of South Africa. Their 
significance for this thesis lies in a purely negative phenomenon. 
Of all the racial groups in South Africa, they were the only ones 
who had no international lobby to protect their particular rights. 
The very absence of a champion (outside South Africa) gives added 
weight to the contention that it was the double-barrelled nature 
of the hostile force (Bantu-Africans; Indians - India and English-
speaking group - British) which led to South Africa's withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth. The Coloureds are the descendants of the 
mixed slave population of the early Cape and the remnants of the 
Hottentot people, together with a certain amount of European and 
Bushman blood2 . They have been almost completely acculturated in 
European customs, language and religion3 . The 1946 Census revealed 
that 89.1% of the Coloureds were Afrikaans-speaking and the 1936 
Census showed that 92.196 were Christian4 . 
The geographical distribution of the Coloureds has made 
them elements of importance in some parts of the country 5, with 
1. South Africa Yearbook (1966) p. 17 - 1,509,258. 
2. Report of the U.N. Commission on the Racial Situation in 
the Union of South Africa (Official Records : Eighth 
Session Supplement No. 16) p. 44. 
3. This applies with less accuracy to a distinctive group - 
the Cape Malays - 40,000 who are kept separate by their 
Mohammedan religion. 
- 	.- 4. Report of the U.N. op. cit • 2 n 441
5. Roux, op. cit., p. 354. 
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25% of the total Coloured population living at Cape Town l and 
88% of them in the Cape Province. The general urbanization 
of all population groups in South Africa since the 1920's has been 
reflected in Coloured population patterns also. In 1921, there 
were 45,612 more Coloureds in rural areas than those in towns, but 
by 1960, approximately 2/3 of the total Coloured population were 
urbanized3 . 
Marais divides the development of the Coloureds into three 
clear periods4 : 
(1) from settlement to 1828-38 when they were subjected to 
compulsory labour and acquired the skills and the habit 
of work which enabled them to survive in civilized society; 
(2) 1838-1920's saw a development under the policy of laissez-
faire; and 
(3) the period following the 1920's when the state began the 
process of excluding the Coloureds from occupations they 
would have had under a system of free competition 5 . 
1. Muller Hiluard,  The Role of the Coloured People, University 
Publis-ners and Booksellers, Grahamstown, 1965, p. 9. 
2. Marquard, op. cit., p. 75. 
, 3. Muller, op. cit ., n e 9. 
4. Marais, B., The Cape Coloured People 1652-1937, Witwatersrand 
University Press, Johannesburg, 1962, p. 281. 
5. Marais, op. cit. cites examples : the Apprenticeship Act, 1922; the Industrial Conciliation Act, 1924; the Wage 
Act, 1925-6, p, 262. 
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The earliest official recognition of the political equality 
of the Coloureds and Europeans is seen in the Municipal 
Ordinance of 18361 which provided for the election of Municipal 
Boards. The franchise regulations did not discriminate on the 
grounds of colour. In 1846, the principle of representative 
institutions for the Cape r was accepted by the Colonial Secretary 
on the understanding that there should be no political 
discrimination against the Coloured people 2 . In 1853, the 
Cape Colony obtained representative government, with European, 
Coloured and African males enjoying the franchise within the 
same property qualifications 3  , and sharing a common roll of 
voters. Nevertheless, the Coloureds did not play a significant 
role in the Cape Parliament, no Coloured man nominating for 
election to Parliament. This was in a sense a measure of their 
political contentment in accepting the European monopoly, for 
it does not appear that the Coloured people felt the racial 
cleavage in political matters, until the second decade of the 
twentieth century. On the other hand, the Europeans of the 
Cape Colony appear to have adjusted to the economic and 
political relationships existing between themselves and the 
Coloureds. 
1. Thompson L.M., The Cape Coloured Franchise, South African 
Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1949, p. 4. 
2. Ibid., p. 5. 
3. Marquard t op. cit., p. 80. 
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The Coloureds have now and then been offered assimilation 
with the Whites, and in the early 'twenties, the Nationalists 
made assimilation a definite plank in the party platform, until 
they gained power in 19241 . Hertzog believed that as the 
Coloureds were descendants of Europeans there were no just 
grounds for separating them on political, economic and industrial 
. 	2 lines . However, the European attitude to them became 
increasingly ambivalent in this period and legislative measures 
began whittling away at their political status. 
The Hertzog Government in 1930, enfranchised European 
women and in the following year, voting qualifications were 
•abolisheeL for European males, but were retained for Africans 
and Coloureds - further weighting the scales in favour of the 
Europeans3 . Prior to 1930, the Coloured vote in the Cape was 
important in several constituencies4 , with Coloured men being 
consistently returned to the Cape Provincial Council 5 . The 
final blow aimed at reducing the political status of the 
Coloureds was delivered in 1951 by the introduction of 
1. Roux, op. cit., p. 355. Even in 1928 Malan referred to the possibility of giving the vote to Coloured women. 2. Resistance to Folly (United Party Pamphlet) p. 4. 
Thompson, op. cit. p. 21. 
3. Maxquard, op. cit., p. 80. 
4. Over 25% of the total number of registered voters in 
Cape Flats were Coloured. 	20-25% in Paarl and Woodstock 
5. Roux, op. cit., p. 356. 
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legislation to place the Coloureds on a separate roll. 
The Separate Representation of Voters' Act became law in 
1956, after a constitutional crisis i, and limited the 
Coloureds to no participation in the general elections and 
to the election of four members in the Cape constituencies. 
The social development of the Coloureds in the nineteenth 
century, was marked by a laissez-faire attitude which allowed 
the Coloureds to "cluster" in the poorer parts of towns, or in 
the municipal locations which were established on the outskirts 
of the towns and villages. A survey by the Tuberculosis 
Commission in 1914, revealed the appalling lack of sanitation 
and the sub-standard houses. The influenza epidemic in 1918, 
momentarily stirred the conscience of European South Africa 2 
and initiated the Public Health Act in 1919, which empowered 
the Central Government to compel Municipal Councils to report 
on crowded conditions and insufficient housing. This seems 
to have achieved little improvement, for the Report of the Cape 
Coloured Commission (1934-7) showed that tuberculosis was still 
4-6 times more prevalent among Coloureds than among Europeans 3 . 
1. Mansergh N., Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 
1952-62, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 306. 
2. Marais, op. cit. p. 257. 
3. Marais, op. cit., p. 259 
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Nevertheless, some Coloureds and Europeans shared the same 
residential areas until 1950, when the Group Areas Act was 
passed. By 1961, the group areas already proclaimed, made 
it clear that tens of thousands of Coloureds and Indians would 
have to leave their areas l . 
The Coloured community in general has been retarded by 
inadequate housing and clothing, inferior schooling 2 and 
prevalent drunkenness - the latter being commonly ascribed to the 
"tot system" entrenched on farms employing Coloured labour 3 . 
The chief avenues of employment have been in the building and 
printing trades, and as factory operatives, domestic servants, 
shop assistants and postmen. They have faced increasing 
competition from Bantu labour in the Cape Province 4 and since 
the 1920's have suffered from state intervention, mainly in the 
interests of the politically dominant Europeans. 
Coloured male workers receive 1/3 of the earnings of white 
workers 5 and this disparity is present in professions as well - 
Coloured school-teachers earn considerably less than their 
European counterparts. They, with other professional Coloureds 
are particularly frustrated by the colour bar and bitterly 
resent their removal from the common voters' roll. They form 
1. Maxquard, op. cit., p. 83. 
2. Marais, op. cit., p. 273. 
3. Marquard, op. cit., p. 84. 
4. Muller, op. cit., p. 10. 
5. Ibid. p. 12. In mining it is only approximately 1/6 of white wage. 
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the potential elite for leading agitation against apartheid, 
because before 1948, they cherished the fact that they were 
administered on the European side of the colour-line. 
The political organizations for voicing Coloured grievances, 
have been divided on the question of the degree of co-operation 
with Europeans 1 . The first political organization of significance, 
was the African Peoples' Organization2 formed at Cape Town in 1902 
and which saw a rapid expansion to over 100 branches by 1907. 
Its direct political influence remained restricted to the area 
of the Cape Province. Its members traditionally voted "British" 
as against "Afrikaner" 3 . The leader of the African Peoples' 
Organization was Dr. Abdurahman, who in 1927, attempted to weld 
together the most influential non-European organizations, but 
his attempt foundered on opposition from a strong section of 
African opinion. 
A more recent and slightly more successful attempt had 
been the Non-European Unity Movement, which secures some support 
from African intellectuals and from the Coloured organizations 
which oppose the Government. 
1. Marquard, op. cit., p. 84. 
2. Originally the African Political Organization. 
3. An exception to this was the Afrikaner Bond which flourished in the period 1920-24. 	(Roux, op. cit., p. 84) 
4. Carter, op. cit., p. 360. 
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Anti-co-operation sentiment is directed specifically 
against the Coloured Advisory Council which was established by 
the Smut's Government in 1943. Many of the educated Coloureds 
feared this as a step to separate them politically and 
administratively from the Europeans and as such would be the 
fore-runner to further discriminatory on racial lines 1. Its 
establishment caused the greatest split among the Coloureds and 
initiated the Anti-Coloured Advisory Council group 2 which 
includes many educated Coloureds who will co-operate only with 
those Europeans who support complete equality 3 . Other leaders 
believe that more benefits lie in co-operation with the Government, 
and they support the Coloured Peoples' National Union which is 
being embarrassed by each extension of apartheid to the Coloureds. 
The significant occasion when divisions of opinion within 
Coloured ranks were blurred in an uneasy alliance, was in the 
agitation over the introduction of the Separate Roll; but this 
was transient. The Coloureds remain the most politically 
1. Horell M., Action, Reaction, Counteraction, South African 
Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1963, 
2. Later changed its name to the Non-European Unity Movement. 
3. Marquard, op. cit., p. 84. 
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divided of all the non-European groups. They belong culturally 
to the Europeans1 , who, in turn, display a variety of attitudes 
to the Coloureds, ranging from sympathy and guilt to the revulsion 
born of the deep-seated fear of miscegenatIon 2  . Many Europeans 
regret the loss of Coloured friendship which may have developed 
as a bridge between White and Black 3 , in a country where race 
relations are the dominant factor in politics. 
The importance of colour as a criterion for deciding 
social status is reflected in the "going-over" of some Coloureds 
to the European side of the colour line. The personal suffering 
involved in the arbitrary definition of Whiteness is seen in the 
division of some families with varying colour shades 4 . Yet it 
cannot be said with certainty that the Coloureds are anti-white 
in their demands for higher living standards - they want the 
benefits inherent in equality of treatment with the Whites. What 
is clear is the possibility that the continual frustration of 
Coloured demands will accelerate the perceptible movement of 
Coloured organizations towards the Left 5 , and intensify unity 
with the more radical objectives and methods of the African 
nationalist groups. 
1. Marais op. cit., p. 283. 
2. MacCrone, op. cit., p. 255. 
3. Resistance to Folly, op. cit., p. 2. 
4. Cope, op. cit., p. 29 
5. Roux, op. cit., p. 359. 
APPENDIX nB" 
CHRONDLOGY OF EVENTS IN AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICA 1948L61 1 
DATE AFRICA SOUTH 	AFRICA 
1948 General election. Dr. Malan and the Nationalists in power. 	Govern- 
ment declares the intention of 
repatriating Indian population. 
1950 Seretse Khama and Tshedeki 
Khama exiled. 
Population Registration Act - com- 
pilation of register according to 
racial groups. 
Group Areas Act. 
Suppression of Communism Act. 
1951 First general election in the 
Gold Coast. 
Nkrumah released from gaol to 
become virtually the first 
African Prime Minister. 
Nigerian constitution with a 
majority of elected Africans 
in legislative and executive 
councils. 
Separate Representation of Voters 
Act (constitutional crisis) 
Amalgamation of National and 
Afrikaner Parties. 
1952 Libya gained independence. 
Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya. 
The Appellate Division of Supreme 
Court declared Separate Represen- 
tation of Voters Act unconstitu- 
tional. 
The High Court of Parliament Act 
gave Parliament the right to 
establish a High Court of Parliament 
with a right of review. 	Parliament 
(sitting as a High Court) over-
ruled the Supreme Court decision of 
March 20th 1952 - reaffirmed 
Separate Representation of Voters 
kTovincial  iEWSupreme Court invalidated the 
High Court of Parliament Act. 	The 
Government appealed unsuccessfully 
(No. 13) to the Appellate Division. 
1. This Chronology owes much to (i) Hatch J., (Africa : Today and Tomorrow) 
op. cit. pp. 314 ff; and (ii) Unesco (South Africa and the Rule of Law) 
op. cit. pp. 15-17. 
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DATE AFRICA SOUTH 	AFRICA 
1953 Federation of Southern Rhodesia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 
Kabaka of Buganda exiled. 
First federal elections in 
C.A•F. 9 
Sir Godfrey Huggins first Prime 
Minister, Sir Roy Welensky 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Bantu Education Act placed all 
Native education under Government 
control. 
General election : Malan's 
Nationalist Party won a majority 
of seats with a minority of votes 
1954 Algerian Revolution began. Lyttelton multi-racial consti- 
tution for Kenya. 
Second general election in the 
Gold Coast; Nkrumah and C P P 
returned. 
Rise of opposition National 
Liberation Movement in the Gold 
Coast. 
Federal fora of Government 
adopted in Nigeria. 
Dr. Malan resigned as Prime 
Minister : succeeded by Mr. 
J.G. Strijdom. 
1955 Kabaka of Buganda returned with a new constitution. 
First ministerial system for 
Uganda. 
Parliament passes a law to increase 
the number of judges on Appellate 
Division from 6 to 11 when sitting 
on constitutional cases. 	Senate 
Act increases the number of 
Senators from 48 to 89. 
1956 Third general election in the Gold Coast. Nkrumah and C P P 
returned again. 
Seretse Khama returned to 
Bechuanaland, 
Togoland votes for incorporation 
in the Gold Coast, 
South Africa Act Amendment Act 
gives force of law to the Separate 
Representation of Voters Act (1951) 
and limits competence of the 
courts to pronounce upon the 
validity of laws passed by 
Parliament. 
1956 Government Commission (Tomlinson) submits plans for large-scale devel-
opment in African reserve areas. 
Nationalist Government eventually 
triumphs in the struggle with the 
Courts. 	The Appellate Division 
(10:1) upholds the South African 
Act Amendment Act and the Senate Act, 
137 South Africans of all races 
arrested on charges of treason. 
More arrests followed. 
December 19th - preliminary hearing. 
Mr. Louw announces South Africa's 
intention to maintain only token 
representation in the U.N. 
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DATE 
1957 
AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA 
First African elections in Kenya. 
Declaration of Ghana, first Black 
dominion in the Commonwealth. 
Constitutional Conference for 
Nigeria, with offer of self-
government for regions. 
Sierra Leone elections under new 
constitution with ministerial 
government. 
First Zanzibar elections to the 
Legislative Council. 
New Kenya constitution with 
increased African representation. 
Separate University Education Bill 
passed against much protesting. 
As from May 3, Die Stem van 
Suid-Afrika the only National 
Anthem. 
   
1958 Kenya African elections for add-
itional representation under the 
new constitution. 
Accra Conference of independent 
African States. 
Cross Bench elections in Kenya 
Legislative Council. 
Algerian crisis leads to the 
downfall of the French Govern-
ment. General de Gaulle takes office 
Southern Rhodesian elections 
won by the United Federal Party. 
Garfield Todd defeated 
Tanganyika. African National 
Union - supported candidates 
won 15 constituencies. 
French referendum; Guinea 
voted for independence from France; 
other territories supported 
de Gaulle's constitution. 
Election won by Nationalists 
103 of 163 seats. (Strijdom 
Prime Minister) . 
Treason Trials began in Pretoria. 
Death of Strijdom; Verwoerd 
Prime Minister. 
"Separate development" announced. 
   
Nigerian constitutional Conference 
resumed; October 1960 fixed as 
independence date. 
First direct elections to Uganda 
Legislative Council. 
Sudan coup d'eTtat; military 
government formed. 
C.A.F. elections under new consti -
tution. Sir Roy Welensky, Prime 
Minister. 
Ghana and Guinea announce inten-
tion to form union. 
New Northern Rhodesian constitution. 
Accra Conference of African colonial territories. Plans for an elected 
Legislative Council in Basutoland announced. 
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DATE AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA 
1959 Introduction of Extension of University Education Bill pro-
hibiting non-Whites from attending 
any White university. 
Progressive Party formed under 
Jan Steytler; Lawrence - chairman. 
U.N. General Assembly adopted 
resolution expressing "deep regret 
and concern" that South Africa had 
not discarded its racial policy. 
Twelve Africans killed in 
Windhoek in South West Africa as 
police, supported by troops, 
opened fire on stone-throwing crowds 
State of Emergency in Southern 
Rhodesia - congresses banned, 
African leaders arrested. 
Disturbances in Northern Rhod-
esia and Nyasaland, National 
Congress banned, Hastings Banda 
arrested, 
Zambia Congress banned in North-
ern Rhodesia. 
Northern Rhodesia gained internal 
self-government. New Tunisian 
Constitution provides for univer-
sal suffrage elections. 
Devlin Commission on Nyasaland. 
New Basutoland constitution. 
Effective responsible ministerial 
government introduced in 
Tanganyika. 
Disturbances in Ruanda-Utundi 
Nigerian federal elections. 
1960 French Cameroons independent 
Basutoland primary elections 
for Basutoland Council. 
Kenya Constitutional Conference 
in London. 
Second All-African Peoples' 
Conference in Timis. 
Algerian settler insurrection 
unsuccessful. 
Sierra Leone elections under 
the new constitution. 
Gambia general election. 
Constitutional conference on 
Tanganyika Madagascar - inde-
pendent (Malagasay) 
Conference of independent 
African states at Addis Ababa. 
Ghana attains republican status 
Nkrumah first .President Force 
Publique mutinied in the Congo. 
U.N. intervention 
Monrovia Conference 
Somalia - independent. 
Independence for Central African 
Republic, the Congo, Dahomey, 
Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, 
Senegal, Chad and Upper Volta 
Second Tanganyika election. 
Julius Nyerere successful. New Nyasaland constitution 
providing for an elected majority 
in the Legislative Council. 
Verwoerd announced future 
referendum on republic. 
"Wind of change" speech. 
Sharpeville massacre. 
State of Emergency declared 
(234 arrested) 
U.N. Resolution (Security Council) 
adopted called on South Africa 
"to abandon its policy of 
apartheid." 
(France and Britain abstained.) 
Attempted assassination of 
Dr. Verwoerd. 
Scheduled African stay-at-home 
strike failed. 
Johannesburg police disclosed 
that more than 4,500 arrests were 
made since March 30. 
Mr, Louw attended the Commonwealth 
Conference in London. 
Affirmative Republic referendum 
result : For : 849,958 
Against : 775,878 




AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA 
Mali - independent. 
Monckton Commission reports 
to British Government. 
Nigeria independent. 
Mauritania independent. 
C.A.F. conference in London. 
Southern Rhodesia constitutional 
conference adjourns to Salisbury. 
Northern Rhodesia constitutional 
conference opens in London. 
New Bechuanaland constitution. 
 
     
1961 Casablanca Conference of indep-
endent states. 
Zanzibar elections deadlocked : 
a caretaker government estab-
lished. 
Primary elections in Kenya under 
new constitution, 
Patrice Lumumba murdered in the 
Congo, 
Southern Rhodesia constitutional 
proposals published. 
Kenya elections. 
Northern Rhodesia constitutional 
proposals established. 
Third All-African Peoples' Con-
ference in Cairo. 
Uganda elections won by the 
Democratic Party. 
Uprisings in Angola : suppressed. 
Sierra Leone - independent. 
Another unsuccessful Algerian 
settler insurrection. 
Bechuanaland elections. 
Tanganyika - self-governing - 
Julius Nyerere first Prime 
Minister. 
Commonwealth Conference in London. 
South Africa announced her 
intention to withdraw. 
Mandela and twelve other African 
leaders arrested. 
South Africa left the Commonwealth. 
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READING NO. 1 
APPEAL OF THE BOER GENERALS TO THE CIVILISED WORLD1 
• As we have up to the present not succeeded in inducing 
the British Government to grant further assistance to our 
people, and as the needs are indescribaly great, no other course 
is open to us but to apply to the peoples of Europe and America. 
▪ The people of the two Republics were prepared to 
sacrifice everything for their independence; and now that 
the struggle is over they stand totally ruined 	at least 
thirty thousand houses of the Boer farms, and, further, a number 
of villages, were burned or destroyed by the British. 
• In this great distress we now turn to the World with 
our appeal to help 
• The small amount which England will contribute, 
according to the terms of surrender, would, even if multi-
plied tenfold, be totally insufficient to cover even the wax 
losses. 
The widows and orphans, the maimed and destitute, and 
our children, for whom alone we make this appeal, will there- 
fore, receive little, and in the most cases nothing, from this 
source 
1. Amery, op. cit. (Vol. IV) p. 91 
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READING NO. 2. 
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN. 1 
If the aspiration which we know existed in the minds 
of some, possibly of many, of our Dutch fellow-subjects - an 
aspiration for a separate Republic outside the British Empire; 
if that aspiration were renounced for ever; if we knew that 
the Dutch accepted with absolute sincerity our idea of a 
common State, one great difficulty at any rate would be removed. 
We want someone with authority to tell us that no longer in the 
history of this colony shall there be any racial or political 
or religious ostracism on the ground of loyalty to its insti-
tutions. We want evidence and I hope it will be forthcoming, 
that our Dutch fellow-citizens recognise that in the future 
their dealing is inseparable from ours, and that they are 
ready to share our pride in the Empire to which we all belong; 
that they are ready to accept their full share in its obligations 
as in its principles 	 
1. Reported in Cape Times, February 13th, 1903. Cited in 
Amery, op. cit. (Vol. IV) p. 363. 
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WADING NO. 3, 
EXTRACT FROM SPEECH ME AT SMITHFIELD BY 0:9101RA1. HERTZOG AS REPORTED IN THE STAR, 14TH OCTOB3R 1912. 
Referring to his Nylstroom speech General Hertzog said it was the policy of the Government that the South African (Afticander) should be "boas" everywhere in South Africa. He should be "bias" politically in the Administration and in the schools. The Government to which he belonged was a South . African Government. He had said that South Africans should be "bass" at Grahamstown, FOrt Elizabeth, Uitenbage, and many other places, and the sentiment had been heartily welcomed. Colonel Byron was the first to object to it. 
Only one person had the right to 'be "bass" in South Africa - namely, the South African. He could understand that statement was not in accordance with the policy of the Opposition, because there were few South Africans in the Opposition. There were a few misled men, but still true. Sir Percy Fitzpatrick was . much upset at the doctrine of "Good South African and foreigner". What he (the speaker) did say at Nylstroom, was that the people had become conscious of themselves as a nation. They felt their own power. They had reached national manhood, and they felt that South Africans and not strangers should rule the country. Formerly they had been governed by people who were not South Africans * and who would never become South Africans. 
Now that they were capable of ruling themselves they would no longer allow themselves to be ruled by those who were not South Africans, That was what he had said at Nylst room, that Colonel 1yron need not worry about the South African being "bass". 
He would be. He would not allow himself to be governed by foreign fortune.seekers ("fortuin zookers") like Colonel Byron. He (General Hartzog) did not know why Sir Percy had taken offence. at that, for no one could deny . certainly not Colonel Byron - that in the sense intended he is a stranger in South Africa, for he came from elsewhere. He (General Hertzog) had used the word "fortuin soaker", and if anyone liked to translate it "adventurer" he could not help it. 
• Sir Percy thought it a pernicious doctrine that South Africa should be governed by South Africans. Was it pernicious that England should be governed by the English? Sir Percy could not pretend that he (General Hartzog) meant only the Dutch when he said South African. Grahamstown knew he did not, Port Elizabeth knew he did not, Vitenhnge knew it, and even Nylstwoom knew that 
1. Kruger (Parties and Policies), op. cit., pp. 63:;7..., 
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he had referred to all South Africans. In the same speech 
he had said that the journey of Sir Thomas Smartt and his 
confreres to Natal was useless, because the Natalians were • 
South Africans. They had only to meet them to see that they 
were as good South Africans as the Dutch-speaking people. He 
(General Hertzog) had said South Africans should be "baas" 
but he wished to draw no line between South Africans and the 
outsiders, 
That was the policy which Sir Percy had said was pernicious 
and appealed to the prejudices of ignorant * superstitious people. 
He could assure Sir Percy that among the people so described 
were many as well educated as Sir Percy and many who had a great • 
deal more common-sense. He (General Hertzog) had said Sir 
Thomas Smartt was not a good South African and that Colonel 
Byron was a fortune-seeker. He meant that they had come to 
South Africa to seek their fortunes and had not yet become 
South African in feeling. As regards the Leader of the Opposi-
tion, he thought a man who was really a South African would not 
have advised that the Constitution of the Cape Colony should 
have been suspended. The least that could be said of a man 
who did that was that he was not a son of the people whom he 
served. 
Speaking of the Opposition generally, General Bertzog said 
it was ridiculous the way in which they appealed for sympathy. 
Arguments they had none. If they had convinced South Africa of 
anything it was the unfruitfulness of their intellects. The only 
thing they prided themselves on was the support of the Government - 
where the Government was right. That was not difficult. 
"The difficulty is to be right ourselves and to get others to 
support us." 	The Opposition had expressed not one original 
thought and had shown no initiative. They simply trotted forth 
overworked platitudes and made pathetic appeals ad misericordiam, 
or else they tried to arouse suspicion. The outburts that had 
followed Nylstroom he could only ascribe to suspicion, to a 
desire to cause nervousness, and to work on the feelings of the 
public, especially the English-speaking public. If any one 
deserved the name of criminal those people did who wished to gain 
sympathy in that way. There was absolutely nothing in his 
Nylstroom speech to which any South African could take exception. 
People like those who lived on the Rand, who came to the country 
to make fortunes and then leave, would be frightened of the speech, 
because they felt that their influence was in danger of being lost. 
There was, of course, nothing wrong in coming to South Africa to 
seek one's fortune, but what he did object to was these people 
ruling the country as against South Africans. Against that he 
would protest 
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• • • 
. READING NO. 
EXTRACT FROM PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL PARTY.' 
1. THE NATIONAL PARTY represents the national conviction and 
aspirations of the South African people within the Union, and 
strives to develop and realise this conviction and these aspir-
ations to the utmost blessing of the country and its people. 
2. The party acknowledges the guidance of God in the destinies 
of countries and peoples and seeks to develop the people's 
life along Christian national lines. 
3. The party recognises the necessity of fostering a strong sense of national autonomy and expressly declares that the interests 
of the Union and its people should be put before those of any 
other country or people. 
4. The position of the Union in regard to its relationship towards the United Kingdom, resting on the good faith of two nations, 
is unequivocally recognised by the party. It is convinced 
that the maintenance of a cordial understanding between the 
Union and the Empire depends on a meticulous avoidance of any 
act whereby the political liberty of the people of the Union 
might be curtailed or restricted or whereby any of the liberties 
of the country or its Government might be withdrawn from the 
immediate supervision or control of the people of the Union. 
5. The party recognises the just claims of the people of Union to mutual respect and free enjoyment of all that belongs to a 
people in respect to language, history, religion, customs and 
morals. By encouraging a feeling of true appreciation of these 
qualities the party strives to develop a sense of national 
worth and of a healthy national character. 
6. The party recognises. that the promotion of the spiritual, 
national and material welfare of the people is the duty and 
calling of the State. It is convinced that that calling may 
only be exercised by means of an impartial and conscientious 
official view of the rights and privileges of every part of 
the population, guaranteed by the Constitution. 
7. The party recognises the right of every inhabitant of the Union to have the official languaee which is his own, acknowledged 
1. Programme of principles as approved of by the special congress of 
members of the South African Party, Orange Free State Province, 
held at Bloemfontein, 7-9 January 1914. Published as a pamphlet by 
Het Volk Drukkerij, Potchefstroom. Translated from the original Dutch by the present editor. 
Cited in Kruger (Parties and Policies) op, cit., pp 69-70. 
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in public offices or in the public service everywhere in the 
country, and to be served in that language by Government officials. 
The party declares, therefore, that the appointment of officials 
who do not possess the necessary knowledge of bath official 
languages, is a negation of the rights and interests of the in-
habitants. 
8. As the maintenance of its rights and liberties is the first 
duty of a people, the party recognises the necessity of increasing 
the people's knowledge of the rights and liberties guaranteed 
to it by the Constitution as a free and autonomous people. 
9. The party is convinced that the basis of the welfare of 
South Africa rests on the unity of the European population in a 
spirit of dedication to South Africa and of mutual esteem of 
and loyalty to their fellow-citizens, and further, that the 
achievement of this goal should be sought by firmly demanding 
that each section of the population be accorded its awn rights. 
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• • • 
READING NO. 5  
EXTRACT FROM THE PROGIMME OF PRINCIPLES OF THE mknow. 
PARTY (1952) 1 
II POLITICAL STATUS AND FUTURE 
5. The Party is founded on the unequivocal recognition that South 
Africa is a sovereign, independent state, which possesses every 
right, and, on its own authority, can exercise all the functions 
of a state in the fullest international sense. 
6. It undertakes to maintain this independence faithfully and 
to oppose by every permissible means any interpretations, 
tendency, action or policy contrary to or threatening such ind-
pendence, and also to remove any inconsistency hampering the 
fullest realization of that independence. 
7. It will thus ensure that the Government of the country is carried out on the basis of South African national principles 
and in the spirit of national autonomy as a free, sovereign and independent nation. 
8. The unitary basis of a united South Africa, as laid down in the South Africa Act, will be upheld, and no power or right in 
conflect with or which can be applied in conflict with that basis will be granted to any province. The Party also declares 
itself in favour of retaining the provincial system * for the 
present. 
9. The Party acknowledges without reservation the right of the 
nation to change its form of Government or state by constitutional 
means at any time, if it considers it to be in the country's 
interests. 
10. It is convinced that the republican form of state, separated 
from the British Crown * is the form best adapted to the traditions 
circumstances and aspirations of the South African nation, and 
is also the only effective guarantee that South Africa will not 
again be drawn into Great Britain's wars. 
1. Carter (Politics of Inequality) op. cit., pp 468. 
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11. While the Party thus declares itself in favour of the attain-
ment of this form of state, it recognizes at the same time, however that a republic can be established only on the broad basis of the 
national will, and with the faithful observance of the equal 
language and cultural rights of the two sections of the European 
population. Accordingly it stipulates that this constitutional 
change can be brought about only as the result of a special and 
definite mandate from the European electorate, and not merely by 
a parliamentary majority obtained as the result of an ordinary 
election. 
III NATIONAL FLAG  
12. The Party declares emphatically that it views the national 
flag as the only exclusive symbol of our awn South African nation-
hood and of the constitutional authority and power of the Union. 
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READING No. 6. 
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH MADE IN souni AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY. 1 
Mx. Strydom : Nothing except this, that we have to induce 
our English-speaking fellow citizens, and the Afrikaners who are 
not yet sympathetic towards a republic * to become so. I go 
further and say that until such time as we have a republic in 
South Africa we shall never really have actual racial peace 
here. I would like my English-speaking friends to think about 
this. If there is really to be race unity in South Africa we 
must ultimately be entirely free from the British empire. I 
know it will be foolish to try and secede unless our English-
speaking citizens concur in that respect, but inasmuch as true 
racial peace anyhow depends on it I think that just as we have 
gradually reached to this position of acknowledging the sovereign 
independence of South Africa, they will also ultimately agree 
with us, and gradually come to the idea that a republic is the 
best form of government for South Africa. 
1. 	South Africa'. House of Assembly Debates, VOL, 23, Co1.20999 (1934) 
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READING Do. 7 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 12/8/38. 1 
Mr. J.G. Strydom : I just want to ask this : Are there any 
members on the opposition side who blame the Minister of Agricul-
ture for having referred to their Prime Minister as a fanatic? 
If so, then I would like to have their views about hte matter 
very much, especially those of the Minister of Justice. I think 
that that will suffice, so far as the charge of the Prime Minister 
of racialism is concerned. We who propose the motion are not 
inspired with racialism, as the Prime Minister accused us of being. 
No, we are inspired with the same ideals as those which he 
himself had when he sat on this side of the House. Our attitude 
is that we want to comply with the desires of the Afrikaner 
people, and the Afrikaner people do not want a national anthem 
which is nothing else but the national anthem of the conqueror. 
We want to have what other nations also want to have - those who 
cherish high ideals - we want to have our own national anthem, 
by which we can give expression to our own national pride, and 
to the things we are striving for. This motion has been moved 
with that object, and instead of the Prime Minister treating the 
matter on its merits, instead of his telling us - if he wanted to 
fight our point of view - why our people could not have their own 
national anthem, he has had recourse to the kind of charges 
that we heard made by him, and the arguments out of which I have 
read out a little jewel here. I want to say that this is our 
attitude, we do not want any German national anthem, no French 
national anthem, no English national anthem; we merely want one 
national anthem and it is the Afrikaans national anthem. What 
then is the attitude of the other side? One does not really 
know what it is, because they speak with so many voices that one 
does not know who is speaking on their behalf. We have heard 
here how the Prime Minister, by means of an amendment, set out 
the attitude of his party. But subsequently the Minister of 
Justice took up a different attitude, and we also heard what the 
Minister of Justice said in East London, namely that "God Save 
the King," if not the national anthem, then at any rate would be 
a national anthem of South Africa for ever. Do you really think 
that the Afrikaners will submit to the national anthem of the 
conquering nation always being their national anthem, and does 
he think that we as an Afrikaner nation will ever get our freedom 
for which he is longing so much, as long as that is the case? 
The attitude of the Minister of Justice, and the section of hon. members on that side which he represents, is that "God Save the 
King" will remain the or a national anthem of South Africa. In 
that way then he wants to conciliate his English-speaking 
supporters. But they go further, and the Prime Minister moves 
1. 	South African House of Assembl Debates Irol 32 C011.908-14, 
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in his amendment that we shall have no national anthem - accord, 
ing to his party, but on the same amendment for which he wants 
us to vote, the Minister of Justice comes - one can almost not 
credit it - but he comes in the same debate and makes the English-
speaking people believe that "God Save the King" will remain the( 
national anthem of South Africa. 
Mr. Bezuidenhout : That is not true. 
Mr. J.G. Strydom : Yes, I took it down, and the hon. member 
will, if he does not believe it, see that I am right when 
Hansard appears. He said the "God Save the King" would remain 
a national anthem of South Africa; he said it at least half 
a dozen times. What results now from the different attitudes • 
which that side has taken up, what is the interpretation which 
the people in the country are to put on the different attitudes 
of hon. members in that party? I have the speech here of Mr. 
Charles te Water lately made in London. He there said - 
South Africa consists of two races who are 
accustomed to lead a two-fold life in every 
respect. There are two languages, two flags, 
two capitals, and now two national anthems 
as well. 
I do not blame Mr. Te Water at all for coming to that conclusion. 
How could he do other than accept it after the statement on these 
lines made by the Minister of Justice, to which we have constantly 
to listen? That is the conclusion to which any reasonable man 
would have to come. But now they go further, and to conciliate 
the Afrikaans-speaking people the Prime Minister says that 
there is in fact no national anthem, but he also says that in 
future, until such time as the people decide otherwise, "God 
Save the King" and "Die Stem" will be played on all occasions in 
which the state is concerned, and where the Governor-General is 
present. We also know that on such occasions when the Governor-
General is present "God Save the King" is played first. This 
is what the Prime Minister wants to persuade us of, he says that 
we have no national anthem, but he pays all the honour to the 
national anthem of another nation, of England, which is due to a 
national anthem. On what occasions is "God Save the King" played 
officially in England? On all occasions when the King appears, 
on the opening of Parliament, at all state functions. Precisely 
the same thing will now take place in South Africa, and the Prime 
Minister is now giving to "God Save the King" all the honour 
which is shown to a national anthem. He treats "God Save the King" 
as if it were our national anthem. He merely gives another name 
to it and says it is a prayer. What is going to happen? Notwith-
standing the fact that the Prime Minister says that there is no 
national anthem, he lays down the practice that "God Save the 
King" is to be treated as our national anthem. That is where 
the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister act together. 
What is said by the Minister of Justice is carried out by the 
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Prime Minister and the party. In other words, whatever he may 
call it, "God Save the King" is treated as if it were the official 
national anthem of South Africa. What is more, he is going to 
show the same honour to "Die Stem" because everywhere, where the 
Governor-General appears, not "Die Stem" but "God Save the King" 
is played first. Therefore "God Save the King" is treated as the 
national anthem, and "Die Stem" is simply played as being comp. 
lementary. If there is any hon. member on the Government side 
who wants to deny that they are going to use "God Save the King" 
in their party in the same way as every independent country uses 
its national anthem, then I will be glad if he will get up and 
say where they are not doing so. I should be glad if the 
Minister of Justice will, on a subsequent occasion, explain to 
what extent the use of "God Save the King" in South Africa will deviate from the user of "God Save the King" as national anthem 
in England. The Prime Minister also said that the procedure 
that was laid down, namely to use "God Save the King," which 
he called a prayer, as our national anthem in practice, would 
continue until such time as the people of South Africa decided 
differently. That means that as long as that Government 
maintains the British connection so long will South Africa never 
have its own national anthem. It is the policy of that side to 
maintain the British connection, to live under the British 
Crown, and as long as that is the case this practice will 
continue to exist. Or does the Minister of Justice want to tell 
me that as long as we remain a part of the British Empire the 
attitude of the English-speaking people in regard to "God 
Save the King" will also change. 
Mr. Verster : Certainly not in view of the way you 
are carrying on. 
Mr. J.G. Strydom : Yes that is the hon. member who 
introduced a petition here which was to be signed, to the 
effect that "God Save the King" should no longer be played in 
the bioscopes. 
Verster : To a point of order, that is absolutely 
untrue. I moved that "Die Stem" should be played, but what the 
hon. member says is absolutely untrue. 
Mx. J.G. Strydom : I say that that is the hon. member 
who went to hon. members, not in this House, and he also approached 
me to sign a petition which he got from the students in Pretoria, 
to prevent "God Save the King" being played any longer in the 
bio scopes. 
Mr. Verster : I say that it is untrue. 
Mx. J.G. Strydom : I say that the consequence of the 
policy of the other side is that we shall never get a national 
anthem of our own. Just see the way in which the Prime Minister is charging us with wanting to force our national anthem down 
the throats of the English-speaking people, but for how many 
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more generations will the Afrikaners have to be satisfied with 
having "God Save the King" forced down their throats in future? 
Then I come to another question, because it was raised in the 
course of this debate as well. I ask how far the Government 
has decided to push "God Save the King" down the throats of the 
Afrikaners on the great occasion of the laying of the foundation 
stone of Voortrekker Memorial? You will remember that the 
Minister of Native Affairs said that such a decision had never 
existed, and not only did the Minister of Native Affairs say 
that but certain newspapers also supporting that side tried to 
mislead the people, they wanted to persuade the people that the 
Government never intended to have "God Save the King" played 
at the laying of the foundation stone of the memorial. To 
enquire whether that is true I want to go back to a report which 
appeared in the English press, because the Nationalist news-
papers are always accused of publishing untrue reports. In the 
Argus of the 20th July 1938, I find the following - 
The Government, I understand, will not hesitate 
to face the agitation against the playing of "God 
Save the King" and the flying of the Union Jack at 
the Voortrekker Memorial unveiling ceremony and 
will not countenance any attempt to detract from 
the national character of the ceremony. 
Here we have in what is possibly the most important English news-
paper the announcement on good authority, that the Government 
will allow "God Save the King" to be played at the laying of 
the foundation stone of the memorial. I also find that the 
Star of the 21st July, says the following in a leading article - 
It is a matter for satisfaction that the Prime Minister 
has finally decided that the forthcoming Voortrekker 
Memorial ceremony at Pretoria in December shall be a 
truly national one, with all that that term implies. 
That the Prime Minister at the eleventh hour should 
agree to what was intended to be a national ceremonial 
assuming a purely sectional character would be the 
negation of all that the word "national" means. 
Surely the Star is well acquainted with things, and that is what 
it said in the leading article of the 21st. Subsequently the 
Argus on the 22nd once more confirmed what it had already said, 
but in view of the tremendous storm of indignation which had 
arisen in the meantime, it started already to suggest that 
the Government should if necessary, abandon its proposed decision. 
Now we come to the statement of the Government itself. After 
they saw what a terrific storm of indignation had arisen amongst 
the Afrikaners throughout the length and breadth of the country, 
the Government fortunately came to its senses and on the 27th 
July published the following official statement in the public 
Press - 
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The Government thought that in order to attain 
this object it was desirable that the laying of 
the foundation stone of the memorial should be 
a state occasion in such a way that expression 
could there be given to the feeling which both 
sections of the people cherish for the Voortrekkers, 
and the spirit which inspired them. That would mean His Excellency the Governor-General, as 
representative of the head of the state, being 
invited to attend the ceremony, and that he should 
be greeted with the customary expression of honour. 
In other words, the Governor-General would be received and "God 
Save the King" would be played and sung. Could the Government have an opinion, unless the Government had discussed the matter and 
come to a decision about it? It says "the Government thought". 
Then it continues - 
It however appeared that in the present circumstances 
such an arrangement would lead to considerable un-
pleasantness and bitterness, and the fear arose that 
the peaceful development of our unity as a people 
would in consequence be handicapped. 
That was why the Government abandoned the decision first come to. 
Mr. Bezuidenhout : Are you quoting from Die Transvaler? 
Mr. J.G. Strydom : The hon. member does not seem to 
understand that when an official statement appears in one and the 
same language in different newspapers it does not matter from 
what newspaper you quote. Can you imagine that a man like the 
Prime Minister, not to speak of other Afrikaners on the other 
side, was prepared in consequence of their change, so fax as political beliefs were concerned, to commit an act of that 
kind against the standpoint and traditions of the Afrikaners? 
Can you realise that on this solemn occasion of the laying of 
the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Memorial, they were 
prepared to allow the national anthem of the conqueror to be 
played? The Voortrekkers, that stout generation, abandoned 
their homes and hearths in the south and trekked into the wider 
north to find a new home. Why ? For the very reason of escaping 
the destructive protection of "God Save the King" and the Union 
Jack, Let us speak the naked truth. That is the reason why 
they trekked to the north to find a new home. But "God Save 
the King" and the Union Jack followed them up, and against 
their desires and will they were placed under the tyranny. 
This little nation of ours has had a tragic past and became the 
prey, in the past, of many crimes and acts of cruelty which 
were committed under the Union Jack, Acts were committed which 
have hurt the Afrikaner people very much. I just want, in passing, 
to call to mind such occurrences as Slagters Nek, the three 
years war. 
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An Hon, Member : What about the National Scouts? 
Mr, J.G. Strydom : In Bloemfontein there is a memorial 
which was erected in memory of 26,000 women and children who 
died. When an Afrikaner has reached the length of being ashamed 
to look at the women's memorial, then it is time to be desperate. 
An Hon. Member : You want to make political capital out 
of it, 
An Hon, Member : To us it is too sacred a matter. 
Mr. J.G. Strydom : Most of these cruel acts against Afrik-
anerdom were committed by the conquerors, and now at this stage 
we would have to see possibly the greatest cruelty of all being 
committed against the Voortrekkers. All that those people went 
through in the past they passed through in consequence of their 
effort to get rid of "God Save the King" and the Union Jack, 
and now after 100 years an Afrikaner leader would be prepared to 
sully the memory of the Voortrekkers and to have "God Save the 
King" played in regard to what you can practically call the 
mortal remains of the Voortrekkers, and to have the flag of the 
conquerors flying over it. We speak of racial co-operation and 
peace in South Africa 	 
Mr, Johnson : How do you think that you are going to get it? 
Mr, J.G. Strydom : I only want to say that if we want to 
get it we shall have to understand each other's point of view 
so fax as this matter is concerned. 
Mr, Grobler : You do not do so. 
Mt, J.G. Strydom : If understanding each other means that 
on the occasion of the laying of the foundation stone of the 
Voortrekker Memorial you must have "God Save the King" played, 
then we will never get it. I want to go further : The Prime 
Minister said that the difference between us and them in this 
debate was that the Nationalist Party stood for a republic. 
Mr, Grobler : What does the Act say? 
Mr, J.G. Strydom : I am not concerned here with what the 
Act says. The Prime Minister was right. It is a cardinal 
point of difference between them and us, and I say with all 
seriousness that racial peace and co-operation are necessary, 
but that you will never obtain them as long as the anthem of 
the conqueror, and the flag of the conqueror, is played and 
is flown. 
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READING NO. 8 
EXTRACT FROM DIE TRANSVALER- QUJTED IN THE FORUM, JOHANNESBURG, 
JULY 27TH, 190. 1 
It will be a republic in which there will be no place 
for British public institutions. These things, which are 
foreign to the spirit and wishes of the Afrikander people, will 
be annihilated to the very foundations. It will be a republic 
with a government that is not subject to all sorts of foreign 
influences. General Smuts' holistic views, according to which 
the small Afrikaans culture must be dissolved in the great English 
culture, and South Africa be but a part of the great British 
Empire, will find no place in the Afrikaans republic. Mr. 
Hofmeyr's negrophilism and liberalism, which would wipe out all 
colour bars and would make the Afrikander a backboneless being, 
will have no place in this Afrikaans republic. Colonel Stallard's 
imperialism, which would make South Africa subordinate in all 
respects td British interests, will have no place in this Afrikaans 
republic. Mr. Madeley's socialism, and conceptions of the 
Afrikaans people, will have no place in this Afrikaans republic. 
The spirit of people who are too afraid to speak about a republic, 
will also find no entry in this republic. In economic policy 
this republic will be no much-cow of Britain. It will be a 
republic in which the Chamber of Mines will not have authority. 
It will be a republic built up on the ideals and views of such 
men as Piet Retief, Paul Kruger and Marthinus Steyn. 
1. Cited in Brady, op. cit. p. 356. 
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READING NO. 9 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 412/41 1. 
Dr, Malan : You can plunge the country into war for the 
sake of England, or because England is at war, or for the sake 
of France, or for the sake of Poland, which was the immediate 
cause of the war. 
The Minister Without Portfolio : What about our own 
interests? 
Dr. Malan : You are able to do so on that side, we on this 
side were not in a position to prevent it. Once and for all 
we cannot approve of it, and the reason for that is that with us 
there is a completely different point of view, a completely 
different outlook with regard to this matter, with all the 
affairs of our country. We regard them from the point of view 
of South Africa's interests and South African nationalism, and 
you on the other side of the House regard them chiefly from the 
attitude of Lritish Imperialism. I believe that, taken as a 
whole, there is no one in this House and no one outside of it 
who does not long for what is usually described as national unity. 
National unity is in the interests of South Africa, something 
desirable, something to be wished for, something to ac4uire 
which we ought to use all our powers of attainment. There will, 
however, be no national unity in the country as long as the 
difference which runs right through the history of South Africa, 
continues to exist in the country. While that lasts you will 
not get it. There are only two ways to get it, and the one is 
that we should all take up the attitude of the British Imperialist, 
that we should all also identify ourselves with the interests of 
a nation or a country overseas. If you do that then it means 
that South African nationalism will either be dwarfed or it 
must die. Only then will you in that way on that basis get 
national unity in the country. And the other alternative for 
getting national unity in the country is that everybody should 
take up the attitude that everyone should accept South Africa's 
own nationhood to the fullest degree, and not only accept it in 
words, but should as a matter of fact, live it out in practice. 
If everyone accepted that attitude you would also get national 
unity. I think, however, that experience in South Africa has 
taught us this - all the experience that we have had : That you 
will never get it as long as British Imperialism in South Africa 
can get a firm footing, as long as the British connection exists, 
and as long as by virtue of the British connection it can on 
each occasion be argued that there shall happen what happened 
here on the 4th September and thereafter. 	If you do not get 
1. 	South Africa  i House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 41, Coll. 2181-84. 
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the length in South Africa of seeing that the British connection 
with all its implications, as interpreted here by a section of 
the population and by the Prime Minister and his followers, 
is broken, then the apple of discord in South Africa between one 
section and the other will remain. Then you will never get 
national unity here, but South Africa will then be doomed to 
eternal discord - unless the nationality minded section of the 
population is prepared to sacrifice the selfrespect of South 
Africa, There can be no peace between nationalism and imperialism 
and there can be no compromise of any kind. On the 4th 
September you on the other side, your Government, chose the 
Empire and we opposed it, because we took up a sound South 
African attitude, and because we did so, we opposed you. In 
connection with the arguments which are being used to justify 
the attitude of the other side of the House, especially the 
argument that they believe that they made the choice because 
it was in the interests of South Africa, I want to add the 
following : I think that I am saying here, without objection 
on the part of any unprejudiced impartial person, that if South 
Africa had not the British connection, if South Africa had 
not been linked up with England, then no one, no responsible 
section in the country when the war broke out, would have dreamt 
of being in favour of South Africa also taking part in the Mar. 
In addition, we do not believe in the view which you on your 
side hold as to what is actually our duty at the present time. 
Your idea of what our duty is is apparently this : That if 
there is anything wrong, if there is anything largely or radic-
ally wrong in any other part of the world, provided England also 
is concerned in the matter, then we must also interest ourselves 
in it, then we must also go and put right or assist in putting 
right the thing that is wrong. That you regard as our duty, 
just imagine'. A small white population of 2,000000, barely 
2,000,000, living in a new and to a great extent still undeveloped 
country, a small population with big problems and questions 
looking it in the face, and a tremendous task to carry out, a 
task to maintain the white civilisation here, in south Africa, 
must solve the difficulties in other parts cf the woaldI We in 
South Africa have that tremendous task, and the great questions 
stare us in the face, and we have a large section of the pop-
ulation living below the bread line. Just imagaineI It is the 
duty of this small population to go and put right everything in 
the great world. And that while even England, as fax as you 
can judge, is not prepared to go and put right what she decided 
and solemnly undertook to go and put right. England disapproved, 
and strongly disapproved of the annexation by Russia of three 
small states, Lithuania l Estonia and Latvia. I believe that 
there is no longer today any question of the giving back of 
their freedom and independence to those countries. We do not 
hear a word about it any longer. There was also Poland, the 
immediate cause of the wax, and a solemn undertaking on the 
part of England to guarantee Poland's indepencence. Poland was cut in half. Germany got one part and Russia got the other part. 
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I would like to know from the Prime Minister - I have not yet 
heard it in a statement by one of the English statesmen - whether 
it is going to be an aim or object of the war that Poland should 
be made free, not only from Germany but also from Russia. 
I fear that in this case things will go as happened in the judg-
ment of Solomon, where the pretended mother made the announce-
ment : I am prepared if I get my way - and she would not even 
get her way - to see the baby divided in two. We do not be-
lieve that this war is being waged in the holy name of democracy 
and Christianity. It remains to be seen when this war is over 
what will remain of democracy even in England. We must not forget 
that England, as is already the case, but much more so at the 
end of this war, will be a completely exhausted country. 
There is no doubt about it that the properties classes, and more 
particularly the middle class in that country, will be completely 
eliminated, and in those circumstances what will remain of the old 
institutions in that country? Will England, in those circum-
stances, remain on a democratic basis, and do so after she has 
experienced to the full in this war, how effective and how 
efficient another system is? That is the question, and apart 
from the question whether England will remain a democratic country, 
there is the cry of Christianity, that that is the reason why 
we must carry on the war. That is the first time that I have 
heard that Christianity needs to be protected to be benefited 
by the sword. The most un-Christian principle to follow is the 
idea that Christianity is to be protected or promoted by the 
sword. Christianity does not need the sword. On the contrary, 
if Christianity has to be protected or promoted, or if an attempt 
has to be made to benefit Christianity by the sword, then it 
has always yet appeared to be a hopeless failure, and, what is 
more, to test the honesty with which these arguments are used - 
if England has got its way to establish the state of affairs whifh 
she tried to create by all the means she had in her power, then 
you would have had not only, as is actually the case now, that 
in this struggle for Christianity the whole of Jewry in the 
whole of the world at war, and giving every wapport, but you 
would also have had the Turks and the Russians, who have made 
history during recent years, of the un-Christian point of view, 
of an anti-religious State policy, which had become a tradition 
with them. Just imagine, Christianity must be furthered, and 
you fight shoulder to shoulder with the Jew, with the Turk and 
with the Russian. I do not believe that war was ever entered 
into by any Government in such a frivolous way as by this 
Government, and that it has been carried on in such a useless 
way as by this Government. If a Government plunges its 
country into war, then that in itself is a matter about which 
it should think twice, ten tines and a hundred times before 
resolving on that step, and especially a mar like this one, 
with its great devastation which is so serious and, in addition, 
a war which involves enormous expenditure, paralysing expenditure 
to a country like this. A government has to consider a long 
time before it goes to war. This Government did not hesitate 
for a moment. This Government undertook the task in spite 
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of the fact that they knew that they were not dealing with a 
unanimous population, but with a population which was deeply 
divided on the subject, and a population which was almost equally 
divided on both sides about this war. I say that for any 
government to go to war with a people which is divided in that 
way is nothing else than committing a crime against its people. 
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READING NO. 10 
EXTRACTS FROM THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION FOR THE REPUBLIC OF 
SCUM AFRICA I. 
The following Draft Constitution for the Republic of South 
Africa was published in DIE BURGER and DIE TRANSVALER on 
January 22 and 23, 1942. It was published by the authority of 
Dr, D.F. Malan, leader of the Herenigde Nasionale Volhaparty, 
who became Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa in 1948. 
At the time of publication Dr. Verwoerd was an editor of 
DIE TRANSVALER. It will be interesting to note whether this 
Draft Constitution will be adopted by the recently determined 
Republic in substitution for the South Africa Act of 1909 
which is the present Constitution. 
The Draft Constitution reads as follows : 
CONSTITUTION FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
ARTICLE I  
INTRODUCTION : In obedience to God Almighty and His Holy Word, 
the Afrikaans people acknowledge their national destination, 
as embodied in its Voortrekker past, for the Christian develop-
ment of South Africa, and for that reason accepts the Republican 
Constitution which follows, to take place of all the existing 
regulations in law, which are in conflict with it, and espec-
ially with the total abolition of the British Kingship over the 
British subjects within the Republic. 
ARTICLE 2 : THE STATE  
(I) The name of the State is "The Republic of South Africa". 
(2) The Republic is grounded on a Christian-national 
foundation and therefore acknowledges, as the standard of the 
Government of the State of, in the first place. the principles 
of justice of the Holy Scriptures; secondly, the clearest 
direction of the development of the national history; and third, 
the necessary reformation of the modern government of States, 
especially with an eye to the circumstances of South Africa. 
(3) The Republic is as a perfectly sovereign and indepen-dent State, the successor of the rights of the Union of South 
Africa. 
(4) The national Flag is the Vierkleur of the Old South African Republic, with the red band replaced by one of orange; 
the National Anthem of the Republic will be "Die Stem van 
Suid-Afrika". 
1. UNESCO (South Africa and the Rule of Law), op. cit. pp.111-28. 
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(5) Afrikaans, as the language of the original white 
inhabitants of the country will be the first official language. 
English will be regarded as a second or supplementary official 
language which will be treated on an equal footing and will 
enjoy equal rights, freedom and privileges with the first 
official language, everwhere and whenever such treatment is 
judged by the State authority to be in the best interests of 
the State and its inhabitants. 
ARTICLE 3 : CITIZENSHIP 
(1) All people whatsoever, settled within the bounds of 
the Republic, are its subjects and subject to its authority. 
They will retain their citizenship of the Republic, with a right 
to its protection, even when out of the country, unless they 
are subjects of a foreign State or have forfeited their citizenship. 
(2) The white subjects who are acknowledged as members 
of the State by the Government, will be called "burgers", 
without distinction of race, as long as they do not abandon 
or forfeit their citizenship. Such recognition will only be 
accorded to subjects of whom it can be expected that they will 
act as builders up of the nation, whatever status they might 
have possessed before. 
(3) Only "Burgess" can obtain the right to vote with re-
gard to the Government of the Republic as such, and that on 
reaching their 21st birthday. 
(4) The State may not bestow any titles (with the exception of academical degrees) or in any other way give rise to what 
might develop into class distinctions. Nor may any citizen 
accept titles from foreign powers. 
(5) The State makes a call upon the consecrated national 
service of every citizen, in every capacity whatsoever, and has the power to make sure that the individual citizens, as well 
as the organs of public opinion, such as the existence of 
parties, the radio, the press, and the cinema, whilst their 
rightful freedom of expression, including criticism of the 
government policy, will be protected, shall not be allowed, by 
the actions, to undermine the public order or good morale of 
the Republic internally or externally. 
(6) The State acknowledges the fundamental interests of 
the household and of a sound family life for the community, and 
undertakes to protect this against all onslaughts. The State 
especially recognises that, by her work within the house, the 
woman gives a support to the State without which the general 
welfare cannot be attained, and will thus ensure that mothers 
should not be forced by economic conditions to seek work outside 
of the house, where this might give rise to neglect of the household duties. 
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(7) The State grants recognition to all organisations 
which, within the national community exercise service to the 
State in different spheres, with deference to their internal 
independence. 
(8) The State acknowledges the full freedom of the Christian 
Churches in their own spheres. 
ARTICLE 4 : THE HEAD OF THE STATE.  
(1) At the head of the State will be the State President. 
(2) Only a registered citizen of the Republic is eligible 
for the post of President. 
(3) A citizen can be nominated as a candidate for the 
presidentship by Parliament on a recommendation from the Cabinet 
(Minister-raad)„ or by the requisition signed by at least 2-19; 
of the registered burgers. 
• 	 (4) The State President is chosen by the registered burgers (citizens) within a period of three months before the term of 
office of his predecessor elapses, or within three months 
after the post has become vacant for any other reason. If 
only one candidate is duly nominated, he will be declared duly 
elected without voting, by the Chief Justice of the Republic, 
or his lawful substitute, under whose supervision the election 
of the State President must be held. 
(5) The State President will hold this position for a 
period of five years from the date on which he takes up his 
work, unless he dies, resigns is put out of his position, as 
hereafter defined, or becomes permanently unfit, such unfitness 
to be ;moved before a Court consisting of the Chief Justice, 
supported by all the Judges of the Appeal Court. The State 
President is further directly and only responsible to God and 
over against the people for his deeds in the fulfilment of his 
duties, and in his actions in connection with the last-named 
as well as the carrying out of the holding of his office, he is 
altogether independent of any vote in Parliament. 
(6) The State President may not be a member of Parliament, 
or of the Community Council, or hold any post of position to 
which any payment is attached, except the position of President. 
(7) When taking up his high position, the President lays 
down the following oath and declaration :"In the presence of 
the Almighty God I declare solemnly and uprightly that I will 
serve the people of South Africa, will maintain the Republic 
- 233 - 
and do everything in my power to honour its constitution and 
laws and to cause them to be honoured. I shall put forth all my 
strength to further the good of the people and the welfare of 
the whole of the population of South Africa, to carry out all 
the duties laid upon me, to protect the independence, safety 
and honour of the Republic against all attacks, and to maintain 
the authority and respect for the Christian religion and the 
public Christian morals in this country. May the God of my 
fathers lead me and make me strong therein to the glory of His Name". 
(8) The State President shall take the lead in all State 
ceremonies. 
(9) The State President declares war and peace in the name 
of the Republic as hereafter defined. 
(10) The State President stands at the head of the Defence 
force of the Republic, but the manner of the exercise of the 
supervision must be defined by legislation. 
. (11) The State President decides on all laws, which can 
only become valid by his personal signature. 
(12) The State President is charged with the task of 
choosing a burger to serve as Head Minister, and with the approval 
of the State President, he must call together an Executive 
Council, to be known as the Council of Ministers, who, together 
with the Head Minister, will be responsible to the State President 
for the effective control of matters relating to the country. 
The State President also has the power to dismiss the Head Minister 
or any other Minister. 
(13) The State President will summon Parliament, or prorogue 
it or dissolve it, on the recommendation of the Head Minister, 
unless the State President is convinced that the latter no longem is 
trusted by Parliament, when he will act according to his own 
discretion, either to relieve the Head Minister of his post, or 
to dissolve Parliament and to let a new election take place, as 
later defined (Article 6, para. 7). 
(14) In time of National danger the State President can, 
within the period of his term of office, suspend the customary 
obligations as laid down in this Constitution, as long as it 
may be in the interests of the people and grant full powers to 
the Head Minister and the Council of Ministers, for the govern-
ment of the Republic, which must, however, be carried out under 
the direct supervision of the State President, and will only 
continue as long as it meets with his approval. 
(15) The State President may not leave the country during 
his term of office without the consent of two-thirds of the members 
of Parliament. Disobedience to this regulation means the immediate laying down of his high position. 
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(16) The State President may send messages to Parliament 
and/or to the Community Council about any matter of great national 
interest, and indicate the direction which he considers such 
body should take in this connection Likewise, he can convey 
messages about such matters to the nation and, in case of need, 
call for a referendum which shall be final, He MUST exercise 
this right of calling for a referendum when a Draft Act is accepted 
which will have the effect of violating the republican independ-
ence of this country, or which threatens ultimately to have 
the effect of violating such independence. 
(17)Should the State President die, or become incapacitated 
in any other waydtring his tern of office, then his post shall 
be filled by the Chairman of the Community Council, until such 
time as a new State President has been elected, or until the 
State President is fully restored. 
(18)When the State President acts in conjunction with 
the Council of Ministers he will be called the President-in-
Council, Any decision of the President-in-Council demands the 
approval of the State President as well as that of the Council 
of Ministers, which, with this object in view, can meet under 
the Chairmanship of the State President. 
(19)The right of exempting from or alleviating sentences 
passed by any Court of Law is granted to the State President, 
who, however, is expected under ordinary circumstances, to do 
this on the advice of the Head Minister supported by the Council 
of Ministers. 
(20) The State President cannot, during his term of office, 
be brought to trial before any of the ordinary courts of the 
land, whether in connection with an accusation of an ordinary 
transgression, or in connection with his carrying out of the 
duties of the position laid upon him. His behaviour can t , 
however, be brought to the notice of Parliament by means of a 
written document, signed by at least one-third of the members 
of Parliament or one-half of the members of the Community 
Council, In the case of such an accusation the Parliament 
must investigate it or cause it to be investigated, and when 
this has been served on him, the State President shall have 
the right to appear personally and/or to let himself be repre-
sented at the investigation. If a motion is accepted by a 
two thirds majority, in which it has been laid down that the 
complaint against his behaviour or the exercise of his duties 
connected with his position is found to be correct and that the 
behaviour has been of such a nature that it has made him un-
fitted to continue in his position, then such resolution of 
Parliament will remove him from his high position. 
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ARTICLE 9 : GOVERNMENT OF THE NON-REGISTERED NON-EUROPEAN GROUPS  
(1) Every Coloured group of Races, Coloured, Natives, 
Asiatics, Indians, etc. will be segregated, hot only as regards 
the place of dwelling or the neighbourhoods dwelt in by them, 
but also with regard to spheres of work. The memoers of such 
groups can, however, be allowed to enter white territories under 
proper lawful control for the increase of working power and also 
for the necessary increase of their own incomes. 
(2) To each of such segregated race groups of Coloured 
subjects of the Republic, self-government will be granted 
within their own territory under the central management of the 
general government of the country, in accordance with the fitness 
of the group for the carrying out of such self-government for 
which they will have to be systematically trained. 
(3) In urban non-European residential areas, non-European 
town councils with a paid White or non-White official as the head 
of the village, will be instituted and carry out functions, which 
will be laid down by law, under the supervision of the Mayor. 
(Appointed official). 
(4) In Reserves Native Chiefs will carry out the rule over their own race in accordance with the system and customs of 
the tribe, but under supervision of the government of the 
country and subject to the demands that such rule shall not 
work against the interests of the Republic, and may not lead 
to the deterioration of the ground in the Reserve or of any-
thing else of value. For this reason guidance must be made 
available by the Republic and supervision exercised by special 
officials of the Government. 
• (5) Accordingly, as the different non-European groups 
become fit for it, a Coloured People's Council, a Native Council, 
an Asiatic and an Indian Council must be developed for the whole 
of the Republic. Each of these Councils will be chosen by the 
Heads or representatives of the race group concerned out of 
their race members who are major subjects of the Republic, in a 
manner which will be laid down by legislation. Provision will 
be made for the appointment of a number of non-European rep- 
resentatives of the race group concerned, or of the Council of the 
Group by the President-in-Council, and also of having a number 
of White advisers to give guidance. 
(6) The government and functions of such Councils will be 
fixed by legislation but the object must be quite clear that 
each Council must discuss the interests of its race group, in 
a constitutional manner, in public, and that any recommendations 
concerning these must be laid before the State President, the 
Government, Parliament or the Community Council. 
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(7) Non-Europeans, educated for any of the professional callings, and non-European traders, are shut out from practice 
or trade among White people, except with special permission 
from the Mayor, who must be convinced that such exception in 
such special cases is in the interests of the whole of the local 
community concerned. At the same time such non-European 
professional persons and non-European traders must be encouraged 
to work among their own race group in their special lines. 
They will be protected there by the Government against White 
competition, except in cases where the non-European group 
concerned is not yet itself able to make sufficient provision 
for the services needed by the non-European community in a 
specified place. 
(8) White employees may not be employed by non-European 
employers. 
ARTICLE 10 : THE OATH OF LOYALTY 
An oath of exclusive loyalty to the Republic and to the 
people of South Africa and of readiness to protect and strive 
for its independence at all times and to honour and to main- 
tain its Constitution in all things must be taken by all strangers 
when they become citizens, and by all servants of the Republic 
when taking up service. This concerns not only the State 
President, as Head of the State, but also the Head Minister, 
the members of the Council of Ministers, members of Parliament, 
and of the Community Council, appointed or elected representatives 
of the people in local bodies, Civil servants, including teachers 
and members and officials of the non-European Councils. 
ARTICLE 11 : BASIC PRINCIPLES OF (NATIONAL)  
STATE POLICY 
(1) The public tone of life of the Republic is Christian-
National, without any forcing of conscience and the honouring 
of this tone of life is demanded in all public activities which 
have a formative influence upon the spirit of the people. The 
propagation of any State policy and the existence of any political 
organisation which is in strife with the fulfilling of this 
Christian-National vocation of the life of the people is forbidden. 
(2) The Republic acknowledges the freedom of the organ-
isation and government of Churches, provided their acts do not 
disturb the public order, undermine the national morale or 
attack the authority of the State. But the acknowledged 
Christian Churches, as established in a Protestant Christian 
people, will be protected and supported by the Republic, especially 
as regards Sunday rest and mission and the Republic expects from 
them support for their authority and advice with regard to education, 
public morale and other things of the same kind. 
- 237 - 
(3) The public education and instruction is a national 
duty, and schooling must be available for every child. The 
education must link up with the general Christian-national 
principles for public life, but with proper supervision for 
acknowledged deviating groups in the population. In particular, 
the home language of the child and the religious tendencies of 
the parents must receive the fullest consideration. Culture of 
the body as well as that of the mind must be attended to and 
especially also with regard to the awakening of the proficiency. 
The task of supervision over national education, so that it 
will not become undermining for the State, or for the national 
morale, does not cease in the ordinary educational institutions 
in the community, but also stretches out to the Youth organisations 
and other social and philanthropic organisations and in parti-
cular to the radio, and amusements in all their divisions. A 
general cultural development in pure Christian-National spirit 
must be furthered (fostered). 
(4) The attitude of Whites over against non-Whites is being regulated in the spirit of Christian guardianship, the former 
over the latter. The Principles of no mixing of blood and of 
segregation must be maintained as of fundamental importance for 
the future existence of a white civilisation in the Republic 
of South Africa. 
(5) The economic and social organisation of the Republic 
must be directed to the highest measure of production, coupled 
with prosperity and happiness, which shall not be the privilege 
of a limited group, but must be evenly spread aslhr as possible 
over all layers of the population, so that there shall be no 
extremes of great wealth and great poverty in the Republic. 
Everyone must get paid work and a reasonable compensation, 
taking into account his capabilities and his value to the community, 
and there must be a minimum scale of wages to that each one out 
of the earnings of his calling will be able at least to provide 
decently the ordinary household needs for his family. The 
principle of private assets is acknowledged, but all exploitation 
on the ground of private assets, or private undertaking, must be 
fought as well as economic competition, when it assumes a character 
that is destructive and impoverishing instead of spurring on and 
building up the people. The duty of labour in the service of 
the people rests upon all subjects and citizens of the Republic. 
(6) It is the right and also the duty of the State Govern-
ment to take the control and co-ordination of the economic and 
social life under its supervision beginning with the agricul-
tural basis of the national life, with the object of keeping 
the balance between the different population groups in the 
different callings and trades, and between capital and labour, 
and to protect against agricultural, industrial and commercial 
undertakings of a parasitic nature or undertakings which come 
into conflict with the interests of the community as a whole. 
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(7) All natural resources of the country must be placed 
by the Government at the services of the people, but culti-
vation can be allowed private people or bodies by law. The 
State must, however, on the principle of utility or otherwise, 
take such cultivation, industrial undertaking or other economic 
activities under its control when the general interests of the 
people demand it, or when an activity is not being conducted in 
the best interests of the Republic and its citizens. The State 
must exercise strict control over economic activities of impor-
tance to the country which are in the hands of subjects of foreign 
States. 
(8) The currency of the Republic must bear a purely 
indigenous character, and to assure this a State Bank must be 
developed with all necessary divisions and branches throughout 
the whole of the country with the object that this institution shall directly control the money and credit transactions of the 
Republic for the good of the people. 
(9) The State must encourage industrial development and 
also help to finance it, but not only with an eye to the greatest 
amount of profit but also to serve social interests alongside 
of the economic objects. Industries on the plattelamd should 
be specially encouraged with an eye to maintaining as large as 
possible a rural populations, including the population of 
the towns. 
(10)Country-wide group organisations for employers and 
employees in the various trades and callings, must receive the 
recognition of the State, which can also call them into being 
or reform them, in accordance with the object of organising them 
for self-government, by the official licensing of suitable persons 
for undertaking the work and by linking them up with the say of 
such groups in the governing of the State by means of the 
Community Council. 
(11) The State must establish as many citizens as possible 
and economically desirable on the land, control the division 
and capitalisation of agricultural land economically and must 
also further the increase of the White population by the encourage-
ment of immigration or assimilable elements. 
(12)The health of the nation is a special care resting upon 
the shoulders of the Government. It must take steps which will 
be reckoned to make the necessary nursing and medical treatment 
available to all. 
(13) The State must act in a protecting, supporting and 
uplifting manner towards the weaker portions of society. In 
conjunction with private social welfare and charitable work, it 
must make provision for the proper handling of the widow and the 
orphan, the weak in body or mind and the old of age. 
- 239 - 
(14)The Republic must regulate its dealings with other 
countries in such a way that friendship and peace with all can 
be assured, without allowing itself to be dominated by anybody 
or on any sphere. It must however realise its special destination 
and task in the Christian development of Southern Africa and 
will therefore develop its own powers to the full, and in partic-
ular maintain an independent defence force, consisting of a 
standing army and a citizen force on a national basis. 
(15) Every citizen is obliged to serve in the Defence Force 
of the Republic. This military service can also be extended 
to all subjects and classes of subjects. 
ARTICLE 12 : REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1) This Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
recalls and replaces the Constitution of the Union of South 
Africa of 1909 as well as any Statutes or regulations of any 
kind whatsoever, of the Union or of another country, which may 
be looked upon as supplementing or amending the Constitution 
of the Union of South Africa. This Constitution comes into 
immediate efficacy. 
(2) Any regulation of the Constitution can be amended or 
recalled, but this can only be done by a Special Amending Act 
of the Constitution which must be published in the Government 
Gazette at least two months before it is dealt with by Parliament. 
(3) A Draft Act which contains a suggestion for amendment 
of the Constitution may not contain any other proposals. 
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READING NO. 11 
EXTRACT FROM A MOTION MOVED IN SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF 
ASSEMBLY, 25/1/44.'' 
Mr, Malan : I move - 
That this House identifies itself with the opinion expressed 
by the Prime Minister before British Members of Parliament on 
the 25th November last, viz. : That after a successful conc-
lusion of the present wax for the Allies (1) Russia "will be 
in a position no other country has ever occupied in the history 
of Europe", and (2) England, on the other hand, will occupy 
a weak position owing to economic exhaustion and will even in 
the Tripartite Alliance be in an unequal partnership, on the 
one hand as against Russia, "the Colossus of Europe", and, on 
the other hand, as against the United States "with its enormous 
assets, its wealth and resources and its unlimited potential 
might". This House accordingly expresses as its deep conviction - 
(a) that any wax aim which contemplates the destruction, crippling or elimination of such 
countries as Germany, Italy, Poland, the 
Baltic States or Finland, which formed a 
bulwark against the communistic avalanche 
and may in the future continue to do so, 
is in conflict with the true and lasting 
interests of Europe and the Western European 
Christian civilisation in which America, 
England and also our own South Africa share; 
(b) that a stable and just world peace cannot be 
brought about or maintained by the domination 
of the so-called leadership of any combination 
of victorious great powers supported by their 
own armed forces; 
(c) that such world peace can be developed and maintained 
only on the basis of territorial demarcation 
which above all takes into consideration ethno-
graphical and national boundaries and the right 
of self-determination of the peoples concerned 
and further upon the basis of a policy of general 
disarmament and internation co-operation, promoted 
Coll. 75-6. 1. South Africar. House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 47, 
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and guided by an inclusive Union of Free Nations 
in which the small nations of the world will have 
equal status and authority with the great nations, 
and which the Union of South Africa will then 
also be prepared to join; and 
(d) that in view of the changed international position 
of England as well as in view of our internal 
solidarity South Africa's interests demand that 
its existing constitutional status should be 
further developed and converted into that of a free 
independent Republic, separated from the British 
Crown and Empire, based upon the principles of 
popular government and the equal language and 
cultural rights of both sections of the European 
population, anti-capitalistic and anti-communistic 
by nature, and made safe for the European race and 
Christian civilisation as well as for the develop-
ment of the non-European population according to 
their own character and ability by the loyal 
maintenance of the principles of separation and 
trusteeship 	 
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READING NO. 12 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 
11/5/49. 
Field-Marshal Smuts : We hear from various sides this 
propaganda on behalf of a republic in this country. We see 
it in the Government Press, we find it mentioned by Ministers 
of the Crown. We find this formula which has been evolved for 
keeping India in the Commonwealth used as an incentive for 
republican propaganda in this country. We see it stated both by Ministers and by the Press that the way is now open; 
that this formula which has been evolved for India opens the 
way to a republic in South Africa; that we are free to do 
anything. There is no question about it. We are free to 
move in any direction we like. This sovereign country can move 
in any direction it likes. But now it is a question of 
policy. It is a question of how far the Prime Minister 
approves of this republican propaganda and how far it is a 
declaration of the policy of his party. You see, Mr. Chairman, 
in this question we are up against something that has been a 
bone of contention between our peoples in South Africa, and I 
do not think that the Government should make its position 
plain and state its policy on this matter Of a republic to 
the country. I am quite satisfied with what happened at the 
London Conference - excepting with regard to India. 
The Minister of Justice : I thought you were the one 
sad exception. 
Field Marshal Smuts : Yes, so far as India is concerned 
and even if I stood alone I would still feel that something has been done there which is a leap in the dark. 
The Minister of Justice : What would you have done if 
you had been there? 
Field Marshal Smuts : With regard to the rest I agree 
that the declaration of this formula is satisfactory and that 
it is in harmony with the preamble of the Statute of Westminster 
but I think we must have some statement of policy. We must 
get our people together, and the Prime Minister, on his arrival 
in South Africa, said that the step that has been taken will be a 
contribution towards racial unity in this country. Well, 
Mx. Chairman, we are all aware that a republic, so far from being 
a bond of union in this country, will produce just the opposite 
effect; that there is today probably no single factor which 
is tending more to keep the two portions of the European race in this country apart than this republican propaganda that is going on. If that could be side-tracked. I think there 
would be a much better chance of our working together. 
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The Minister of Justice : So we must give in to you, then 
there will be peace. 
Field-Marshall Smuts : No, you need not give in to us. I 
am not talking of the distant future. I am talking about the 
situation that faces us in South Africa today, and we are all 
agreed that an attempt should be made to keep the people of this 
country together and to help them to form a united nation in 
South Africa. We are all agreed on that. 
The Minister of the Interior : Do not the principles of 
your party allow propaganda for a republic? 
Field Marshal Smuts : Yes, but it is not our policy. 
Maj. Van Der Byl : We can do what we like, but it is not 
our policy. 
Field Marshall Smuts : No, my hon. friend will admit that 
that is a verbal score. We have a declaration in our programme 
of principles which allows an opening for it. 
The Minister of the Interior : But surely it cannot be a 
bone of contention then if you allow it. 
Field Marshal Smuts : As an actual policy it is. 
Major Van Der Byl This is not a Broederbond meeting you 
are having. 
Field Marshal Smuts : There is no question - everybody knows 
it - that in the background there was this danger and this danger 
is keeping the people of this country apart. If the people knew 
that there would not be this agitation for a republic, this 
continual attempt to reconstruct this country on a republican 
basis, you would have much more unity; you would have much more 
co-operation in this country than we are having today, and I 
would ask the Prime Minister to state the policy of the Government 
on this point because I think there is nothing today which keeps 
the two sections of our people further apart than this question 
of establishing a republic. Mk. Chairman, do not let us use 
this exceptional case of India as a precedent for this country. 
India is not a precedent for us to follow. We need only look at 
what is happening abroad in these days in New York to realise that we should not follow India. Nobody knows what will become 
of that exceptional case 	 
1. South Africar  House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 68, Coll. 5571-73. 
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READING NO. 13 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES 14/6/49. 1 
The Prime Minister (Dr. Malan) : The hon-member for 
Claremont (Mr. Waterson), as did other hon. members, appealed 
to me to repeat what was done in 1927 in connection with the 
Flag Act. At that time, so they say, a compromise was agreed 
upon and now they expect that the same procedure will again 
be followed in this case and that we shall again have recourse 
to a compromise. All I can say is that in view of the 
experience which we have gained, if there is anything which warns 
me against a compromise, then it is the happenings of 1927. 
The compromise of 1927, embodied in the Flag Act which was 
passed, laid down that there would be one single national flag 
in South Africa and not two, but when we recollect how that 
compromise was carried out and what was for a long time and 
still is today the point of view of hon. members on the other 
side, then I say that from the outset they broke that compromise 
both in the letter and in the spirit. The late Gen. Hertzog 
also repeatedly stated in this House that such was the case.... 
1, South African House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 69, Coll. 7905-6 
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READING NO. 14 
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH mArof MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE 
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY 7/7/53. 
The Prime Minister (Dr. Malan) : No, I have no objection 
to it if any member, any European power with possessions in 
Africa, wants to develop its possessions in a judicious manner. 
I have nothing against that. It is their right to do so and 
so the Gold Coast also has that right. But what I want to 
emphasize is this, that they should exercise their rights judiciously. What the experiment, as it is called, on the Gold 
Coast has resulted in is that the whole of Africa is today in a turbulent state. It had its influence on Kenya. It had its 
influence on Nyasaland. It had in influence in North Rhodesia 
where the Natives say that they will be satisfied with nothing 
less in regard to the Federation than the Gold Coast Constitution, and that eventually numbers must count in regard to those 
territories. That is the influence which is exercised and 
much of the dissatisfaction in Africa today resulted from that, 
and also from Communistic agitation. 
Now, my amendment is as follows :- 
To delete all the words after "That" and to substitute - 
"(1) (a) the House expresses its approval of the close 
consultation and co-operation in matters of 
common concern with other members of the 
Commonwealth by the Government at the recent Prime 
Ministers' Conference in London, and more 
especially so in view of the disturbed and 
unsettled conditions in the world; 
(b) it further expresses its conviction that such 
co-operation may also in the future prove to be 
possible and desirable irrespective whether 
South Africa is a Republic or not and irres-
pective whether she is a member of the 
Commonwealth or not; 
(c) it further approves of and confirms, as the 
basis of the Commonwealth, the full recognition 
of the sovereign independence of its member 
states, their freedom of association with each 
1. South Africa:, House  of Assembly Debates, Vol. 82, Coll. 58-60. 
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other as well as their equality in respect 
of their national and international status, 
and the principle of non-interference in the 
domestic affairs of the respective member 
states; and 
(d) the House accordingly reaffirms the sovereign 
right of the Union of South Africa under the 
supremacy and guidance of Almighty God to be 
the sole master of its own destinies and of 
its own constitutional structure, subject only 
to the true interests of its people as determ-
ined from time to time in a constitutional way. 
It rejects therefore every attempt to curtail 
this right of self-determination; and ... 
That is really my amendment. But now I have taken the 
liberty of adding something to it. What I am adding here is to 
record on this occasion, in view of the unfounded fear which has 
unfortunately been aroused - I do not say by whom - on the part 
of portion of our population that this Government, this Parliament 
will make misuse of the powers which the people entrusted to them, 
namely to force upon the people, against the will of the people 
and without the people having any say in the matter, a republic. 
The motion of the hon. Leader of the Opposition is an anti-
republican motion. It is fitting to record here what the 
Nationalist Party and this Government want, and that the assurances 
given by the Government and its Party in this regard should be 
registered before the eyes of the whole nation. 
Mr. S.J.M. Steyn : Tomorrow it will be the dead hand of 
the past. 
The Prime Minister : I do not ask in this motion that the 
Opposition should vote for a republic. If I were to ask in 
this motion that the Opposition should vote for this republican 
ideal, I would be doing the same wrong thing of which I accused 
the Leader of the Opposition. I do not ask the Opposition to 
vote for it, but I include it in this motion in order to record 
the assurances which this Government and its party have given, 
so that it can stand there and no one in future can be able to 
say that they expect the worst from the Government. I now add - 
(2) the House further takes cognizance of the Republican 
policy of the Government and the assurances given there-
in, viz. : 
(a) that such constitutional change to a Republican 
form of state, though it offers a great 
contribution to true national unity and is best 
adapted to the traditions, circumstances and 
aspirations of the South African nation, can be brought about only on the broad basis of the 
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national will, and with the faithful observance 
of equal rights in all respects of the two 
sections of the European population and as the 
result of a special and definite mandate from the 
European electorate and not merely by a 
Parliamentary majority obtained as the result of 
an ordinary election; 
There must be a special authorization by the nation on this point. 
And further - 
(b) that, in view of the London Declaration of 1949, the proclamation of a Republic and withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth have become two separate 
questions which need not be answered simultan-
eously, and that the last-mentioned should be 
judged and decided at any given time in the 
light of the then existing circumstances and 
South Africa's interests and position in the 
international world. 
In other words, there may be a repdblican South Africa, but 
South Aftica will still be a member of the Commonwealth, just 
as any other member which wants a republic. And if it decides 
to leave the Commonwealth, that has to be done afterwards by 
means of a separate resolution. 
Mt Lawrence : Will that resolution be by way of a referendum? 
The Prime Minister : That is not a matter we need discuss 
at the moment, because we do not intend to go to the nation now 
for a republic. Those are natters which can be decided later. 
But my object is this, that we want a united South Africa, and 
for that reason we must remove fear, and especially unfounded 
fear, of one another from the life of the nation. That is our 
purpose and we are not asking the Opposition to vote for a 
republic but just to take notice of it and of the assurances 
given, and to leave these assurances as a solemn and full guarantee 
to the nation which we dare not, and we on this side of the House 
will not, break 	 
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READING NO. 15 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES 2 	56. 1 
Dr. J.H.O. Du Plessis : I do not intend making a speech about 
the republic, but I feel the need to protest strongly against the attack made here this afternoon by the hon. member for South Coast 
(ft. Mitchell). The hon. member accused us this afternoon of 
acting maliciously, or mischievously, when we plead for a 
republic. Now I just want to tell the hon. member for South 
Coast and other hon. members opposite this : They cannot render 
the country a greater disservice at this stage of our history, when we need White unity in South Africa more than ever before, 
than to proceed with this opposition, malicious opposition on 
their pert, against the republican ideal of the Natioaalist Government and the Afrikaners. The greatest task with which 
we are faced in this country is to build up a united White race. 
If we cannot unite the Whites, we have no hope of surviving the period of crisis ahead of us. Now we have had the position 
that attempts have been made to create a united White population in South Africa by force of arms. That attempt failed miserably. 
Secondly, an attempt was made to create a united nation on the 
basis of a Crown colony. That attempt also failed miserably. Thirdly, an attempt was made to unite the White people in South 
Africa on a dominion basis, without sovereign independence and 
full freedom,, and also that attempt did not succeed. It is our 
solemn duty to strive to attain the only real constitutional basis on which the White people can be united. It is my deep 
conviction that that basis is the republican freedom in which 
one will have symbols which are South Africa's own, and where 
also the head of the State is our own, but a republic co-operating 
with Britain and the members of the Commonwealth and all friendly 
states in the greatest friendship; not a state or a republic 
which isolates itself. That is the only real basis of unity. 
As long as the member for South Coast and other hon. members 
opposite continue their propaganda and those attacks on the 
republican aim, sowing suspicion by saying that it is the policy 
of suppression and isolation, for so long are they busy opposing 
national unity in South Africa. 
1. South Africa- House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 91, Coll. 4117-18. 
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READMM NO. 16 
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY MR. J.G. STRIJDOM (PRIME MINISTER) 
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MUSE OF ASSI3MBLY, 1ST FEBRUARY 1957 1. 
I think that I am speaking on behalf of the whole House in saying that we have listened with the greatest interest to the 
speech of the hon. member for Hospital (Mr. Barlow). 	Let me say this as far as his Bill is concerned. South Africa, as he 
has said, is a sovereign independent country; but, as he also 
indicated, a sovereign independent country which, in contrast 
with all other independent countries, occupies the peculiar 
position that we have two official flags, one being our national 
flag and the other also a national flag but the national flag of 
another sovereign independent country, namely Great Britain. 
It is difficult to imagine such a state of affairs in other sovereign countries such as Britain, for example. Can anyone 
imagine Britain accepting the flag of another country, in 
addition to her own national flag, or that the U.S.A. or Holland 
or Belgrim or Germany would do such a thing? What then is the 
reason for the peculiar position that we have here? Those reasons are known to most of us but for the sake of clarity I want to deal with them briefly. 
The fact that the Union Jack which flies in South Africa 
today is the flag of another independent country is, of course, 
due to the fact that South Africa is or was a conquered country 
and, as happens in all conquered countries, whether the conqueror 
be Britain or Germany or France, the flagkof the conquered 
flies in that country. Similarly the Union Jack was flown in South Africa was a conquered country. But after South Africa had become a conquered country and a Colony of Britain's, a very interesting development took place in the composition of the 
British Empire. Some of the Crown Colonies, as a result of 
legislation passed by the British Parliament, first developed into self-governing Colonies; and later on some of them, as the 
result of an agreement with the British Government, countries 
such as Canada, Australia and South Africa developed into 
sovereign independent countries, bound together in what was 
formerly called the British Commonwealth and what is now called simply the Commonwealth. 	DE FACTO we in South Africa, for all 
1. On the second reading of a Bill introduced by Mr. Arthur 
Barlow doing away with the Union Jack as one of the official 
flags of the Union. It was enacted as the Flags Amendment  Act No. 18 of 1957. 
Kruger (Parties and Policies) op. cit., pp. 215-219. 
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practical purposes, attained independent status at the end of 1926. 
Juridically we attained it in 1931 when the British Parliament 
passed the Statute of Westminster. 
Mr. Speaker, what would one regard as the logical and natural.'_ 
consequence of attainment of independent status by South Africa? 
One would have expected the disappearance of the Union Jack, which was the national flag of Britain, and which had flown over us 
because up to that stage we were subordinate to Britain. But it did not disappear, and there are reasons why it did not disappear, 
reasons which I want to deal with just briefly. I do not say 
that they are good reasons, but there are certain reasons. I 
ask myself - and this is a question which every stranger, who 
does not live in South Africa, would ask himself - why, when South Africa attained independent status, our people did not im- mediately celebrate with pride the attainment of independent 
status by accepting and hoisting the outward sign and symbol of 
that independence, namely a national flag of our own as the only 
flag of this country. Why, instead of that, did we have the 
struggle to which the hon. member for Hospital referred, a bitter 
and unpleasant flag dispute - let us admit it today -which 
lasted for a long time and which caused feelings in this country 
to run high and which eventually led to Act No. 40 of 1927 which 
gave these two flags to our country, namely the Union Jack which 
is the national flag of Britain, and our own national flag. 
And it then became necessary to attach to the Union Jack the meaning which the hon, member over there quoted, that is to say, that it 
would indicate the association of the Union with the other members 
of the group known as the Commonwealth of Nations. Principally - 
and let us admit it in all honesty, without reproaching one 
another, because there is not the slightest reason why at this stage in our history there should be any recriminations with 
regard to these things - principally because we in South Africa 
had two European groups who in respect of this natter adopted two diametrically opposed attitudes and who viewed this matter from two different Angles, posed attitudes and who viewed this matter 
from two different angles, the one being the Afrikaans-speaking 
group, the conquered group, which naturally viewed the Union Jack 
and as a. matter of fact the whole question of the independence of South Africa and the question of our own flag in quite a different light to the way in which our English-speaking fellow-
Afrikaners viewed it. That was quite natural. 
As against that there were English-speaking citizens of this 
country who naturally, in view of their history and perhaps for 
the very reason that we had another group here, namely the 
Afrikaans-speaking group, did not at that stage regard themselves 
as a separate South African nation, but who then still regarded 
themselves as part of the British nation and for that reason saw 
the Union Jack in the same light as the British people in Britian 
that is to say, as their flag. Well, viewed in retrospect one can 
appreciate that. However disappointing it may have been to us, 
the Afrikaans-speaking section, that most of our English-speaking 
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fellow-citizens in the years 1926-27 and thereafter adopted an attitude which so strongly conflicted with the attitude adopted by us with regard to the flag issue, I personally as convinced that what I have just said here was perhaps the main reason for their attitude at that time. Under different conditions today 0. we are no longer living in the year 1926, 1927 or 1931; we are now living in the year 1957, 30 years later - today under different conditions and looking back over the years calmly we, the Afrikaans-speaking section, can perhaps better appreciate the feeling of our English-speaking fellow-citizens in those days than we were able to appreciate it in the beat of the struggle, and I am convinced that the majority of our Englishspeaking fellow-countrymen in South Africa are also in a position today to appreciate with greater sympathy and better than they 
did in those days the feeling of the Afrikaans-speaking people 
in the country. This feeling on the part of the English..speaking people in this country in those days that they still formed pert of the British nation and that for that reason Britain' s national flag, i.e. the Uhion Jack, was also their flag, was so strong in the years 1926-27 that, as we all know, a. rebellion was threatened if the then Government proceeded with its plan to give the Union one flag only, namely the national flag. 
In view of this deep-seated feeling on the part of the English-speaking people of South Africa that they still formed part of the British nation and that they still regarded the Union Jack AS their flag, therefore the then Government, in those circumstances, entered into a compromise in order to meet the Bnglishspeaking section, and as a result of this compromise the Flag Act of 1927 was then placed on the Statute Book, which then, as the hen. member for Hospital has said, gave our country this system of two flags, namely a national flag as described in our present Act, and the Union Jack. The terms of that compromise have been read out by the hon. member over there. r do not went to emote them therefore. I just went to say briefly, in the first place, that the Union Jack was to be retained to indicate our association with the other Commonwealth countries; in the second place, that the Union Jack, together with our national flag, mould be heisted over the Houses of Parliament, the main Government buildings in the two capitals and in the capitals of the provinces and over the Government offices overseas. And that is a, very important thing when one bears in mind that here a sovereign independent country was required to fly the flag of another country over its offices overseas. But that was part of the compromise. At this stage I want to ask whether there is any member in the Mouse who can tell me, without prejudice end calmly, that he can imagine Britain, for example, flying the flag of another country such as the South African national flag, for instance, over her foreign offices, or that he can imagine Canada doing so? Even Canada and Australia do not do it. This provision, which is contained in our Act as a result of the compromise entered into in good faith at that time, is to be found in the legislation of no other country in the world, as fax SA I know. 
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South Africa therefore occupies that illogical, inconsistent 
position. 
The question now arises - and this is the question which the 
hon. member for Hospital raised - whether this state of affairs 
should continue. The question whether this state of affairs should 
continue was frequently raised after 1927. It was raised in 
this House in the course of various debates from time to time. 
It was frequently raised on public platforms, and the question 
was frequently raised in letters, in leader columns and in 
documents whether this state of affairs, this unheard of and 
illogical state of affairs, should continue, namely that South 
Africa should have two flags, that is to say, our own national 
flag and in addition to that the national flag of another country. 
This question was raised frequently and it was done after 1927 
when this compromise was entered into, great changes took place in 
South Africa and the situation changed completely. Quite apart 
from other changes which came about after 1927, when for 
practical purposes we were already independent but were not yet 
juridically independent, the Statute of Westminter was sub-
sequently passed in terms of which South Africa then became a 
sovereign independent country not only DB FACTO but also DE JURE 
and in every sense of the word. This tremendous change came about 
after the flag agreement had been entered into in 1927, and this 
change inevitably exercised an enormous influence over the pop-
ulation as a whole. I make bold to say - and I do not think 
that any right-thinking person would contradict me - that gradually 
the fact that South Africa had become a sovereign independent 
country and was recognised as such throughout the world by all 
other sovereign independent countries, inevitably exercised an 
enormous influence over many of the English-speaking citizens of 
this country, in the first place with regard to their relationship 
with Britain and in the second place - and this is the most imp-
ortant aspect - their relationship with South Africa. 
It stands to reason that the fact that together with us they 
were witnessing and participating from day to day in the exercise 
and implementation of our sovereign independent powers, brought 
home' to them the realisation and the feeling which we had already 
had for generations, that they were no longer part of Britain or 
of the British nation but that, together with us, they formed 
the South African nation and that the independence of our nation 
could be symbolised by one flag only, namely by a national flag. 
Gradually the fact that since 1931 we had been a sovereign 
independent country, brought home to many of the members sitting 
over there and to the English-speaking section throughout the 
country the realisation that it was a completely inconsistent, 
illogical state of affairs for a sovereign independent country 
to allow the national flag of another country to flay as one of 
her flags. As a result of this course of events in the first 
place, and, in the second place, as the result of expressions 
of opinion which you, Mx. Speaker, and I and many of the members 
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in this House have heard in recent years from English-speaking 
people, particularly from those English-speaking people in this 
country who were born here in the last 50 years and who grew up here 
and also many others who settled here and adopted South Africa 
as their fatherland - I say as a result of what we have observed 
and learned from them, I have become deeply convinced and I think 
most people at least on this side of the House - and I would say 
throughout the country - have become deeply convinced that over 
and above the Afrikaans-speaking section of our people there is 
also today a very large section of the English-speaking people, 
citizens of our country, who want only one flag for South Africa. 
I say that in the opinion of the vast majority of our people, the 
time is ripe to bring about this much-desired change, namely 
that South Africa should have only one flag. I think that the 
vast majority of people in South Africa are convinced - whether they 
all desire it, is another matter, and I do not suggest that - 
/ say the vast majority of people in South Africa, even those 
who do not desire it, whatever their reasons may be, are convinced 
of the fact that sooner or later South Africa is going to become 
a republic. That, I think, is as plain as a pikestaff 	 
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READING NO. 17 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES, 18/9/58 1 
The Prime Minister ( Dr. Verwoerd) : I also wonder whether 
that is true, because apart from the fact that they are demanding 
that we should sacrifice our entire policy, I believe that the 
United Party will then search for other bones of contention in 
other fields - between English and Afrikaners, between Whites and 
• non-Whites - in order to come into power. This has indeed been 
the basis of our struggle over the years : Nationalism against 
Imperialism. This has been the basis of the struggle since 1910 : 
A republic as against the monarchial connection. That is why I 
say we should not allow ourselves to be bluffed by such contentions. 
In this connection another allegation has been made regarding 
myself to which I must reply. It is the contention that I am 
supposedly the person who above all others does not want to have 
anything to do with a republic within the Commonwealth. The 
standpoint which my party has stated before is the standpoint 
I advocate, and this standpoint is clearly set out in the party's 
constitution. This standpoint is that while the issue prior to 1949 was whether the Union would become a republic (obviously 
outside the Commonwealth) or whether it should remain in the 
Commonwealth, the situation was changed after the 1949 London 
Declaration in terms of which States such as India became republics 
and remained within the Commonwealth. Thereafter the National 
Party adopted a clear standpoint which was stated in this House * 
first by DT. Malan and later by Mr. Strydom. I repeat it today, 
namely, that the issue as far as we are concerned has since been 
split into two sections. The first is that the question should 
be asked : Should we or should we not become a republic? There-
after, the second question which must be asked is whether it will 
be a republic within or outside the Commonwealth. Our reply is this : As regards the first point we stand unequivocally and 
clearly for the establishment of the republic by the correct 
methods and at the appropriate time : but as regards the second 
question, we shall not nor can we come to a decision at the moment. 
This decision will have to be taken when the time for establishing 
a republic arrives. Then the decision will have to be taken when the 
time for establishing a republic arrives. Then the decision as to 
whether the republic should be within or outside the Commonwealth 
will depend on what will be in the best interests of South Africa 
under the prevailing circumstances. I stand by this standpoint as 
unequivocally and as firmly as my predecessors 	 
1. South Alticau. House of Assembl Debates Vol. 98, Co1.4161. 
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READING MO. 18 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES 20/3/59 1. 
Dr. De Wet : To strengthen our case and to give it 
more force, I believe that South Africa should become a republic 
as soon as possible. Mr. Speaker, the establishment of a 
republic will emphasize the individual identity of the White 
man because we cannot get away from the fact that in the outside 
world - and anyone who has travelled knows this - we are simply 
regarded as a British colony. That is the general belief. 
Most people of the Western world are not even fully aware of the 
fact that South Africa forms an independent part of Africa. I 
say that our becoming a republic will focus attention on South 
Africa. This is what happened in the case of Ghana. The fact 
that Ghana became independent focused the attention of the 
world upon her. Such a great constitutional change would 
contribute more than anything else towards showing the world 
that we are a permanent White community. It would give substance 
to the rights of the White man. An independent republic would 
earn recognition of our right to a permanent home here on the 
southern tip of Africa. 
Mt. Holland : Will the Black people have a say in that 
republic ? 
Dr. De Wet : I shall not allow myself to be distracted by 
such silly interjections 	 
1. South Africa. House of Assembly Debates Vol. 100, Col. 2901. 
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READING NO. 19 







The time is approaching when all of us must help to decide at 
the referendum what the immediate future of our country and people 
must be. 
Only in a republic will we be able to unite in giving our full 
attention to what is of vital importance. This includes the 
development of a safe future for our white population, coupled with 
justice towards the Non-whites. It is also necessary to ensure 
prosperity for everybody. 
Above all, however, we must create a republic in which we can 
all co-operate in truly building one South African nation. Self-
preservation and the interests of our children must compel us to 
look forward instead of backwards. 
Or will you, through not voting for a republic, let South 
Africa continue as a state in which the English- and Afrikaans-
speaking sections cannot unite? Then the struggles of the past 
and differences of descent will remain stumbling blocks due to 
the unsolved conflict on the question : British Monarchy or South 
African Republic? Peace and order and economic progress demand a 
final settlement of this dispute. 
Should South Africa remain a monarchy, it will have to suffer, 
time and again, from instigated racial clashes and economic setbacks, 
since these are the weapons used to prevent the coming of the republic. 
I sincerely trust that you will co-operate with me in developing 
a united nation within a prosperous South Africa by voting for a republic now. Never has the time been more suitable for this. 
Indeed, circumstances are such that it will prove unwise to wait longer. 
The struggle between Eastern and Western nations, between communism and Christendom, is such that both groups of nations will 
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grant and concede anything (including the white man of Africa, his 
possessions and his rights) to seek the favour and support of the 
black man. This has led to chaos in the Congo. Internal conflict 
and further elimination of the white man seem imminent in most 
other parts of Africa. Until the Western nations realize more fully 
what is happening, we should at least combine and protect ourselves. 
A democratic republic within the Commonwealth which guarantees 
both languages, enjoys so much support today for this very reason. 
The time is truly ripe. 
If we do not take this one step now, we ourselves may possibly, 
but our children certainly, will experience all the suffering 
of the Whites who are being attacked in and driven out of one 
African territory after the other. 
You love your country. You love your children. Sixty or 
more years of life lie ahead of many of them. I plead for their 
sake, their unity, safety and prosperity. 
For all these reasons I feel justified in approaching you 
personally with this urgent appeal. Become, by answering "Yes" 
through your cross on the voting paper, one of the founders of our 
Republic of South Africa. 
With best wishes, 
H. F. VERWOBRD. 
1. Cited in Hepple, op. cit. FP. 
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READIM N3. 20 
EXTRACT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY DEBATES 23/1/61 1 . 
The Prime Minister (Dr. Verwoerd) : The mandate was this, 
that South Africa, when it becomes a republic, wants to remain a 
member of the Commonwealth. That is the first point. I gave 
the assurance that I would do my best, notwithstanding all the doubt 
in the minds of hon. members, to keep our word to try to achieve 
that. And if we succeed we will continue, as we said in all honesty, 
to remain a member of the Commonwealth as long as the Commonwealth 
remains what it is. If in future the Commonwealth should change 
its character and become a body which tries to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of member states, then for the same reasons why 
otherwise we would not become a member, we would then not be able 
to remain a member. Everybody understands that. As long as the 
Commonwealth remains what it is we stand by our firm undertaking 
to co-operate to the best of our ability with a Commonwealth which 
does not interfere in the affairs of member countries. Now the 
honesty of that standpoint is being unjustifiably doubted. 
But there WAS a second leg to our standpoint, vim. this. If 
the Commonwealth should refuse us membership, or if we should be 
granted membership only subject to humiliating conditions which 
would reflect on the honour of our country, we will still become 
a republic, but not a member of the Commonwealth. Those who 
voted for a republic also voted for this second aspect of our 
standpoint. 
Now I want to tell the hon member this also. If he puts 
this question to us, as he does in the amendment, then all that 
is necessary to negative the decision of the electorate is that 
at the next Commonwealth Conference there should be a refusal for 
us to remain a member. If I give the guarantees he asks for the 
establishment of the republic would be destroyed. And who prepared 
the smoothest path for a refusal of membership, if only we want to 
make this concession, but the hon. the Leader of the Opposition 
himself? Before the election on 5th October, he allowed the 
impression to be created overseas that if only they are firm enough 
in preventing us from becoming a member of the Commonwealth their 
opposition would eventually triumph 	 
1. South Africac.  House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 106, Coll. 25-6. 
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READING NO. 21 
EXTRACT FROM A STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, DR. THE VON. 
H.F. VERWOERD, IN THE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, 23RD MARCH 1961 a . 
The Prime Minister : I move - That the House discuss the following matter, viz. : The withdrawal of the Union's application for continued membership of the Commonwealth after the establish-
ment of a republic on 31st May 1961. 
May I inform hon. members that there were two reasons in part-
icular which, amongst others, persuaded me to allow a discussion 
of our colour policy, the first being the discussions which! had 
had in advance with the leaders of Great Britain herself. It is 
common knowledge that strenuous efforts were made by the Prime Minister of Britain and the Minister of Commonwealth Relations 
to have discussions with the various member countries to bring 
home to them the basic idea that the Commonwealth should remain in-
tact for the sake of points of agreement and in spite of the points of difference. I was then informed that if I adopted the attitude, which we had adopted in the past, that South Africa's 
affairs may not be discussed, even if that was the correct 
constitutional position, or if I conceded no more than we had 
conceded last year, that is to say, that the policy of South 
Africa may be discussed in private conversations and in private 
groups, I would probably spoil the atmosphere to such an extent 
that the prospects of success would immediately disappear. An 
appeal was therefore made to me not to press this demand on this occasion. I then said : "Very well, if it is necessary to create 
the right atmosphere for South Africa's admission to the Common-
wealth, I shall accept your advice and allow this policy to be 
discussed, but I want to say perfectly clearly that I regard it as 
wrong, and that I also regard it as a dangerous precedent." I 
went on to say : "I must say that, although I am giving my consent 
now, which is the only way in which such a discussion can take place, it must not be regarded as a precedent that I shall give permission in the future, and that I am also of the opinion that 
such a discussion ought not to take place in the ease of other 
countries' affairs." In the circumstances, therefore, so as to 
help to create a favourable atmosphere, I gave that permission. 
1. Mansergh (Docs. 1952-62, Vol III), op. cit. pp. 375-8 and 388-9. 
(The full statement appears in Mansergh pp. 375-89.) 
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But there was a second reason, and this is a purely logical 
reason. If, when South Africa's application for membership came 
before the Conference, there were people present who, on the grounds 
of our colour policy, either objected to our membership or (and 
this would be more reasonable) had certain doubts which they were 
anxious to have removed by hearing our side of the case, I did not 
see how I could say that they should not be allowed to advance their 
reasons for their attitude. In other words, 2E felt that in these 
circumstances it was only reasonable and desirable, even unavoidable, 
that permission should be given to discuss South Africa's policy 
colour policy on this occasion. Both in view of the request of 
those who had taken the lead in their attempt to keep South Africa 
within the Commonwealth and because of the reasonableness of such 
a request, I therefore felt obliged to give this permission. I an 
convinced that if we had refused permission, it would have led to 
much more unpleasant discussion and insistence* and the result 
would have been no different. Then I would have been reproached 
here today for the very opposite reason, namely, for my refusal to 
make just the "small concession" of permitting a discussion. 
That was the first serious concession that I made therefore in 
an attempt to keep us within the Commonwealth, in accordance with 
my promise to do everything possible to ensure our continued 
membership. 
I may say here in parenthesis that the question of a republic 
or a monarchy was never discussed or regarded as being of any 
importance, All that happened was that everybody said that it had 
nothing to do with this matter, that we were perfectly free to change 
our form of government, and that that was not the basis of any of the 
arguments. That has also been stated in his latest speech by the 
Prime Minister of the Milted Kingdom. It is true that the 
establishment of a republic could be used as an excuse for this 
discussion, and it is true that the argument was advanced by our 
opponents in South Africa that if only we had not come forward with 
the proposal to establish a republic, the question of our colour 
policy would not have come under discussion. In that regard I 
want to give two replies. The one is that the abandonment of our 
republican policy on this ground would have meant that membership 
of the Commonwealth would have placed such limitations upon South 
Africa that she would not even have been able to make up her own 
mind or to act in regard to a matter which is obviously her own affair. 
That very curtailment of our power to act in accordance with cur 
own wishes would then have been a good reason basically to leave the 
Commonwealth without further ado, because it would have restricted 
the sovereign freedom of the nation and the State. Secondly, I am 
perfectly convinced that the absence of this constitutional issue 
would not have helped at all, because, in the course of these 
discussions, it emerged perfectly clearly that the Afro-Asian 
members, with one single exception, intended to try to force us at 
every opportunity, indeed, at the first opportunity, to abandon 
our colour policy. Failing that, they would have come along with a proposal that we should be expelled, and this matter would then 
- 261 - 
still have come under discussion. I am not so sure that it 
would not have come under discussion on this occasion. I think it 
would have been discussed. In other words, I have no doubt in my own mind that, although the establishment of a republic was used 
as a convenient excuse for dealing with this matter, the policy of 
separate development would have been dealt with and would have led, 
sooner or later, to the same result - rather sooner than later, 
and probably now! 
We must be under no illusions. This whole dispute concerned the 
colour policy. The outcome, too, is based entirely on differences 
with regard to the question of colour policy. Moreover, in the 
final analysis it is based not only on our party's attitude, although 
inevitably Government policy became the bone of contention, because 
we happen to be in power. In essence the reason for the clash was 
the unequivocal demand that the White man must not be allowed to 
protect himself anywhere in Africa or in the world by putting up 
barriers. That was-regarded as being in conflict with complete 
equality. I admit that initially the critics would have been 
satisfied with "small concessions". In that regard I shall have a 
few more words to say. However, one must look beyond the immediate 
shadow at the substance behind it, and the substance, the reality, 
was unambiguously that the White man must no longer be allowed to 
protect himself by erecting barriers, either here in South Africa 
or anywhere else in the world. There must be complete equality 
everywhere; full and equal political rights must be given everywhere. 
I know that the Tunku stated recently that he had no objection to 
the White Australia policy; in other words, to the erection of such 
barriers. I know that, but that is what is being said today. 
Like Mr. Menzies, I, too, fear that the self-protection of the White 
man in other countries will give rise to future attacks. I an as 
strongly convinced of that as he is. 
I put forward the proposition that it was not our aim, just as 
little as it is the aim of the other side, to make one group of the 
population subordinate eventually to the other. I pointed out 
that we all sought, along different roads, to bring about non-
subordination eventually. I tried to prove, in terns of our Bantu 
policy as well as our Coloured policy, that in every may we were 
seeking some means whereby co-existence would become possible. 
I said, just as I stated in my South Africa Club speech, that when a 
particular group, perhaps a smaller group, had acquired something 
for itself, it was entitled to its continued existence, without 
its being watered dawn in any way. Sometimes it can only retain 
its possessions and its independence, just as a small nation can 
only retain it next to a great nation, by a separate existence, with 
political independence and with its own geographic boundaries. 
That is why we must retain our borders, not only materially in terms 
of geography, but spiritually and physically as well. That is why 
I said that we were not fighting for anybody's permanent subordination. 
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It is true that there is a transition period during which there are 
certain forms of separation and even certain forms of discrimination 
against the Black man within the White area and against the White man 
within the Black area. But these are transition periods. One also 
finds discrimination, however, in India and in Canada and in practi-
cally every country of the world where there are Black:people and 
White people - or different kinds of non-Whites - although, perhaps, 
in different ways. I pleaded that we should accept in principle therefore that everybody was in favour of ultimate free co-existence 
and that every one of us was striving towards this end in our own 
way, and that that should not be used as an argument to push us out 
of the Commonwealth. But even this clear statement and this 
revelation that the policy of apartheid was not aimed at subordination 
but at co-existence, at good neighbourliness, made no impression. 
I regarded this as proof of what they contemplated. What they sought was not equality through co-existence and non-subordination in 
countries like South Africa, but the domination of superior numbers 
in the name of full equality and, therefore, eventual victory over 
the Whites by forcing out or swallowing up the Whites. It was 
there that we had to draw the line 	 
	 The opposition to South Africa's continued membership of the 
Commonwealth is based on alleged discrimination against and oppression 
of the non-White peoples of South Africa. I do not intend now 
repeating my strong denial of those allegations. I do, however, wish 
to state that it is ironical that those allegations have come from 
Prime Ministers in whose countries oppression and discrimination are 
openly practised, and where the basic principles of democratic 
government are flouted. In this connection I refer particularly to Ghana, India, Malaya and Ceylon, although certain other Common-
wealth countries are also not free from such practices which are 
sanctioned by legal enactments. In other cases, while not expressly 
permitted by law, little or no attempt is made to discontinue such 
practices. 
In conclusion, I wish to state that the proceedings at today's 
meeting which have obliged me to take this regrettable step, in my 
opinion, mark the beginning of the disintegration of the Commonwealth. 
This free association of states cannot hope to survive, if instead 
of devoting itself to co-operation in matters of common concern, 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers are going to continue the practice of 
interfering in each other's domestic affairs, and if their meetings 
are to be made the occasions for attacking their fellow members. 
The practices which have led to the present unsatisfactory conditions 
prevailing in the United Nations will, I venture to predict, lead 
to the eventual disintegration of the Commonwealth, which all would 
regret 	 
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READING NO. 1 
BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS'. 
We, African people in the Union of South Africa, urgently 
demand the granting of full citizenship rights, such as are enjoyed 
by all Europeans in South Africa. We demand : 
1. Abolition of political discrimination based on race .. 
and the extension to all adults, regardless of race, of the right to vote 
and be elected to parliament, provincial councils, and other repres-
entative institutions. 
2. The right to equal justice in courts of law, including 
nomination to juries and appointment as judges, magistrates and 
other court officials. 
3. Freedom of residence and the repeal of laws ... that restrict this freedom. 
I. Freedom of movement. 
5. Freedom of the press. 
6. Recognition of the sanctity or inviolability of the home 
as the right of every family, and the prohibition of police raids 
on citizens in their homes for tax or liquor or other purposes. 
7. The right to own, buy, hire or lease and occupy land and 
all other forms of immovable as well as movable property, and the 
repeal of restrictions on this right ... 
8. The right to engage in all forms of lawful occupations, 
trades and professions, on the same terms and conditions as members 
of other sections of the population. 
9. The right to be appointed to and hold office in the civil 
service and in all branches of public employment on the same terms 
and conditions as Europeans. 
10. The right of every child to free and compulsory education 
and of admission totechnical schools, universities and other 
institutions of higher education. 
11. Equality of treatment with any other section of the 
population in the state social services, and the inclusion on an 
equal basis with Europeans in any scheme of Social Security. 
(The declaration stresses a number of specific issues connected 
with industry and labour, commerce, education, public health and 
medical services and discriminatory, legislation.) 
1. 	African Claims in South Africa, Congress Series No. II, 
published by the African National Congress, Johannesburg. 
Adopted on December 16, 1945, at the Annual Conference 
Bloemfontein, cited in Carter G., The Politics of Inequality, 
Thames and Hudson, London, 1962 pp. 484-5. 
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A. Equal opportunity to engage in any occupation, trade and 
industry. In order that this objective might be realized to the 
fullest extent, facilities must be provided for technical and uni-
versity education of Africans so as to enable them to enter skilled, 
semi-skilled occupations, professions, Government service and other 
spheres of employment. 
B. Equal pay for equal work, as well as equal opportunity for 
all work and for the unskilled labour workers in both rural and 
urban areas such minimum wage as shall enable the workers to live 
in health, happiness, decency and comfort. 
C. Removal of the Colour Bar in industry, and other occupations. 
D. The statutory recognition of the right of the African worker 
to collective bargaining ... 
E. The extension of all industrial welfare legislation to 
Africans engaged in agriculture, domestic service and in public 
institutions or bodies. 
F. The recognition of the right of the Africans to freedom 
of trading. 
G. The state must provide full facilities for all types of 
education for Africans' children. 
H. Abandonment of the theory that 'there is a need of a 
special type of education for Africans as such'. Africans must 
therefore be given the type of education which will enable them 
to meet on equal terms with other people the conditions of the 
modern world. 
I. It is the duty of the state to provide adequate medical 
and health facilities for the entire population of the country. 
J. It is fundamental to the establishment of a new order in 
South Africa to abolish all enactments which discriminate against 
the African on the grounds of race and colour ... 
K. In short, we demand the repeal of any and all laws as well 
as the abandonment of any policy and all practices that discriminate 
against the African in any way whatsoever on the basis of race, 
creed or colour in the Union of South Africa. 
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READING NO. 2  
Charter of the United Nations : Articles 2, 10, 11, 13, 14. 1 
ARTICLE 2  
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes 
stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following 
Principles. 
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members. 
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith 
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present 
Charter. 
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security, and justice, are not endangered. 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance 
in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and 
shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the 
United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. 
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not 
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these 
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
2, Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. 
1. 	Nicholas H.G., The United Nations, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1962, pp. 197-201. 
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ARTICLE 10  
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any natters 
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers 
and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, 
and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to 
the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to 
both on any such questions or matters. 
ARTICLE 11 
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of 
co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, 
including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of 
armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such 
principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both. 
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by 
any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by 
a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with 
Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may 
make recommendations with regard to any such question to the state 
or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such 
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security 
Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. 
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security 
Council to situations which are likely to endanger international 
peace and security. 
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10. 
ARTICLE 13  
1. 	The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recom- 
mendations for the purpose of : 
(a) promoting international co-operation in the political 
field and encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification; 
(b) promoting international co-operation in the economic, 
social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and 
assisting in the realization of human rights and 
• fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion. 
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ARTICLE 13 (contd.) 
2. 	The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the 
General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 
1 (b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X. 
ARTICLE 14 
Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly 
may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, 
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general 
welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations 
resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter 
setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
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READING NO. 3 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONALIST PARTY DEFINES ITS RACIAL POLICY, 1948 1 . 
In the spring of 1948, prior to a general election, 
Dr. Malan, then the prime minister, and Mr. Strijdom, 
who was later to succeed his chief as head of the 
government, made several statements laying down the 
Nationalist Party's stand on basic issues of racial 
policy. 
Referring to the stand taken by a member of the opposition 
United Party, Mr. Strijdom declared : The Hon. Minister of Mines 
(Mr. J.H. Hofmeyr) rejects with contempt the principles of the 
white man's domination. He dismisses with scorn the Herrenvolk 
idea .... Are we ruling South Africa as a result of his stupid 
leadership idea? No, we are ruling South Africa today because 
the legislation placed the power in our hands and not in the hands 
of his friends .... But he does not want to rule the country 
by power. Our policy is that the Europeans must stand their ground 
and must remain Baas (master) in South Africa. If we reject the 
Herrenuolk idea and the principle that the white man cannot remain 
Baas, if the franchise is to be extended to the non-Europeans, and 
if the non-Europeans are given representation and the vote and ... 
are developed on the same basis as the Europeans, how can the 
Europeans remain Baas? Our view is that in every sphere the 
European must retain the right to rule the country and to keep it 
a white man's country. 
Dr. Malan made his position clear in the following statement : 
Give the non-Europeans numerical strength; give them social security; 
give them the right to organise in the field of labour; give them 
political equality and give them arms, and then there is only one 
ultimate result and that is the non-European will govern the country 
and the European will have to leave it. 
Dr. Malan's views on the Indian minority in South Africa were 
set out thus : The Party hold the view that Indians are a foreign 
and outlandish element which is unassimilable. They can never become 
part of the country and must therefore be treated as an immigrant 
community. The Party accepts as a basis of its policy the 
repatriation of as many Indians as possible and proposes a proper 
investigation into the practicability of such a policy on a large 
scale in co-operation with India and other countries. 
1. Kohn, Hans, African Nationalism, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1955, pp 164-5. 
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READING NO. 4-  
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY JAWARHALAL NEHRU IN THE CONSTITUENT 
ASSEMBLY IN MOVING THAT ME DECISION TO CONTINUE iy THE 
COMMONWEALTH BE RATIFIED, NEW DELHI, MAY 16, 1949. 
	 I am often asked haw we can join a Commonwealth in which 
there is racial discrimination, in which there are other things 
happening to which we object. That, I think, is a fair question 
and it is a matter which must necessarily give us some trouble 
in our thinking. Nevertheless, it is a question which does not 
really arise. That is to say, when we have entered into an 
alliance with a nation or a group of nations, it does not mean that 
we accept their other policies, it does not mean that we commit 
ourselves in any way to something that they may do. In fact, 
this House knows that we are carrying on at the present moment a 
struggle, or our countrymen are carrying on a struggle in regard 
to racial discrimination in various parts of the world. 
This House knows that in the last few years one of the major 
questions before the United Nations, at the instance of India, has 
been the position of Indians in South Africa. May I, if the House 
will permit me, for a moment refer to an event which took place 
yesterday, that is, the passing of the Resolution at the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, and express my appreciation and my 
Government's appreciation of the way our delegation has functioned 
in this matter and our appreciation of all those nations of the 
United Nations, almost all, in fact all barring South Africa, 
which finally supported the attitude of India? One of the pillars 
of our foreign policy, repeatedly stated, is to fight against 
racial discrimination, to fight for the freedom of suppressed 
nationalities. Are you compromising on that issue by remaining 
in the Commonwealth? We have been fighting 'on the South Africa 
Indian issue and on other issues even though we •ha..7e thus far 
been a Dominion of the Commonwealth. It as a dangerous thing 
for us to bring that matter within the purview of the Commonwealth. 
Because then the very thing to which you and I object might have 
taken place. That is, the Commonwealth might have been considered 
as some kind of a superior body which sometimes acts as a tribunal, 
or judges, or in a sense supervises the activities of its member 
nations. That certainly would have meant a diminution in our 
independence and sovereignty, if we had once accepted that 
principle. Therefore, we were not prepared and we are not prepared 
to treat the Commonwealth as such or even to bring disputes between 
member nations of the Commonwealth before the Commonwealth body. 
We may, of course, in a friendly way discuss the matter; that is 
1. 	Jawarhalal Nehru's Speeches 1946-49 1 (Vol. I) Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Delhi, 1958 pp. 279-88. 
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a different matter. We are anxious to maintain the position 
of our countrymen in other countries in the Commonwealth. As 
far as we are concerned, we could not bring their domestic 
policies in dispute there; nor can we say in regard to any country 
that we are not going to associate ourselves with that country 
because we disapprove of certain policies of that country. 
I am afraid that if we adopted that attitude, then there 
would hardly be any association for us with any country, because 
we have disapproved of something or other that that country does. 
Sometimes, it so happens that the difference is so great that 
either you cut off relations with that country or there is a 
conflict. Some years ago, the United Nations General Assembly 
decided to recommend to its member States to withdraw diplomatic 
representatives from Spain, because Spain was supposed to be a 
Fascist country. I am not going into the merits of the question. 
Sometimes the question comes up in that way. The question has 
come up again and they have reversed that decision and left it 
to each member State to do as it likes. Take any great country or 
a small country and see what this means; you do not agree with 
everything that the Soviet Union does; therefore, why should we 
have representation there or why should we have a treaty of 
alliance in regard to commercial or trade matters with it ? 
You may not agree with some policies of the United States of 
America; therefore, you cannot have a treaty with them. That is 
not the way nations carry on their foreign work or any work. 
The first thing to realize, I think, in this world is that there 
are different ways of thinking, different ways of living and 
different approaches of life in different parts of the world. 
Most of our troubles arise from one country imposing its will 
and its way of living on other countries. It is true that no 
country can live in isolation, because the world as constituted 
today is progressively becoming an organic whole. If one country 
living in isolation does something which is dangerous to the other 
countries, the other countries have to intervene. To give a rather 
obvious example, if one country allowed itself to become the 
breeding ground of all kinds of dangerous diseases, the world 
mould have to Come in and clear it up, because it could not afford 
to allow disease to spread all over the world. The only sa fe 
principle to follow is that, subject to certain limitations, each 
country should be allowed to live its own life in its awn way. 
There are at present several ideologies in the world and 
major conflicts flow from these ideologies. What is right or 
what is wrong, we can consider at a later stage. Perhaps something 
totally different is right. Either you want a major conflict, 
a great war, which might result in the victory for this nation or that, or else you must allow them to live at peace in their 
respective territories and to carry on their way of thinking, 
their way of living, their structure of State, allowing the facts 
to prove which is right ultimately. I have no doubt at all that 
ultimately it will be the system that delivers the goods - the 
goods being the advancement and the betterment of the human race 
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or the people of the individual countries - that will survive 
and no amount of theorizing and no amount of warfare can make 
the system that does not deliver the goods survive. I refer 
to this because of the argument that was raised that India could 
not join the Commonwealth because it disapproved of certain 
policies of certain Commonwealth nations. I think we should 
keep these two matters completely separate. 
We join the Commonwealth, obviously, because we think it 
is beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that we 
wish to advance. The other countries of the Commonwealth want 
us to remain, because they think it is beneficial to them. It 
is mutually understood that it is to the advantage of the nations 
in the Commonwealth and therefore they join. At the same time, 
it is made perfectly clear that each country is completely free 
to go its own way; it may be that they may sometimes go so far 
as to break away from the Commonwealth. In the world today 
where there are so many disruptive forces at work, where we are 
often on the verge of war, I think it is not a safe thing to encourage 
the breaking up of any association that one has. Break up the 
evil part of it, break up anything that may come in the way of your 
growth, because nobody dare agree to anyting which comes in the 
way of a nation's growth. Otherwise, apart from breaking the 
evil parts of the association, it is better to keep going a 
co-operative association which may do good in this world than 
to break it. 
Now, this declaration that is placed before you is not a 
new move and yet it is a complete reorientation of something 
that has existed in an entirely different my. Suppose we had 
been cut off from England completely and we had then desired to 
join the Commonwealth of Nations, it would have been a new move. 
Suppose a new group of nations wanted us to join them and we joined 
them in this way, that would have been a new move from which 
various consequences would have flowed. In the present instance s 
what is happening is that a certain association has been in 
existence for a considerable time past. A very great change 
came in the way of that association about a year and eight or 
nine months ago, from August 15, 1947. Now another major change 
is contemplated. Gradually the conception is changing. Yet 
that certain link remains in a different form. Now, politically 
we are completely independent. Economically we are as independent 
as independent nations can be. Nobody can be 100:; independent 
in the sense of absolute lack of interdependence. Nevertheless, 
India has to depend on the rest of the world for her trade, for 
her commerce and for many supplies that she needs, today for her 
food unfortunately, and so many other things. We cannot be 
absolutely cut off from the world. Now, the House knows that 
inevitably during the past century and more all kinds of contacts 
have arisen between England and this country, many of them were 
bad, very bad, and we have struggled throughout our lives to put 
an end to them. Many of them were not so bad, many of them may 
be good and many of them, good or bad, irrespective of what they 
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may be, are there. Here I am the patent example of these contacts, 
speaking in this Honourable House in the English language. No 
doubt we are going to change that language for our use, but 
the fact remains that I am doing so and the fact remains that 
most other members who will speak will also do so. The fact 
remains that we are functioning here under certain rules and 
regulations for which the model has been the British Constitution. 
Those laws which exist today have been largely forged by them. 
Gradually, the laws which are good we will keep and those that 
are bad we will throw away. Any marked change in this without 
something to follow creates a hiatus which may be harmful. 
Largely our educational apparatus has been influenced. Largely 
our military apparatus has been influenced by these considerations 
and we have grown up naturally as something rather like the British 
Army. I am placing before the House certain entirely practical 
considerations. If we break away completely, the result is that 
without making sufficient provision for carrying on in a different 
way, we have a period of gap. Of course, if we have to pay a price, 
we may choose to do so. If we do not want to pay the price, 
we should not pay it and face the consequences. 
But in the present instance, we have to consider not only 
these minor gains, which I have mentioned to you, to us and to 
others but, if I may say so, the larger approach to world problems. 
I felt as I was conferring there in London with the representatives 
of other Governments that I had necessarily to stick completely 
and absolutely to the sovereignty and independence of the Indian 
Republic. I could not possibly compromise on the question of 
allegiance to any foreign authority. I also felt that in the 
state of the world today and in the state of India and Asia, it 
would be a good thing if we approached this question in a friendly 
spirit which would solve the problems in Asia and elsewhere. I 
am afraid I am a bad bargainer. I am not used to the ways of the 
market place. I hope I am a good fighter and I hope I am a 
good friend. I am not anything in between and so when you have to 
bargain hard for anything, do not send me. When you want to 
fight, I hope I shall fight and then when you are decided about 
a certain thing, then you must hold on to it and hold to it to 
the death, but about minor things I think it is far better to 
gain the goodwill of the other party. It is far more precious 
to come to a decision in friendship and goodwill than to gain a 
word here and there at the cost of ill will. So I approached 
this problem and may I say how I felt about others? I would 
like to pay a tribute to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
and also to others there, because they also approached the problem 
in this spirit, not so much to score a debating point or to change 
a word here and there in this declaration. It was possible 
that if I had tried my hardest I might have got a word here and 
there changed in this declaration, but the essence could not'have 
been changed, because there was nothing more for us to get out 
of that declaration. I preferred not to do so, because I 
preferred creating an impression and I hope the right impression 
that the approach of India to these and other problems of the world 
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was not a narrow-minded approach. It was the approach based on 
faith and confidence in her awn strength and in her own future 
and, therefore, it was not afraid of any country coming in the 
way of that faith, it was not afraid of any word or phrase in 
any document, but it was based essentially on this that if you 
approach another country in a friendly way, with goodwill and 
generosity, you would be paid back in the same coin and probably 
the payment would be in an even larger measure. I am quite convinced that in the treatment of nations to one another, as in 
the case of individuals, only out of goodwill will you get goodwill 
and no amount of intrigues and cleverness will get you good 
results out of evil ways. Therefore, I thought that this was an 
occasion not only to impress England, but others also, in fact 
to some extent the world, because the matter that was being 
discussed at 10 Downing Street, in London, was something that 
drew the attention of the entire world. It drew the attention 
of the world, partly because India is a very important country, 
potentially so, and actually so too. And the world was interested 
to see how this very complicated and difficult problem which appeared 
insoluble, could be solved. It could not have been solved if 
we had left it to eminent lawyers. Lawyers have their uses in 
life; but they should not be spread out everywhere. It could not 
have been solved by those extreme, narrow-minded nationalists who 
cannot see to the right or to the left, but live in a narrow 
sphere of their own, and, therefore, forget that the world is 
going ahead. It could not be solved by people who live in the 
past and cannot realize that the present is different from the 
past and that the future is going to be still more different. It 
could not be solved by any person who lacked faith in India 
and in India's destiny. 
I wanted the world to see that India did not lack faith in 
herself, and that India was prepared to co=operate even with those 
with whom she had been fighting in the past; provided the basis 
of co-operation today was honourable, that it was a free basis, 
a basis which would lead to the good not only of ourselves, but 
of the world also. That is to say, we would not deny that co-
operation, simply because in the past we had fought, and thus 
carry on the trail of our past karma along with us. We have to 
wash out the past with all its evil. I wanted, if I may say so 
in all humility, to help in letting the world look at things in 
a slightly different perspective, or rather try to see how vital 
questions could be approached and dealt with. We have seen too 
often in the arguments that go on in the assemblies of the world, 
this bitter approach, this cursing of each other, this desire, 
not in the least to understand the other but deliberately to mis-
understand the other, and to make clever points. Now, it may 
be a satisfying performance for some of us on occasions to make 
clever points and be applauded by our people or by some other 
people. But in the state of the world today, it is a poor thing 
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for any responsible person to do, when we live on the verge of 
catastrophic wars, when national passions are roused, and when 
even a casually spoken word might make all the difference. 
Some people have thought that by our joining or continuing 
to remain in the Commonwealth of Nations we are drifting away 
from our neighbours in Asia, or that it has become more difficult 
for us to co-operate with other countries, great countries in the 
world. But I think it is easier for us to develop closer 
relations with other countries while we are in the Commonwealth 
than it might have been otherwise. This is rather a peculiar 
thing to say. Nevertheless, I say it, and I have given a great 
deal of thought to this matter. The Commonwealth does not come 
in the way of our co-operation and friendship with other countries. 
Ultimately we shall have to decide, and ultimately the decision 
will depend on our awn strength. If we dissociate ourselves 
completely from the Commonwealth, then for the moment we are com-
pletely isolated. We cannot remain completely isolated, and so 
inevitably by stress of circumstances, we have to incline in 
some direction or other. But that inclination in some direction 
or other will necessarily be a basis of give-and-take. It may 
be in the nature of alliances : you give something yourself and 
get something in return. In other words, it may involve commit-
ments far more than at present. There are no commitments today. 
In that sense, I say we are freer today to come to friendly under-
standings with other countries and to play the part, if you like, 
of a bridge for the mutual understanding of other countries. I 
do not wish to place thistoo high; nevertheless, it is no good 
placing it too low either. I should like you to look round the 
world today and look at the relative position of India and the 
rest of the world more especially during the last two years or so. 
I think you will find that during this period of two years or less, 
India has Onemup in the scale of nations in its influence and in 
its prestige. It is a little difficult for me to tell you exactly 
what India has done or has not done. It would be absurd for 
anyone to expect that India can become the crusader for all causes 
in the world and bring forth results. Even in cases that have 
borne fruit, it is not a thing to be proclaimed from the house-
tops. But something which does not require any proclamation is 
the fact of India's prestige and influence in world affairs. 
Considering that she came on the scene as an independent nation 
only a year and a half or a little more ago, it is astonishing - 
the part that India has played. 
One more thing I should like to say. Obviously a declaration 
of this type, or the Resolution that I have placed before the House 
is not capable of amendment. It is either accepted or rejected. 
I am surprised to see that some hon. Members have sent in notice 
of amendments. Any treaty with any foreign power can be accepted 
or rejected. It i; a joint declaration of eight - or is it nine? - 
countries, and it cannot be amended in this House or in any House. 
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It can be accepted or rejected. I would, therefore, beg of 
you to consider this business in all its aspects. First of all 
make sure that it is in conformity with our old pledges, that it 
does violence to none. If it is proved to me that it does 
violence to any pledge that we have undertaken, that it limits 
India's freedom in any way, then I certainly shall be no party 
to it. Secondly, you should see whether it does good to us and 
to the rest of the world. I think there can be little doubt that 
it does us good, that this continuing association at the present 
moment is beneficial for us, and it is beneficial in the larger 
sense, to certain world causes that we represent. And lastly, if 
I may put it in a negative way, not to have had this agreement would 
certainly have been detrimental to those world causes as well as 
to ourselves. 
And finally, about the value I should like this House to 
attach to this declaration and to the whole business of the talks 
leading up to this declaration. It is a method, a desirable 
method, and a method which brings a touch of healing with it. 
In this world which is today sick and which has not recovered 
from so many wounds inflicted during the last decade or more, it 
is necessary that we touch upon the world problems, not with passion 
and prejudice and with too much repetition of what has ceased to be, 
but in a friendly way and with a touch of healing, and I think 
the chief value of this declaration and of what preceded it was 
that it did bring a touch of healing in our relations with certain 
countries. We are in no way subordinate to them, and they are 
in no way subordinate to us. We shall go our way and they will 
go their way. But our way, unless something happens, will be 
a friendly way; at any rate, attempts will be made to understand 
one another, to be friends with one another and to co-operate 
with one another. And the fact that we have begun this new 
type of association with a touch of healing will be good for us, 
good for the, and I think, good for the world. 
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READING NO. 5 
EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER i DR. D.F. MM-ANIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, 11/8/53.. 
The PRIME MINISTER : In regard to U.N. I just want to add this, 
that what has been developing recently and what will bring more 
discredit to U.N. is that nothing at U.N. is considered and 
dealt with on its awn merits. It is nothing but a horse-sale 
where one bids against the other. Blocs have been formed. 
There is the South American bloc. Good or bad, right or wrong, 
they always vote together. They do not regard any matter on 
its merits, but they vote together. There is the Arabian bloc. 
They vote together, rightly or wrongly; and then there is the 
continual back-scratching : "Do this for me in the regard and I 
will do something for you in that regard". I say it has become 
a horse-market, where one bids against the other. That 
organization cannot continue to exist in that way and in any 
case it can be of no benefit to the world or a guarantee for the 
maintenance of world peace. 
I just want to add a word about U.N. and the Commonwealth. 
We are a member of both. In so fax as U.N. and the Commonwealth 
are concerned, I want to express this thought - and I say it with 
emphasis - that U.N. is busy undermining the foundations of the 
Commonwealth. U.N. will eventually become the greatest catas-
trophe for the continued existence of the Commonwealth. Do hon. 
members ask me why? The Commonwealth exists and can only exist 
on the basis of no interference with each other' d internal affairs. 
Therefore, when at a conference of Prime Ministers a complaint 
is lodged by one member of the Commonwealth against the other, 
it is simply scrapped from the agenda. The matter cannot be 
discussed. In that way there was a complaint on a previous 
occasion in regard to the dispute between India and Pakistan 
over Kashmir. The Chairman simply looked at it and said but 
that complaint should not be there. That is a ruling which operates 
in favour of the maintenance of the Commonwealth, and when we came 
into power I stated that we did not want to be accused at U.N. in 
regard to our internal affairs, just as little as we want to be 
accused at a conference of Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth. 
I was given the assurance that that would not happen, and in fact 
it has not happened. There was no complaint about that. But 
India - and I mention India especially - leaves the conference 
of Prime Ministers where it cannot ventilate a complaint about 
us, and it goes to U.N. and U.N. interferes in our internal affairs, 
1. 	South Africa House of Assembly Debates, Vol. 82, Co11.1323-4. 
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and then India is the chief attacker of South Africa, which is 
a co-member of the Commonwealth. India attacks a co-member of 
the Commonwealth in that round-about way. I say that where 
U.N. exceeds its own limits and attacks us, U.N. is busy under- 
mining the foundations of the Commonwealth and U.N. will eventually 
be the greatest danger to the continued existence of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. 
That is what I wanted to say in regard to U.N. and the 
Commonwealth. There is only one thing that can save us, namely, 
that the members of the Commonwealth should stand together, and 
they can divert that danger threatening us from U.N. by driving 
back U.N. within the limits of its own Constitution. If U.N. 
does not interfere in our internal affairs, another member of the 
Commonwealth like India will also not be able to do it in that way 	 
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READING NO. 6 
"ASIA AND AFRICA AWAKE" - SPEECH MADE BY JAWARHALAL NEHRU AT 
THE CONCLUDING SESSION OF THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE AT BANDUNG, 
APRIL 24TH, 1955. 1 
For seven days we have been in this pleasant city of Bandung, 
and Bandung has been the focal centre - I might even say the 
capital - of Asia and Africa during this period. 
We have met here because of an irrepressible urge amongst 
the people of Asia and Africa. We have met because mighty 
forces are at work in these great continents, moving millions 
of people, creating in their minds urges and passions and desires 
for a change in their condition. 
So we met and what have we achieved? Well, you have seen 
the draft statement which has been read to you. I think it 
represents a considerable achievement. But I should like to 
draw your attention even more to the importance of the fact that 
we have met here together, seen and made friends with one another 
and argued with one another to find a solution for our common 
problems. 
My friend the hon. Prime Minister of Burma referred to our 
diversities of opinion as differences, and we wrestled with one 
another these seven days because we wanted to arrive at a common 
opinion and common outlook. Obviously, the world looks different 
according to the angle from which you look at it. If you are 
sitting in the far east of Asia, you have a certain perspective 
of the world and the world's problems. If you are sitting in the 
far west of Asia, you have a different perspective. Again, if 
you are in Africa, it will be quite different. 
We all came with our own perspectives, each considering his 
own problem the most important in the world. At the same time, 
we are trying to understand the big problems of the world, and 
to fit our problems into this larger context, because in the 
ultimate analysis, all our problems, however important they may 
be, cannot be kept apart from these larger problems. Thus, how 
can we solve our problems if peace itself is in danger? So our 
primary consideration is peace. All of us are passionately 
eager to advance our countries peacefully. We have been backward. 
We have been left behind in the race, and now we have a chance again 
to make good. We have to make good rapidly because of the 
compulsion of events. If we do not make good now, we shall fade 
away not to rise again for a long time to come. 
1. 	Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. III, op. cit. pp. 288-291. 
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We axe determined not to fail. We are determined, in this 
new phase of Asia and Africa, to make good. We are determined 
not to be dominated in any way by any other country or continent. 
We are determined to bring happiness and prosperity to our people 
and to discard the age-old shackles that have tied us not only 
politically but economically - the shackles of colonialism and other 
shackles of our own making. No doubt there were differences in 
our discussions, and great criticism was levelled at certain 
resolutions; we had to meet such criticism because we wanted to 
achieve a common goal. But it is not resolutions that will solve 
the problems that face us today. Only our practices and actions 
will bring success to our aims and ideals. It is only then that 
we can make good what we lost in the past. We have to take a 
realistic view of all things and face them in a realistic spirit. 
But there is yet another spirit in Asia today. Asia is 
no longer passive; it has been passive enough in the past. It 
is no longer a submissive Asia; it has tolerated submissiveness 
too long. The Asia of today is dynamic; it is full of life. 
Asia might make mistakes, but they do not matter so long as she 
is alive. Where there is life there is advance. 
Our achievements at this Conference have been great - 
because we have been in general agreement in all our resolutions - 
but much greater has been the background of all those agreements. 
We had to wrestle with our differences. We are not yes-men 
sitting here to say 'yes' to this country or that, not even to 
one another. We are great countries of the world who live in 
freedom without dictation. If there is anything that Asia wants 
to tell the world, it is that there is going to be no dictation 
in the future. There will be no yes-men in Asia nor in Africa, 
I hope. We had enough of that in the past. We value the frindship 
of the great countries, but we can only sit with them as brothers. 
I say this not in any spirit of hatred or dislike or 
aggressiveness in regard to Europe or America. We have sent 
them our greetings, all of us here, and we want to be friends 
with them and to co-operate with them. But in the future we 
shall only co-operate as equals; there is no friendship when 
nations are not equal, when one has to obey the other and when one 
dominates the other. That is why we raise our voices against 
domination and colonialism, from which many of us have suffered 
for so long. And that is why we have to be very careful to see 
that no other form of domination comes our way. We want to be 
friends with the West and friends with the East and friends with 
everybody. The only approach to the mind and spirit of Asia 
is the approach of toleration and friendship and co-operation, not 
the approach of aggressiveness. 
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I wish to speak no ill of anybody. In Asia, all of us have 
many faults as countries and as individuals. Our past history 
shows that. Nevertheless, I say that Europe has been in the past 
a continent full of conflicts, full of trouble, full of hatred. 
Europe's conflicts continue, its wars continue and we have been 
dragged into these wars because we were tied to Europe's chariot 
wheels. Are we going to continue to be tied to Europe's troubles : Europe's hatreds and Europe's conflicts? I hope not. 
Of course, Europe and Asia and America are all dependent 
on one another. It is not right to think in terms of isolation 
in this modern world which is moving towards the ideal of one 
world. Nevertheless Europe and some other great countries, what-
ever their political persuasion may be, have got into the habit of 
thinking that their quarrels are the world's quarrels and that 
therefore the world must submit to them. I do not follow that 
reasoning. I do not want anybody to quarrel in Europe, Asia or 
America, but if the others quarrel, why should I quarrel and why 
should I be dragged into their quarrels and wars? 
I realize, as the Prime Minister of Burma said, that we 
cannot exercise any decisive influence on the world. But there 
is no doubt that our influence will grow. It is growing, in 
fact, and we do exercise some influence even today. But whether 
our influence is great or small, it must be exercised in the 
right direction, in a direction which reflects the integrity of 
purpose and ideals and objectives embodied in our resolution. 
This resolution represents the ideals and the new dynamism of 
Asia. We are not copies of Europeans or Americans or Russians. 
We are Asians and Africans. It would not be creditable for our 
dignity and new freedom if we were camp followers of America 
or Russia or any other country of Europe. 
As I said, we mean no ill to anybody. We send our greetings 
to Europe and America. We send our greetings to Australia and 
New Zealand. And indeed Australia and New Zealand are almost in 
our region. They certainly do not belong to Europe, much less 
to America. They are next to us and I should like Australia 
and New Zealand to come nearer to Asia. I would welcome them 
because I do not want what we say or do to be based on racial 
prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism elsewhere. 
We have passed resolutions about conditions in this or 
that country. But I think there is nothing more terrible than the 
infinite tragedy of Africa in the past few hundred years. Every-
thing else pales into insignificance when I think of the infinite 
tragedy of Africa ever since the days when millions of Africans 
were carried away as galley slaves to America and elsewhere, 
half of them dying in the galleys. We must accept responsibility 
for it, all of us, even though we ourselves were not directly 
involved. 
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But unfortunately, in a different sense, even now the tragedy 
of Africa is greater than that of any other continent, whether it 
is racial or political. It is up to Asia to help Africa to the 
best of her ability because we are sister continents. 
I am sure that the Conference has left its powerful impress_ 
on the minds of all who are here. I am sure that it has left an impress on the mind of the world. We came here as agents of 
historic destiny and we have made history here. We have to live 
up to what we have said, and even more so, to what the world 
expects of us, what Asia expects of us, what the millions in 
these countries expect of us. I hope we shall be worthy of the 
people's faith and our destiny. 
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READING NO. 7 
THE TEXT OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE 
ISSUED IN BANDUNG ON APRIL 24TH, 1955. 1 
The Asian-African Conference, convened upon the invitation 
of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to 24th April, 1955. In 
addition to the sponsoring countries the following 24 countries 
participated in the Conference : 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Cambodia 
3. People's Republic of China 
4. Egypt 
5. Ethiopia 
















22. Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam 
23. State of Viet-Nam 
24. Yemen 
1. Foreign Policy of India 1947-58, Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, 1958, pp. 157-165. 
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The Asian-African Conference considered problems of common 
interest and concern to countries of Asia and Africa and discussed 
ways and means by which their people could achieve fuller economic, 
cultural and political co-operation. 
A. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
1. The Asian-African Conference recognised the urgency 
of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. 
There was general desire for economic co-operation among the part-
icipating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect 
for national sovereignty. The proposals with regard to economic 
co-operation within the participating countries do not preclude 
either the desirability or the need for co-operation with countries 
outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital. 
It was further recognised that the assistance being received by 
certain participating countries from outside the region, through 
international or under bilateral arrangements, had made a valuable 
contribution to the implementation of their development programmes. 
2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical 
assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, 
in the form of : experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment 
for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment 
of national, and where possible, regional training and research 
institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-
operation with the existing international agencies. 
3. The Asian-African Conference recommended the early 
establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development; the allocation by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources 
to Asian-African countries; the early establishment of the Inter-
national Finance Corporation which should include in its activities 
the undertaking of equity investment; and encouragement to the 
promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so 
far as this will promote their common interest. 
4. The Asian-African Conference recognised the vital need 
for stabilising commodity trade in the region. The principle 
of enlarging the scope of multilateral trade and payments was 
accepted. However, it was recognised that some countries would 
have to take recourse to bilateral trade agreements in view of 
their prevailing economic conditions. 
5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective 
action be taken by participating countries for stabilising the 
international prices of and demand for primary commodities through 
bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as 
practicable and desirable, they should adopt a unified approach 
- 285 - 
on the subject in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission 
on International Commodity Trade and other international forums. 
6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended that 
Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by 
processing their raw materials, wherever economically feasible, 
before export; that intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted 
and encouragement given to the exchange of trade delegations and 
groups of businessmen; that exchange of information and of samples 
should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade, 
and that normal facilities should be provided for transit trade of 
land-locked countries. 
7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable impor-
tance to shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed 
from time to time their freight rates, often to the detriment of 
participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem, 
and collective action thereafter, to induce the shipping lines to 
adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was suggested that a study 
of railway freight of transit trade might be made. 
8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement 
should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks 
and insurance companies. 
9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of 
information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of 
profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation 
of common policies. 
10. The Asian-African Conference emphasised the particular 
significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes for the Asian-African countries. The Conference 
welcomed the initiative of the Power principally concerned in 
offering to make available information regarding the use of 
atomic energy for peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establish-
ment of the International Atomic Energy Agency which should 
provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries 
on the executive authority of the Agency; and recommended to the 
Asian and African Governments to take full advantage of the 
training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programmes. 
11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment 
of Liaison Officers in participating countries, to be nominated by then i respective national Governments, for the exchange of information 
and ideas on matters of mutual interest. It recommended that 
fuller use should be made of the existing international organisations 
and participating countries who were not members of such inter-
national organizations but were eligible, should secure membership. 
- 286 - 
12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there 
should be prior consultation of participating countries in inter-
national forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering 
their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended 
to form a regional bloc. 
B. CULTURAL CO-OPERATION.  
1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among 
the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations 
is the development of cultural co-operation. Asia and Africa 
have been the cradle of great religions and civilisations, which 
influenced other civilizations and cultures while themselves 
being enriched in the process. Thus the cultures of Asia and 
Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. 
Unfortunately, contacts among Asian and African countries were 
interrupted during the past centuries. The peoples of Asia 
and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to 
renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the 
context of the modern world. All participating Governments at 
the Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer 
cultural co-operation. 
2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that 
the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in 
whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural co-operation 
but also suppresses the national cultures of the people. Some 
colonial powers have denied to their dependent peoples basic 
rights in the sphere of education and culture which hampers the 
development of their personality and also prevents cultural 
intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is parti-
cularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where 
the basic right of the people to study their own language and 
culture has been suppressed. Similar discrimination has been 
practised against African and coloured peoples in some parts 
of the Continent of Africa. The Conference felt that these policies 
amount to a denial of the fundamental rights of man and impede 
cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural co-
operation on the wider international plane. The Conference condemned 
such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education 
and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other 
forms of cultural suppression. 
In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a 
means of cultural suppression. 
3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry 
with other groups of nations and other civilisations and cultures 
that the Conference viewed the development of cultural co-
operation among Asian and African countries. True to the age-
old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed 
that Asian and African cultural co-operation should be developed in 
the larger context of world co-operation. 
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Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural 
co-operation, the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop 
cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their awn 
culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and 
understanding. 
4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and 
technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries 
in Asia and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect 
should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees 
from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities 
should also be made available to the Asian and African people in 
Africa to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are 
at present denied. 
5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of 
cultural co-operation among countries of Asia and Africa should 
be directed towards : 
(i) the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country; 
(ii) mutual cultural exchange; and 
(iii) exchange of information. 
6. The Asian-African Conference was of opinion that at this 
stage the best results in cultural co-operation would be achieved 
by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations 
and by each country taking action on its awn, wherever possible 
and feasible. 
C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support 
of the fundamental principles of Human Rights as set forth in 
the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations. 
The Conference declared its full support of the principle 
of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations 
resolutions on the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination 
which is a pre-requisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental 
Human Rights. 
2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies 
and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which form 
the basis of government and human relations in large regions of 
Africa and in other parts of the world. Such conduct is not only 
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a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the 
fundamental values of civilisation and dignity of man. 
The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the 
courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination, 
especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani 
origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustain their 
cause; re-affirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples 
to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their 
own countries; and pledged to use its full moral influence to 
guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil 
in their struggle to eradicate it. 
D. PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLES  
1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of 
dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from the 
subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation. 
The Conference is agreed : 
(a) in declaring that colonialism in all its 
manifestations is an evil which should 
speedily be brought to an end; 
(b) in affirming that the subjection of peoples 
to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a denial of 
fundamental human rights, is contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations and is an 
impediment to the promotion of world peace 
and co-operation; 
(c) in declaring its support of the cause of 
freedom and independence for all such 
peoples; and 
(d) in calling upon the powers concerned to 
grant freedom and independence to such 
peoples. 
2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and 
of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of 
their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference 
declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, 
Morocco an Tunisia to self-determination and independence and 
urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settle-
ment of the issue without delay. 
E. OTHER PROBLEMS  
1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East, caused 
by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to 
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world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support 
of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and called for the 
implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and 
the achievement of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine 
question. 
2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its 
expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported 
the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the 
relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands. 
The Asian-African Conference urged the Netharlands Government 
to reopen negotiations as soon as possible to implement their 
obligations under the abovementioned agreements and expressed 
the earnest hope that the United Nations would assist the parties 
concerned(in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute. 
3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position 
of Yemen in the case of Aden and the Southern parts of Yemen known 
as the Protectorates and urged the parties concerned to arrive 
at a peaceful settlement of the dispute. 
F. PROMOTIONS OF WORLD PEACE AND CO-OPERATION 
The Asian-African Conference taking note of the fact that 
several States have still not been admitted to the United Nations, 
considered that for effective co-operation for world peace, 
membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on 
the Security Council to support the admission of all those States 
which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter. In 
the opinion of the Asian-African Conference, the following among 
the participating countries viz., Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, 
Libya, Nepal, a unified Viet-Nam, were so qualified. 
The Conference considered that the representation of the 
countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council, 
in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution 
was inadequate. It expressed the view that as regards the 
distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries 
which, under the arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are 
precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the 
Security Council, so that they might make a more effective 
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.. 
2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the 
dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks 
confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war 
in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including 
nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, would be employed, invited 
the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that 
would follow if such a war were to break out. 
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The Conference considered that disarmament and the pro-
hibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear 
and thermo-nuclear weapons are imperative to save mankind and 
civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. 
It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here 
have a duty towards humanity and civilisation to proclaim their 
support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons 
and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world 
opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition. 
The Conference considered that effective international 
control should be established and maintained to implement such 
disarmament and prohibition and that speedy and determined 
efforts should be made to this end. 
Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear 
and thermo-nuclear weapons, this Conference appealed to all the 
Powers concerned to reach an agreement to suspend experiments 
with such weapons. 
The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an 
absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested 
the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all 
concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, 
control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, 
including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and 
use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective 
international control to this end. 
G. DECLARATION ON THE PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND CO-OPERATION 
The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the 
question of world peace and co-operation. It viewed with deep 
concern the present state of international tension with its danger 
of an atomic world war. The problem of peace is correlative with 
the problem of international security. In this connection , all 
States should co-operate, especially through the United Nations, 
in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination 
of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In 
this way, international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy 
may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help 
answer the needs particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they 
urgently require are social progress and better standards of 
life in larger freedom. Freedom and peace are inter-dependent. 
The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples, 
and freedom and independence must be granted, with the least 
possible delay, to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed 
all nations should have the right freely to choose their own 
political and economic systems and their own way of life in 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
- 291 - 
Free from mistrust and fear, and with confidence and goodwill 
towards each other, the nations should practise tolerance and 
live together in peace with one another as good neighbours and 
develop friendly co-operation on the basis of the following 
principles: 
1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all nations. 
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and 
of the equality of all nations, large and small. 
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in 
the internal affairs of another country. 
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend 
itself, singly or collectively, in conformity 
with the Charter of the United Nations. 
6. (a) Absention from the use of arrangements of 
collective defence to serve the particular 
interests of any of the big Powers. 
(b) Abstention by any country from exerting pressures 
on other countries. 
7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or 
the use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any country. 
•8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful 
means, such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration 
or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful 
means of the parties' own choice, in conformity with 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
9. Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation. 
10. 'Respect for justice and international obligations. 
The Asian-African Conference declares its conviction that 
friendly co-operation in accordance with these principles would 
effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of inter-
national peace and security, while co-operation in the economic, 
social and cultural fields would help bring about the common 
prosperity and well-being of all. 
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The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five 
sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting 
of the Conference in consultation with the participating 
countries. 
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READING NO. 8. 
THE FREEDOM CHARTER OF THE PEOPLES OF EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA (1958) 1 
Freedom is our birthright; self-government our heritage 
as sons and daughters of the free men and women who inherited 
Africa for the Africans. It is, therefore, not only just but 
imperative that we restore our birthright which is freedom and 
our heritage - self-government - for ourselves, our children 
and our children's children. This we must do now. Every 
hour that passes under imperialism takes in its train a measure 
of our freedom and a portion of our noble heritage as Africans, 
the true and just and rightful masters of Africa's destiny. 
Every hour that passes means one more hour of subjection, 
degradation, exploitation, and humiliation by imperialists, 
white supremacists, and foreign self-seekers. 
Therefore we, the undersigned, on behalf of the African 
people of East and Central Africa, dedicating ourselves to the 
great task of restoring our freedom, devoting our energies to 
the cause of African Freedom and prosperity, and pledging 
ourselves individually and collectively to this task and this 
cause until imperialism is wiped out of our motherland, hereby 
declare : 
I. That democracy must prevail throughout Africa from 
Senegal to Zanzibar and from Cape to Cairo, 
II. That colonialism, the so-called trusteeship, and so-
called partnership, apartheid, multi-racialism, and 
white-settlerism are enemies of freedom and can be 
eradicated only by African nationalism - virile and 
unrelenting. 
III. That the right of self-determination is God-given and 
no man or nation is chosen by God to determine the 
destiny of others. 
IV. That poverty, ignorance, ill health and other human 
miseries cannot be satisfactorily eradicated under 
imperialism but only under self-government and inter-
national co-operation on the basis of equality and 
mutual benefaction. 
1. Cited in Cox Richard, Pan-Africanism in Practice, 
Oxford University Pre;711Zga7171-7,077-71707 
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V. That we of East and Central Africa, believing in the 
above declarations, commit our lives, our wealth and all 
our endeavour to the following set of purposes : 
(a) The setting up of the Pan-African Freedom Movement 
to establish in each territory, in East and Central 
Africa, a government of Africans by Africans for 
Africans on Pan-African lines. 
(b) The Movement shall fight white racialism and black chauvinism. 
(c) The Movement shall seek liberty of the subject within 
the law and pledges itself to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rightd and the United Nations Charter. 
(d) Economically the Movement shall press for full 
industrialisation and the enhancement of co-operative 
methods and for the control of the major means of prod-
uction by the peoples themselves through their demo-
cratically instituted government. 
(e) The Movement shall press for the recognition of full 
trade union rights in every country in Africa. 
(f) The Movement shall work for the establishment and 
perpetuation of true parliamentary democracy in 
every territory within the African Continent. 
(g) The Movement shall work for complete equality 
and justice in all social, educational, political 
and economic affairs. 
(h) The Movement shall carry on the national struggle 
against poverty, ill-health, ignorance and 
imperialistic exploitation so that the African 
may lead a progressively decent, informed, and 
dignified life within the community of free and 
democratic nations. 
Signed on the 18th September 1958, Thursday, at 10.45 a.m., 
in the Conference Room at Mwanza, for and on behalf of 
the PAN-AFRICAN FREEDOM MOVEMENT OF MST AND CENTRAL AFRICA by : 
(SGD.) FRANCIS JOSEPH KHAMISI 
Chairman of the Conference 
(SGD.) I.M. BHOKE MUNANKA 
Secretary of the Conference. 
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READING NO. ? 
TOKEN REPRESMTATION 
A decision to withdraw the South African delegation from the 
General Assembly and to maintain only a token representation 
in the United Nations was announced by Mr. Louw on November 
27th, 1956. 1 
I do not intend once more to traverse the ground that I 
covered when I fully set out my Government's objections to the 
inscription of items 24 and 61. In order, however, to keep 
the record straight, I must refer to the statement of the 
leader of the delegation of India - a statement which, as has 
so often been the case in the past, contained allegations 
which were not in accordance with the facts. I do not intend 
to deal with the Indian representative's allegations regarding 
the treatment of the Indians and other non-white people in my 
country, except to deny emphatically and categorically that these 
people are being oppressed or that they - to quote his words - 
"live in conditions that are just beyond slavery." The 
representative of India has sufficient information in his 
possession to know that his statement is not true. Not only 
do I deny his accusations, but I repeat my previous statement - 
namely, that generally speaking the South Africans of Indian 
origin are materially much better off and fax happier, than 
masses in the Indian representative's own country. That is 
why the South Africans of Indian origin refuse to take advantage 
of the repatriation scheme arranged between the two Governments 
in 1947. 
The Assembly will have noted that the leader of the Indian 
delegation carefully avoided the legal points relating to 
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, upon which the South 
African Government's objection is based. He of course, realizes 
that the Union of South Africa has an unimpeachable case in 
resisting interference in its domestic affairs. 
The support which, during the past years, has been accorded 
by the General Assembly to the Indian delegation and its allies 
Is a sad reflcection on the extent to which the United Nations 
has moved away from its own Charter - not only in regard to 
Article 2, paragraph 7, but also in regard to other fundamental 
aims and purposes. 
1. 	Louw B., The Case for South Africa, Macfadden Books, 
New York, 1963, pp. 33-38. 
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I wish to deal with a statement made by the representative 
of India, to the effect that the South African Government has 
refused to discuss with the Government of India the settlement 
of this dispute. 
What are the facts - facts with which the representative 
of India is fully conversant? In December 1954, the South 
African Government, while reserving its position on the question 
of domestic jurisdiction, took the intitiative in making a friendly 
approach to the Governments of India and Pakistan, respectively, 
informing those Governments that the Union Government was prepared 
to discuss this dispute. 
While the telegrams were being exchanged that are usual in 
such cases - telegrams relating to the basis for the proposed 
discussions and other relevant matters - Mr. Nehru, the Prime 
Minister of India, considered that that was an opportune time 
to make violent attacks on the Government of South Africa. 
In two speeches at New Delhi, he said the following, inter alia  : 
"I call upon Russia and the United States to declare 
their stand on the tyrannical oppression of peoples 
of Indian origin in South Africa by the white South 
African Government." 
To enlist the aid of the Soviet Union in regard to alleged 
tyrannical oppression is, in the light of recent events in Hungary, 
distinctly ironical. But I shall let that pass. 
The Prime Minister of India went on to refer to what he 
termed "the naked racial persecution being perpetrated by the 
capitalist white Government of South Africa on African and 
Indian people." Nacontent with making these baseless charges, 
the Prime Minister spoke of the "dastardly happenings in South 
Africa." The Prime Minister of India received his education 
in the United Kingdom; he is well acquainted with the English 
language; and he knows the meaning of the word "dastardly." 
He went on to say that "the South African Government shoiad 
learn some decency." 
May I remind my fellow representatives that this attack 
was made while telegrams were actually being exchanged between 
the two Governments, in consequence of the South African 
Government's suggestion that the Governments concerned should 
get together around a conference table. 
After this outburst by the Prime Minister of India, the 
South African Government naturally concluded that the Government 
of India was not serious about continuing these discussions, 
and that, in fact, the Prime Minister of India was deliberately 
trying to wreck the proposals for a discussion which had been 
initiated by the South African Government. In the circumstances, 
the South African Government decided that it would be futile to continue with these discussions. 
- 297 - 
In fairness to the Government of Pakistan, I must add that 
it was in no way to blame for the breakdown of the negotiations. 
It was, however, not possible to continue the discussions with 
Pakistan separately, because of the fact that there is complete 
freedom of religion in South Africa, and no distinction is made 
between different religious faiths and groups. It is thus not 
possible to single out the Muslims, who are, moreover, a small 
minority compared with Hindu and other religious groups. It 
is also a practical impossibility to determine whether the 
forebears, the ancestors of persons of Indian origin in South 
Africa came from those parts of India which now form Pakistan. 
In the light of this information, I am entitled to ask my 
fellow representatives how much value can be attached to the 
statement of the leader of the Indian delegation that the South 
African Government has always refused to discuss the matter with 
the Government of India, or, to quote his own words, that 
"no such negotiations were forthcoming." I also ask how much 
value can be attached to his assurance of, I quote his words, 
India's "desire to live in peace and friendship with South Africa." 
The leader of the Indian delegation told the General 
Assembly on November 15th that his delegation has "at all times 
scrupulously refrained from the use of vindictive, violent or 
vituperative language." One wonders in what category he places 
the unsavory remarks of his Prime Minister, which I quoted a 
few minutes ago. 
The General Assembly repeatedly has been a party to a 
violation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, thereby 
permitting the Government of India and its Soviet and other allies 
to carry on a vendetta against South Africa. 
Apart from this interference in South Africa's domestic 
affairs, this negation - one might say repudiation - of a 
fundamental principle of the Charter is evidence of what is 
happening in the United Nations. It shows how far the Organ-
ization has wandered from the path clearly defined by its founders, 
and it shows to what extent the United Nations is developing into 
an entirely different organization from that conceived and 
established at San Francisco. 
I can speak with feeling because, for the past ten years, 
my country has been the object of baseless accusations and 
violent attacks both in the General Assembly and in its Committees. 
Those who were present in the past years at these demonstrations 
of malevolence and hostility against South Africa, demonstrations 
which, invariably led by India acting in concert with its 
Soviet and other associates, will be able to testify that 
successive South African delegations replied to these attacks 
in restrained language and endured them with commendable patience. 
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I now turn to another development which was not envisaged 
by the founders of the United Nations. Soon after the Organi-
zation came into existence, various geographical, racial and 
ideological groups or blocs came into existence. The members 
of these groups generally act in concert and stand together 
when votes are taken on certain proposals. The existence of 
such groups is openly admitted, and they have become part of 
the structure of the United Nations. 
There is something else. One of the contributory causes 
to the decline and fall of the League of Nations was the extent 
to which each Member State looked to its own national interests 
when deciding to vote for or agaAnst a particular proposal. 
That attitude is perhaps not an unnatural one; it is in accor- 
dance with human nature. But as one who represented my country 
also at two sessions of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 
I can testify that the guiding and the compelling motive of 
self-interest exists to a far greater degr ee in the United 
Nations, where it is aggravated by the fact that delegations act 
not only in accordance with the interests of their respective 
countries, but what is far worse, generally act in accordance 
with the interests of the group of States to which they belong. 
More often than not, they act in accordance with the decisions 
of the group caucus. 
It often happens that delegations reverse their policies 
and abandon principle in the interest of political expediency. 
At Geneva the practice of what is colloquially known as horse 
trading was also indulged in. But it was never carried on to 
the same extent that it is in the lobbies and lounges of the 
United Nations building. It is well known that in regard to 
many matters delegations record their votes not in accordance 
with the merits of the issue but as a quid pro quo for favors 
received. 
May I remind this Assembly that South Africa, like certain 
other countries which shall be nameless, is faced with difficult 
racial problems which we are trying our utmost to solve in a 
manner which willtake account of the interests of both the 
European and the non-European peoples, and which if carried out 
in the right spirit on both sides, will provide the basis for 
harmonious co-operation between the two sections of South Africa's 
population. 
The continued interference of the United Nations in South 
Africa's problems accompanied as it is by baseless charges of 
oppression and ill-treatment, made from the rostrum of this 
Assembly, has had the effect of aggravating racial tensions 
and of seriously disturbing racial relations in South Africa. 
One wonders whether the more responsible delegations who have 
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who have no knowledge of the actual position in South Africa, 
and who do not know what the Government is doing to provide 
housing, health and social services, and education for the large 
non-European majority - one wonders if these more responsible delegations realize what the effect is of their support of 
Indies vendetta against South Africa, and what harm they are 
doing to the cause of co-operation between the white and non-
white population of our couhtry. 
We are not willing any longer to be even an unwilling 
party to the continued interference in South Africa's comestic 
affairs - interference moreover, which is detrimentally 
affecting the maintenance and the promotion of harmonious racial 
relations in our country. 
It has therefore been decided that until such time as the United Nations shows that it is prepared to act in accordance 
with the spirit of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 and to 
conform to the principles laid down by the founders of the 
Organization in Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, the 
Union of South Africa, while as yet continuing to be a member of 
the UnitPd Nations, will in the future maintain only a token 
representation or a nominal representation at the meeting of 
the Assembly and at the Headquarters of the Organization. 
In respect to the normal work and the agenda of the 
Assembly and its committees the new arrangement will operate 
as from the close of today's proceedings. In view of the fact 
that the Union of South Africa will continue to be responsible 
for the payment of its annual assessments, a member of its 
delegation will attend the meetings of the Fifth Committee when 
necessary in order to watch South Africa's interests. 
The decision which I have just announced was taken by the 
Union Government only after serious reflection and because it 
was considered to be necessary in the interests of South Africa. 
I want to say the following : The full sense of the respons-
ibility - the responsibility for the step which South Africa has 
been obliged to take - rests and must rest squarely upon the 
shoulders of those Member States which, at the instigation of 
the Government of India, or in pursuance of their own policies, 
have since the first meeting of the Assembly in 1946 acquiesced 
in this interference in South Africa's domestic affairs and in 
the unjustified attacks to which we have annually, and again 
this year, been subjected. 
There is a strong and growing feeling in my country that 
South Africa should withdraw from the United Nations, The Union 
Government has, however, not entirely given up hope that the more 
responsible Members of the United Nations may yet prevail upon 
the Assembly to return to the ideals and the objectives of its 
founders. Relying on that hope, however slight, South Africa will meanwhile maintain its membership of the Organization. 
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But as I have said, our representation will be on only a purely 
nominal basis. It will be a token representation, 
To those delegations which during the past years have supported South Africa in its resistance to unwarranted and 
illegal intrusion into our domestic affairs, I wish to convey 
the sincere thanks of the South African Government. 
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READING NV. 10 
small AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH 
An outline of the concept of a South African Commonwealth 
of white and non-white States formed the subject of Mr. Loupes 
main policy statement to the General Assembly at the 1959 
Session . 1 
Today I propose dealing with that part of the world 
which includes my country - namely the continent of Africa, 
on which the spotlight of world interest has been focused 
especially during the past year or two. 
It is more particularly in sub-Saharan Africa that start-
ling changes and developments have taken place during the past 
two years. Three fully independent states - Sudan, Ghana and 
Guinea - have come into being, to join South Africa and Liberia, 
which until then were the only sovereign independent states 
south of the Saimaa. 
The status of certain other territories, including the 
former French colonies, has also undergone a significant change. 
Next year• the already fully independent African states will be 
joined by Nigeria, the Cameroons, Somalia, Togoland and possibly 
by the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. 
In Africa, south of the Sahara, the world has been witness-
ing a rapid and at the same time a relatively peaceful political 
evolution, of a magnitude which must necessarily bring with it 
the need for large-scale adjustments, not' only within the newly 
independent states themselves, but also in their relations with 
other states and territories in Africa, as well as with the rest 
of the world. 
First of all, there is necessary a reappraisal of the 
relationship between the newly independent country and the 
previous administering or metropolitan power. This is an 
important stage in the growth from dependence to full, or even 
partial independence. Thereafter the new state will have to 
decide what its relations are going to be with its neighbors - 
with other African states and territories, as well as with the 
rest of the world. 
Events in Africa during the past two years have been the 
subject of much discussion. It has for instance been suggested 
that some of the territories aiming at independence are not 
viable, and will thus have to rely on foreign assistance, which 
is often not actuated by altruistic motives. 
A representative of India, speaking in the Trusteeship Council in 1954 warned : 
1. Louw, op. cit., pp. 49-61. 
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"A stable, contented and viable state cannot be built up 
without strong economic foundations. Political independence 
will mean little if it is not based on economic independence." 
I think it will be generally agreed that apart from the 
interests of the emergent African States themselves, it is in 
the interest also of the continent of Africa as a whole that 
its constituent States should be built on solid economic foundations. 
I wish, as the representative of an African State, to convey 
to the newly independent African States the good wishes of the 
Union of South Africa for their progress and prosperity, 
and to assure them of our hearty co-operation in regard to 
matters of common concern. 
With the exception of Liberia,South Africa is an African 
State with a life and experience of sovereign independence 
longer than any of the other independent States geographically 
south of the Sahara. 
I have thus the right to speak from this rostrum as the 
representative of an African State in the fullest sense of that 
term, and it is in that capacity that I today welcomethose fellow 
African States that have acquired independence during the past 
two years, and also those that are on the threshold of indepen-
dence. It is in the spirit of a common African heritage, that 
on behalf of my country I offer our friendship and our co-
operation. 
But I mould hasten to add that South Africa's offer of 
co-operation is equally made to other African territories - to 
the two neighboring Provinces of Portugal, namely Mozambique 
and Angola, and to those territories which in the language of 
the United Nations are described as "non--self-governing". 
Indeed, I am glad to be able to testify to the excellent relations 
which in the past have existed between the Union on the one 
hand and the Portugese Provinces; the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland; and the territories administered by France, 
Belgium, and the United Kingdom, respectively. 
During recent years, attacks on the metropolitan Govern-
ments have been made inside and outside the United Nations. 
It is not necessary for me to defend those Governments. That 
has been ably done by their respective delegations at previous 
Assemblies of this Organization. As the representative of an 
African State, who is better informed regarding some of those 
territories than most of the critics from outside Africa, may 
I be permitted to say that there seems to be little realization 
or appreciation of what the much maligned metropolitan Governments 
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have done in opening up and developing the natural resources 
of these territories; combating human and animal diseases; 
creating conditions of law and order; putting an end to inter-
necine strife; and raising standards of living. 
Those who are in control of the newly independent African 
States, and those about to become independent, will be able to 
testify to the great value of the development work and benefits 
inherited from their predecessors, the metropolitan Governments. 
In spite of what has been accomplished by the previous 
so-called colonial administrations, much still remains to be done 
for the development of the emergent African states. Not only 
will capital from outside be required, but there is a great need 
also for technical skill and assistance. Some of this will be 
provided by the former administering or metropolitan countries. 
Some of it will be supplied by certain countries that are anxious 
to obtain an economic and perhaps also a political or ideological 
foothold in Africa. And then there is also the economic 
technical assistance rendered by the Specialised Agencies of the United Nations. 
It is unfortunate that when these matters are discussed 
inside and outside of the Assembly, mention is seldom made of the 
fact that there is in Africa itself, a joint co-operative pool 
for providing technical and scientific assistance, the resources 
of which are available to the countries south of the Sahara 
whether they are independent or not. This is the Commission 
for Technical Co-operation South of the Sahara (generally known 
as the C.C.T.A.), together with its associate bodies, the Scientific 
Council (C.S.A.) and the Foundation for Mutual Assistance 
The original members of these organizations were the metro-
politan countries, namely Belgium, France, Pbrtugal, and the 
United Kingdom and also South Africa and the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. They were later joined by Liberia, Ghana and Guinea. 
The object of C.C.T.A. is to ppol and exchange technical 
knowledge; the C.S.A. is a body of independent scientists, 
organized for the exchange of scientific information and for 
undertaking special scientific studies. These two bodies 
working in close collaboration have done valuable work, particularly 
in the fields of human, plant and animal diseasss; nutrition; 
soil conservation and productivity; rural welfare; housing; sociology; forestry and fisheries. 
Co-operation in these fields between African States and 
territories has been of immense value, and has moreover contri-
buted to the promotion of friendship and understanding between 
the States and territories in the immense sub-Saharan region. 
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In the work of these organizations South Africa has played 
a prominent part. It has been able to do so because of the 
great advances made in my country in the field of scientific 
and technological research and development. The huge labora-
tories and experimental workshops of the Council of Scientific 
Research at Pretoria have been described as among the finest 
in the Commonwealth, and compare favorably with any in the world. 
This institution has attained outstanding results in several 
fields, including housing and personnel management which have 
been used for the benefit of the rest of Africa. Some of its 
discoveries are being applied and used in many countries. The 
Veterinary Institute at Onderstepoort is well known all over 
the world for its work and research in connection with animal 
diseases, and has made a valuable contribution toward freeing 
Africa from such diseases. The South African Bureau of 
Standards has also gained a great reputation. 
Two years ago the work of the C.C.T.A. and the C.S.A. was 
extended by the establishment of F.A.M.A. -the Foundation of 
Mutual Assistance in Africa. The purpose of this body is to 
channel available and offered scientific and technical assistance. 
The idea is to bring the donor and the receiver into touch with 
each other. South Africa has on many occasions been able, 
and has been glad, to provide such assistance to other African 
States and Territories. 
The work of the C.C.T.A. and its associated bodies is not 
intended to be exclusive. It is prepared to co-operate with the 
Health, Agricultural, Labor and other international organizations 
which have been taking a keen interest in Africa during the 
recent past. It is, however, necessary that there should be 
proper co-ordination between these organizations and the 
C.C.T.A. so as to prevent overlapping of activities and a waste 
of valuable skill and resources. 
I would have liked to deal more fully with the great 
economic and material progress of my country - particularly 
during the past 25 years; with the almost phenomenal industrial 
development which is taking place and which has made South 
Africa the most highly industrialized country on the whole of 
the African continent; with the Bnion's progress and growth 
in other fields such as mining and agriculture. Unfortunately 
however, time will not permit me to do so. 
I wish however, to inform the Assembly of what we are doing 
in order to find a satisfactory method of dealing with the 
problem of relations between South Africans of European descent 
and the Bantu peoples, both of whom have their homelands in 
South Africa. This is particularly necessary in view of the 
misconceptions prevailing in many countries, as the result 
mainly of misinformed and often distorted news despatches. 
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South Africa is not unique in having to deal with problems 
derived from relations between races. Recently, within the short 
period of ten days, the newspapers of three different Western 
countries carried headlines of interracial troubles and clashes 
in those countries. May I add that in the history of South 
Africa, organized attacks by white on non-whites have never yet 
taken place - a record of which we are justly proud in view of 
our far more difficult and complex situation. 
In the eyes of the outside world South Africa's problem has 
assumed extraordinary dimensions, not only because it has been 
prominently featured in the world press, but also because of the 
fact that in some countries it has been grossly and also cruelly 
misrepresented not only in certain newspapers but latterly also 
on the cinema and television screens. 
I will mention only one recent instance to show to what 
lengths this misrepresentation is being carried. A cinema film 
has recently been completed which purports to portray conditions 
in South Africa. It was described by the film critic of the 
Rand Daily Mail - an Opposition paper - as "one of the greatest 
hoaxes (deceptions) in film history." One of the scenes shows 
what the producer describes as a "systematic destruction by bulldozers 
of African homes which it took the owners years to pay for." 
The cinema audience is not told that this is, in fact, a slum 
clearance operation - that the occupants of the shacks being torn 
down were some time previously transferred to well-built bones in a 
new township at Meadowlands, that the removals were occasions of 
cheering and joy, and that those whose new homes had not yet been 
completed begged to be removed as soon as possible. Nor was his 
audience told that former owners were compensated at such reasonable 
valuations that less than 1% of them sought arbitration. 
Two days before my departure from South Africa a special article 
written by a Bantu appeared in a leading Opposition newspaper under 
the headline "We Couldn't Be Happier in Meadowlands." 
One can imagine the indignation of the New York public and 
press if a foreign film producer has given a version of the tearing 
down of the old, dilapidated and unsanitary tenement houses on the 
East Side, without mentioning that Peter Cooper Village and other 
projects such as the huge blocks of apartments erected by the City 
Housing Board rose in their places. 
I have mentioned only this latest instance of the calumny to 
which South Africa is being subjected, so that this Assembly can 
have some idea of the difficulties with which we have to contend 
in dealing with a complex and delicate problem. There have been 
numerous similar instances of completely distorted and false 
presentations of the South African scene. 
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The early European pioneers followed the course that has 
since been the traditional policy of South Africa, namely the 
policy of separation between the white and black races. It was 
realized that only in that way could the differences and clashes 
that necessarily must arise where two entirely different races live 
together in the same locality be avoided. 
History records that such racial clashes have taken place in 
all countries, and are still taking place today in countries rep-
resented in this Assembly. Indeed, the past history of the African 
continent is a record of almost continual strife not only between 
different African races, but also of tribal wars between different 
ethnic groups of the same race. 
In the early 19th century in the Cape Colony, as it was then 
known, it was found necessary to have a boundary in the Bast between 
the ground occupied by the British settlers and the Bantu inhabi-
tants, respectively. Toward the end of the last century this policy 
was carried further, and the Glen Grey Native Territory was 
established in the Eastern Cape which provided for a measure of 
self-government in regard to local affairs. 
This principle was later extended to the Transkeian Territories 
and was further developed recently when Bantu Authorities were 
established in the huge areas reserved for occupation only by the 
Bantu. South Africans of European descent are not permitted to 
acquire or to occupy land in the Bantu territories, except under permit for trading purposes, and only for so long as the needs of 
the Bantu are not fully provided by their own traders. 
South Africa's traditional policy of separate development was 
clearly set out by General Smuts when he addressed a gathering in 
London on May 22, 1917. His words, uttered more than forty years 
ago, are of particular significance in the context of what has rec-
ently been happening in other parts of the African Continent : 
"There is now shaping in South Africa a policy which is being 
expressed in our institutions, and which may have very far-reaching 
effects in the future civilization of the African continent 	A 
practice grown up in South Africa of giving the natives their awn 
separate institutions on parallel lines 	On these parallel 
lines we may yet be able to solve a problem which otherwise may be 
insoluble 	We have felt more and more that 	it is useless to try to govern black and white in the same system 	Their political 
institutions should be different, while always proceeding on the 
basis of self-government. 
"In land ownership settlement and forms of Government (our 
policy is) to keep them apart Thus in South Africa you will 
eventually have large areas cultivated by blacks and governed by 
blacks ... while in the rest of the country you will have whites 
who will govern themselves according to accepted European principles." 
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In 1929 - twelve years later - General Smuts enunciated the 
same principles when he delivered the Rhodes Memorial Lectures 
at Oxford University : 
"It is clear that a race so unique, and so different in its 
mentality and its cultures from those of Europe, requires a policy 
very unlike that which would suit Europeans. Nothing could be 
worse for Africa than the application of a policy the object or 
tendency of which would be to destroy the basis of this African 
type - to de-Africanize the African 	If Africa is to take her 
rightful place among the continents we shall have to proceed on 
different lines, and evolve a policy which will not force her 
institutions into an alien European mould, but which will preserve 
her unity with her own past, conserve what is precious in her past, 
and build her future progress and civilization on specifically 
African foundations." 
If I am not mistaken, a prominent member of the Government 
of one of the independent African States, recently expressed views 
similar to those I have quoted when he was replying to outside criti-
cism regarding the policy or methods followed by his Government. 
I have quoted these statements made by a previous and well-
known South African Prime Minister to show that the policy at 
present being followed in South Africa is not only the traditional 
policy of my country, but that it takes account of the traditions, 
the cultures, and the needs of the Bantu peoples. 
This policy has during recent years been developed and put 
into practice by means of legislative enactments which are intended 
to reaffirm and to implement the policy of peaceful co-existence, 
on the'one hand of Bantu communities which can eventually attain 
full self-government, and on the other hand of a separate European 
community or State controlled by South Africans of European descent. 
The implementation of this policy culminated in the enactment by 
the recent session of the Union Parliament of measures designed 
to provide Bantu self-government for six different ethnic groups 
which comprise the Bantu population of South Africa. 
An important step toward the implementation of this policy was 
the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. It provides the basis for future 
development on modern lines, and is intended to safeguard the Bantu's 
traditional and essentially democratic system of self-government, to 
which he is strongly attached and which has always been centered in 
the authority of the Bantu chief advised by his Council. 
Under this system increased executive and judicial powers are 
exercised by different grades of chiefs - or rulers-in-council. 
At the same time the necessary safeguards are provided to ensure that 
the authority granted to them is exercised in the interests of the 
community, and in accordance with its will and desires. 
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The Bantu Authorities Act was warmly welcomed in all the 
Bantu territories, particularly as it was followed in 1953 by the 
Bantu Education Act, which gave to Bantu parents both in those 
territories and in the European areas the power to control their 
own schools. Already more than 4,000 School Committees and 500 
School Boards composed only of Bantu parents and leaders have been 
established and are functioning with excellent results. 
May I at this stage briefly recount what we have done in South 
Africa in the field of Bantu education. Illiteracy is not only an 
African problem. Fax from it 	It is found also in some of the 
most modern countries. In evolving an educational policy for the 
Bantu we are following the universally accepted educational principle 
of leading the child in his education from the known and the familiar 
to the unknown and the unfamiliar. 
We have to bear in mind that we are dealing with a child 
trained and conditioned in a Bantu culture, generally knowing only 
a Bantu language, and acquainted with values, interests and behavior 
patterns learned from a Bantu mother. These are the facts which must 
to a large extent determine the methods to be employed in the system 
of a separate Bantu education intended for a Bantu people - as 
happens also in the education systems of other peoples. 
The success of any particular method employed in any sphere is 
best judged by results. 
A literacy map of the world shows that most of the continent 
of Africa is burdened with some of the highest illiteracy rates. Only 
a few of the African territories show a rate below even 80%. The 
success of the system of Bantu education in South Africa has, under 
the circumstances, been outstanding. The illiteracy rate among 
the Bantu which, according to a UNESCO report was 73% in 1946, was by 1951 reduced to 69%, and by 1956 to 63%. It can be assumed that 
today, three years later, it is even lower. 
Our progress in the field of education is even more significant when it is noted that in the 7,600 Bantu schools, 26,000 teachers 
impart knowledge to 1,400,000 pupils. Before the Bantu Education 
Act came into operation there were 800,000 pupils. The increase to 
1,400,000 in a period of only five years testifies to the efficacy 
of the new legislation. 
In this connection I could make comparisons with many other 
countries which would show South Africa in a very favorable light. However, I will refrain from doing so. 
I come now to the important legislation passed by this year's 
session of the South African Parliament, namely the Act to provide 
for self-government in the territories of the six ethnic groups of 
the Bantu race. Experience has shown, not only in South Africa 
but also in other parts of the African continent, that clashes and even internecine wars have resulted from rivalry and other 
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differences between ethnic groups of the African peoples. In 
this respect the black man in Africa is no different from the white 
man in Europe - as history can testify. 
The Act for the promotion of Bantu self-government provides 
the means for the different Bantu territories to progress along 
the road toward self-government, and eventually to form part of a 
South African Commonwealth, together with the Union of South Africa, 
which will during the intervening period act as the guardian of the 
emergent Bantu self-governing States. 
The question has been asked as to why the emergent Bantu 
states will not continue to be represented in the South African 
Parliament. May I, in passing, remind the Assembly that South 
Africa is not the only country where the indigenous population 
or a portion thereof is not represented in the Central Legislature. 
In replying to that question I can do no better than to refer 
to the White Paper that was issued concurrently with the publication 
of the Bill providing for Bantu self-government. The following 
is a summary of that particular part of the White Paper : 
The political autonomy envisaged for the Bantu national units 
demands that factors or impediments that may retard this develop-
ment should be removed. Such an impediment would be the continued 
representation of the emergent Bantu national units in the Parliament 
of the white population. On the one hand, this would tend to 
encourage fears harbored by the white community of being politically 
swamped by the numerically superior Bantu. On the other hand, the 
representation of the emergent Bantu States in the Union Parliament 
would have the effect of discouraging the development of Bantu 
institutions because of the expectation of greater participation, 
thereby promoting the desertion of trained human material from 
service in their own communities. 
The White Paper further points out that experience has shown 
that representation in the parliament of the guardian or metro-
politan country is not a factor that plays a role in the attainment 
of self-government by the dependent territory. So, for instance, 
none of the previously different territories comprised in the British 
Empire or in the Commonwealth, which were destined for autonomy, 
were at any time or are now represented in the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom. 
The further question has been asked as to what the position 
will be of the Bantu who are resident outside of the Bantu territories. 
Their position will be no different from that of the thousands 
of Bantu from the neighboring British Protectorates who are at 
present working and temporarily resident in the Union. They have 
had political or similar rights in the Union, and if they are able 
to enjoy such rights in their own countries they are free at any time to return to their respective territories. 
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For instance, in the case of Basutoland, to which a measure 
of self-government has recently been granted, the Basutos resident 
in the Union could if they wished and if the local law so provides 
return to exercise their political rights there. 
The legislation providing for Bantu self-government has, 
however, given due attention to the interests of those Bantu who 
are working or are resident outside their own territories. It 
is provided that the Bantu Authorities established in terms of the 
Authorities Act can nominate persons to be their representatives 
in urban areas outside the Bantu territories. 
There they will serve as a link between the Bantu living in 
the urban areas, and the Authority in the Bantu territory, which in 
turn can make representations to the Union Government on behalf of 
the members of their ethnic group working or resident in such urban 
areas. It is intended to establish Bantu Urban Authorities with 
jurisdiction in Bantu townships which fall within areas reserved 
for white occupation. 
I would add that in each of the respective Bantu territories 
there will be a Commissioner General whom, particularly during 
the earlier years of political development, will act as an adviser 
and a link between that territory and the Union Government, and 
later as the Union's representative in such territory. 
The Parliamentary enactment providing for Bantu self-government 
was accompanied by a measure to provide for the establishment of 
three Bantu University Colleges within Bantu territories. These 
University Colleges will be obliged to provide as high a standard 
of education and the same standards of equipment as any of the ex-
isting universities, since for examining purposes they will be 
constituent colleges of the University of South Africa. 
This development is in accordance with the policy set out in 
the preceding part of my address. It provides that the Bantu will 
in an increasing measure control the university education of their 
children, and that the teaching staff will be supplied by Bantu 
graduates as and when they become available. 
I have sketched the course upon which we in South Africa have 
embarked - the course which we firmly believe will provide the 
ultimate solution of the problems of the relations between the two 
races in our country. It follows recent trends and developments 
on the African continent, and aims at progressively giving the 
Bantu control of his own homeland. At the same time this policy 
ensures to the South Africans of European descent control of their 
homeland, which was opened up and developed by their ancestors and 
by succeeding generations. 
The carrying out of the policy which I have outlined brings 
with it a heavy responsibility. In discharging that responsibility we will act in accordance with the dictates of our consciences and 
in the light of our knowledge of conditions in our country - 
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conditions which are unknown to and misrepresented to people 
outside of South Africa. 
The implementation of our policy will entail large sacrifices 
and make heavy demands upon our economic and financial resources. 
For that we are prepared. Pew people outside of South Africa realize 
the immensity of our problem and the sacrifices it entails; they 
certainly do not appreciate that in South Africa we have never yet 
resorted to foreign aid or to other forms of outside assistance. 
In spite of this urgent and prior call on our financial resources 
we have in the past, when possible, contributed toward humanitarian and meritorious measures designed to assist under-developed countries, 
and other worthy causes sponsored by the United Nations. At one 
stage my country was one of the leading contributors to the Inter-
national Children's Emergency Fund. 
We need our resources for carrying out the projects intended 
to serve as a solution to our great problem. I may, however, 
here state that it is the intention of my Government to make a 
further contribution to some of these funds in order to give ex-
pression to our sympathy with action which is being taken by the 
United Nations in these fields. 
A final wore regarding the continent of Africa. I have in 
this address directed attention particularly to that part of the 
continent which lies roughly south of the Sahara, extending to its 
southernmost end, the Cape of Good Hope. Not only has the spot-
light of world attention been directed to the constitutional 
developments that have already taken place or that are in the process 
of taking place, but in the international sphere interest has been 
aroused by reason of the fact that the African continent lies mid-
way between the West and the East. 
Upon the independent, the near independent, and the emergent 
States of Africa rests the responsibility of resisting attempts to 
use the continent of Africa for the play of power politics and 
international intrigue. 
In pursuance of this aim the Union of South Africa will play 
its part, and assures the States and territories of Africa of its 
willingness to co-operate on all matters of common concern. 
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READING NO. 11 
EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED 
KINGDDM, THE RT. HON. HAROLD MACMILLAN, TO BOTH HDUSES OF PARLIAMENT AT CAPE TOWN, 3RD FEBRUARY 1960. 1 
As a soldier in the First World War, and as a Minister in 
Sir Winston Churchill's Government in the Second, I know personally the value of the contribution which your forces made to victory in the cause of freedom. 
I know something too of the inspiration which General Smuts 
brought to us in Britain in our darkest hours 
Ever since the break up of the Roman Empire one of the constant 
facts of political life in Europe has been the emergence of indepen-
dent nations. They have come into existence over the centuries in 
different forms with different kinds of government. But all have 
been inspired by a deep, keen feeling of nationalism, which has 
grown as the nations have grown. 
In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the 
war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening 
of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived 
in dependence on some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement 
spread through Asia. Many countries there, of different races 
and civilisations, pressed their claim to an independent national 
life. Today the same thing is happening in Africa, 
The most striking of all the impressions I have formed since 
I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national 
consciousness. In different places it may take different forms. 
But it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this Continent. 
Whether we like it or not, this growth of national conscious-
ness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact. Our 
national policies must take account of it 
Of course you understand this better than anyone. You are 
sprung from Europe, the home of nationalism. And here in Africa 
you have yourselves created a free nation, a new nation. Indeed 
in the history of our times yours will be recorded as the first 
of the African nationalisms. And this tide of national conscious-
ness which is now rising in Africa is a fact for which you and we and the other nations of the Western world are ultimately responsible. 
1. Mansergh N. Documents(1952-62), (Vol. III), op. cit., 
Oxford University Press, London, 1963, pp. 347-51. 
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For its causes are to be found in the achievements of Western 
civilisation in pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge, applying 
science to the service of human needs, expanding food production, 
speeding and multiplying the means of communication and perhaps 
above all, and more than anything else, in the spread of education. 
As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in Africa 
is a political fact and we must accept it as such. This means, I 
would judge, that we must come to terms with it. I sincerely believe 
that, if we cannot do so, we may imperil the precarious balance 
between East and West on which the peace of the world depends. 
The world today is divided into three main groups. First, 
there are what we call the Western Powers. You in South Africa 
and we in Britain belong to this group, together with our friends 
and allies in other parts of the Commonwealth, in the United States 
of America and in Europe. We call it the free world. Secondly, 
there are the Communists; Russia and her satellites in Europe, 
and China - whose population will rise by the end of the next 10 
years to the staggering total of 800,000,000. Thirdly, there are 
those parts of the world whose people are at present uncommitted 
either to Communism or to our Western ideas. In this context we 
think first of Asia and of Africa. 
As I see it, the great issue in this second half of the twen-
tieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa 
will swing to the East or to the West. Will they be drawn into the 
Communist camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government 
that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the 
Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by their example so compelling, 
that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and 
justice? The struggle is joined, and it is a struggle for the 
minds of men. 
What is now on trial is much more than our military strength 
or our diplomatic and administrative skill. It is our way of life. 
The uncommitted nations want to see before they choose. What 
can we show them to help them choose aright? Each of the indepen- 
dent members of the Commonwealth must answer that question for itself. 
It is a basic principle of our modern Commonwealth that we 
respect each other's sovereignty in matters of internal policy. At 
the same time we must recognise that, in this shrinking world in 
which we live today, the internal policies of one nation may have 
effects outside it. We may sometimes be tempted to say to each 
other "Mind your own business". But in these days I would myself 
expand the old saying so that it runs "Mind your own business, of 
course, but mind how it affects my business too," 
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If I may be very frank, I will venture now to say this. What 
Governments and Parliaments in the United Kingdom HAVE done since 
the last wax in according independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana, and what they WILL do for Nigeria and other 
countries now nearing independence - all this, though we must and 
do take full and sole responsibility for it, we do in the belief 
that it is the only way to establish the future of the Commonwealth 
and of the free world on sound foundations. 
All this, of course, is of deep and close concern to you. For 
nothing we do in this small world can be done in a corner and remain 
hidden. What WE do today in West, Central and East Africa becomes 
known to everyone in the Union whatever his language, colour or traditions. Let me assure you, all those here assembled and all 
who may be listening, in all friendliness that we are well aware 
of this, that we have acted and will act with full knowledge of 
the responsibility we have to you and to all our friends. 
Nevertheless, I am sure you will agree that in our own areas 
of responsibility we must each do what we think right. What we 
British think right derives from a long experience both of failure 
and success in the management of these affairs. We have tried to learn and apply the lessons of both. Our judgment of right and 
wrong and of justice is rooted in the same soil as yours - in 
Christianity and in the rule of law as the basis of a free society. 
This experience of our own explains why it has been our aim, in the 
countries for which we have borne responsibility, not only to 
raise the material standards of life, but to create a society which 
respects the rights of individuals - a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full stature, and that must 
in our view include the opportunity of an increasing share in 
political power and responsibility; a society finally in which 
individual merit, and individual merit alone, is the criterion 
for a man's advancement, whether political or economic. 
Finally, in countries inhabited by several different races, 
it has been our aim to find means by which the community can become 
MORE of a community and fellowship can be fostered between its 
various parts. 
This problem is by no means confined to Africa. Nor IS it 
always a problem of a European minority. In Malaya, for instance, 
though there are Indian and European minorities, Malays and 
Chinese make up the great bulk of the population, and the Chinese 
are not much fewer in numbers than the Malays. Yet these two 
peoples must learn to live together in harmony and unity, and 
the strength and future of Malaya as a nation will depend on the 
different contributions which the two races can make. 
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The attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards this 
problem was clearly expressed by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. 
Selwyn Lloyd, speaking at the United Nations' General Assembly on 
the 17th of September 1959. These were his words :- 
In those territories where different races or tribes 
live side by side, the task is to ensure that all the 
people may enjoy security and freedom and the chance 
to contribute as individuals to the progress and well-
being of these countries. We (that is the British) 
reject the idea of any inherent superiority of one race 
over another. Our policy, therefore, is non-racial; 
it offers a future in which Africans, Europeans, Asians, 
the Peoples of the Pacific and others with shorn we are 
concerned, will all play their full part as citizens in 
the countries where they live, and in which feelings of 
race will be submerged in loyalty to new nations. 
I have thought you would wish me to state plainly and with 
full candour the policy for which we in Britain stand. It may 
well be that, in trying to do our duty as we see it, we shall 
sometimes make difficulties for you. If this proves to be so, 
we much regret it. But I know that, even so, you would not 
ask us to flinch from doing our duty. You too will do your 
duty as you see it. 
I am well aware of the peculiar nature of the problems 
with which you are faced here in the Union. I know the differences 
between your situation and that of many other States in Africa. 
You have here some three million people of European origin. This 
country is their home. It has been their home for hundreds of 
years. They have no other. The same is broadly true of Europeans 
in Central and East Africa. 
Of course, in most other States those who have come from 
Europe have only come to work, to spend their working life, to 
contribute their skills, perhaps to teach, perhaps to administer 
and then go home. That is quite a different problem. 
The problems to which you as members of the Union Parliament 
have to address yourselves are therefore very different from those 
which face the Parliaments of countries of homogeneous nations. 
Of course, I realize that these are difficult, hard, sometimes 
baffling problems. And, therefore, it would be surprising if 
your interpretation of your duty did not sometimes produce 
different results from ours, in terms of Government policies and 
actions. 
As a fellow member of the Commonwealth we always try and, 
I think, we have succeeded, in giving to South Africa our full 
support and encouragement, but I hope you won't mind my saying 
frankly that there are some aspects of your policies which make 
it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own 
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deep convictions about the political destinies of freemen to 
which in our own territories we are trying to give effect. I 
think therefore that we ought as friends face together - without 
seeking, I trust, to apportion our praise or blame - the fact 
that in the world of today this difference of outlook lies 
between us 
I certainly do not believe in refusing to trade with people 
because you may happen to dislike the way they manage their 
internal affairs at home. Boycotts will never get you anywhere 
and may I say in parenthesis haw I deprecate the attempts which 
are being made in Britain today to organize a consumer boycott 
of South African goods. It has never been the practice so 
far as I know of any Government in the United Kingdom, of whatever 
complexion, to undertake or support campaigns of this kind de-
signed to influence the internal politics of another Commonwealth 
country. I and my colleagues in the United Kingdom Government 
deplore this proposed boycott and regard it as undesirable from 
every point of view. It can only have serious effects on 
Commonwealth relations and trade and be to the ultimate detriment 
of others than those against whom it is aimed 
The members of the Commonwealth feel particularly strongly 
the value of interdependence. They are as independent as any 
nation in this shrinking world can be, but they have voluntarily 
agreed to work together. They recognize that there may be, and 
must be, differences between them, in their institutions or in 
their internal policies, and membership does not imply either the 
wish to express a judgment on these matters or the need to impose 
a stifling uniformity. It is, I think, a help that there has 
never been any question of a rigid constitution for the Commonwealth. 
Perhaps this is because we in the United Kingdom seem to have got 
on all right for several hundreds of years without a written 
constitution and are rather suspicious of such things. But whether 
that is so or not, it is quite clear that a rigid constitutional 
framework for the Commonwealth would not work. It is not that 
kind of thing. At the very first of the stresses and strains 
which are inevitable in this period of history cracks would appear. 
in this rigid framework and the whole structure, in my view, 
would crumble. It is the flexibility of our Commonwealth 
institutions which gives them their strength 
In conclusion, may I say this. I have spoken frankly about 
the differences between our two countries in their approach to one 
of the great current problems with which each has to deal within its 
own sphere of responsibility. These differences are well known : 
they are matters of public knowledge - indeed, of publicccontrover.syw 
I would have been less than honest if, by remaining silent on 
them, I had seemed to imply that they did not exist. But 
differences on this one subject, important though it is, need not 
and should not impair our capacity to co-operate with one another 
in furthering the many practical interests which we share in common. 
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The independent members of the Commonwealth do not always all 
agree on every subject. It is not a condition of their assoc-
iation that they should do so. On the contrary, the strength 
of our Commonwealth lies largely in the fact that it is a free 
association of free and independent states each responsible 
for ordering its own affairs but co-operating in the pursuit of 
common aims and purposes in world affairs. Moreover, these 
differences may be transitory. In time they may be resolved. 
Our duty is to see them in perspective against the background of 
our long association. Of this, at any rate, I am certain. 
Those of us who by the grace or favour of the electors are 
temporarily in charge of affairs in my country and in yours, we 
fleeting, transient phantoms over the great stage of history, 
we have no right to sweep aside on this account the friendship 
that exists between our two countries. That is the legacy of 
history. It is not ours alone to deal with. To adapt a 
famous phrase : it belongs to those who are living, it belongs 
to those who are dead and to those who are yet unborn 	 
- 318 - 
READING NO. 12  
EXTRACT FROM DR. VERWOERDIS REPLY TO HAROLD MACMILLAN' 
The Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa : Dr. the 
Hon. H.P. Verwoerd, in thanking Mr. Macmillan for coming to 
South Africa and putting before them his point of view, said: 
I am glad you were frank. We are a people who are capable 
of listening with great pleasure to what others have to say 
even though they differ from us. I think it is an attribute 
of civilization that one should be capable of discussing matters 
with friends with great frankness and even in spite of differences 
great or small 9 remain friends after that and be able to co-
operate in all that remains of mutual interest. 
May I say that we can understand your outlook on the picture 
of the world, and on the picture of Africa in that world. I 
also do not find fault with the major objects you have in view. 
South Africa has the same objects : peace, to which you have 
made a very considerable contribution and for which I al§o wish 
to thank you today. The survival of Western ideas, of Western 
civilization; throwing in your weight on the side of the Western 
nations in this possibly increasing division which exists in 
the world today - we are with you there. Seeing Africa as 
making possible balance between the two world groupings, and 
hoping to develop the mind of man as it exists in Africa in the 
abovementioned direction - that, too, can be of the greatest 
value in your search for goodwill between all men and for peace 
and prosperity on earth. It is only a matter of how that 
can best be achieved. How can Africa be won? There we do not 
see eye to eye very often. 
You believe, as I gather, that policies which we deem not 
only advisable for South Africa but which we believe, if rightly 
understood, should make an impact upon Africa and upon the world, 
are not to the advantage of those very ideals for which you 
strive and we strive tool If our policies were rightly under-
stood, we believe, however, that it would be seen that what 
we are attempting to do is not strange to the new direction in 
Africa but is in the fullest accord with it. We never presume 
to criticize the application of other policies in the areas for 
which you are responsible, but when on an occasion such as this, 
on which we are perfectly frank, we look at them critically, 
1. Journal of the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, 
Vol. XLI - No. 2. April, 1960 pp. 127-8. 
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then we see, different to you, that there may be great dangers 
in those policies. The very object at which you are aiming 
may be defeated by them. 
The tendency in Africa for nations to become independent 
and, at the same time, the need to do justice to all, does 
not only mean being just to the black man of Africa but also 
to be just to the white man of Africa. We call ourselves 
Europeans but actually we represent the white man of Africa. 
They are the people, not only in the Union but throughout 
major portions of Africa, who brought civilization here, who 
made possible the present development of black nationalism 
by bringing the natives education, by showing them the W2stern 
way of life, by bringing to Africa industry and development, 
by inspiring them with the ideals which Western civilization 
has developed for itself. The white man who came to Africa, 
perhaps to trade, in some cases, perhaps, to bring the Gospel, 
has remained to stay and, particularly we in this southernmost 
portion of Africa, have such a stake here that this has become 
our only motherland. We have nowhere else to go. We 
settled a country which was bare. The Bantu, too, came to 
this country and settled certain portions for themselves. It 
is in line with the thinking of Africa to grant those fullest 
rights to them there which we also, with you, admit all 
people should have. We believe in providing those rights 
for those people in the fullest degree in that part of South 
Africa which their forefathers found for themselves and 
settled in. But we also believe in balance. We believe 
in allowing exactly those same full opportunities to remain 
within the grasp of the white man in the areas he settled, the white man who had made all this possible. 
We also see ourselves as a part of the Western world, a 
true white State in Africa, notwithstanding this possibility 
of granting a full future to the black men in our midst. We 
look upon ourselves as indispensable to the white world. If 
there is to be a division in the future, how can South Africa 
best play its part? It should both co-operate with the white 
nations of the world and, at the same time s make friends with 
the black States of Africa in such a way that they will provide 
strength to the arm of those who fight for the civilization 
in which we believe. We are the link. We are white, but we 
are in Africa. We have links with both and that lays upon 
us a special duty and we realize that. 
I do not wish to pursue this matter any further but do wish 
to assure you that in the Christian philosophy which you endorse, 
we find a philosophy which we, too, wish to follow. If our 
methods should be different, let us try to understand one 
another and may we at least find in the world at large that 
trust in our sincerity which must be the basis of all goodwill 
and true understanding. 
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I wish to thank you for coming to South Africa, not in order 
to commit yourself to our policies, not in order to become 
either the mediator or the judge in our problems or between the 
various racial groups which we have in this country. We thank 
you for coning to see us simply because that shows that you wish 
to be our friend as we wish to be yours. It also shows quite 
clearly that between us and Great Britain there exists now, and 
should, and I hope will, exist in the future, the best co-operation 
on those many matters in which we can co-operate. You mentioned 
the economic relations which exist between our two countries. 
We know they are very good; we know they go very far. We, 
Members of the present Government, would be the last to wish 
to deduct in the slightest from that. We wish to increase our 
prosperity and yours by good co-operation, and I can truly 
endorse the wise words you uttered when you said : Nothing can 
be gained by trying to harm each other economically, in the 
political or theoretical fields. There* at least, we have a 
sphere of activity in which we not only think fully alike, but 
in which we are equally interested - the economic world, the 
prosperity of South Africa. I pledge myself and my Government 
to the fullest co-operation in seeking that prosperity and 
happiness for all. 
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READING NO. 13 
IKTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY KWAME NKRLMAH AT THE ENGLISH-
SPEAKING UUION DINNER HELD DURING THE 1960 CONFERENCE PERIOD 
IN LONDON."' 
After referring to defence and the econcdicdevelopment of 
Africa, I came to the issue of racialism, which strikes at the 
very heart of the Commonwealth. Ghana, as the only truly 
African member of the Commonwealth had a responsibility to 
make its views on the subject absolutely clear : 
The Government of Ghana is concerned with racialism 
wherever it exists in the world, and particularly with apartheid 
as one aspect of the racial problem in South Africa. My 
Government is concerned with racialism, not only as a practice 
repugnant to every decent principle and contrary to Christian 
faith and ethics, but also because of its effect on the basic 
principles which determine the existence of the Commonwealth. 
We believe that the Commonwealth cannot exist as an effective 
association of nations, all dedicated to the same basic principles 
of life, if exceptions are made. It is illogical and 
unreasonable to eppect African states to be happy about joining 
and remaining within the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth 
tolerates governments which perpetuate policies of racialism 
and apartheid. 
One of the principal aims of the Prime Ministers' 
Conference should be to preserve the Commonwealth as an effective 
organisation where racial policies of the member-governments are 
consistent with the multiracial character of the Commonwealth. 
This isatbasic issue. It is a natter of principle, and the 
march to independence of many African territories makes it 
inevitable that it must be faced honestly by the individual 
members - and resolved - in order that we may not be faced with 
a crisis which could do irreparable harm to the Commonwealth 
as a whole. 
Today the lives of thirteen million human beings in South 
Africa are at stake. If the Commonwealth has any meaning, 
it cannot - and it must not - let this situation drift until 
a revolution of desperation creates another Algeria on our 
continent. The warning has been written in blood for all to 
read. The Commonwealth cannot avoid this situation 
1. Nkrumah N., I Speak of Freedom, Heinemann, London, 
1961, pp 225-26, 
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READING NO. 14 
THIS ARTICLE BY JULIUS NYERERE APPEARED IN SLIGHTLY ABRIDGED 
FORM IN THE OBSERVER (LONDON) 7/3/61. 1 
The people of Tanganyika are working to build a non-racial 
democratic society. We fought successfully against our class-
ification as a multi-racial state because what we want is a 
society where the individual matters, and not the colour of 
his skin, or the shape of his nose. Racial group privileges or 
discriminations are incompatible with this. 
Success in these efforts will not come easily. It is true 
that we have made a good start; all visitors to Tanganyika 
are struck by the prevailing atmosphere of inter-racial harmony. 
But the people of Tanganyika are the same as those elsewhere 
in the world - subject to reason and prejudice, to feeling of sympathy and revenge, selfishness and self-sacrifice. Also, 
we have to overcome a legacy of inter-racial suspicien, as well 
as to change an economic structure where the high correlation 
between income and race mocks the concept of the fundamental 
equality of man. The internal difficulties are thus formidable. 
Yet we believe that they can be overcome, and we are determined 
to take every action which is necessary to weaken the possibility 
of racialism in our country. 
We have not decided on this policy because we expect to 
gain economically if we do so. On the contrary, if it becomes 
necessary, we shall accept economic loss. We are following 
this policy because we believe that it is the only one which 
is morally justifiable. In our struggle for self-government and 
independence we have spoken of the brotherhood and equality of 
man. We are not hypocrites who merely used these phrases for 
our own ends. Now that we are in positions of responsibility 
we are continuing our attempts to establish conditions where 
these concepts can become the stuff of everyday life. 
The policies of apartheid now being practised in the Union 
of South Africa are a daily affront to this belief in individual 
human dignity. They axe, in addition a constantly reiterated 
insult to our own dignity as Africans, about which we cannot be 
expected to remain indifferent, and which could inflame our own 
passions if not otherwise dealt with. To be successful in 
building up a good society in our country we must therefore make 
- 1. Nyerere J., Freedom and Unity, Oxford Universith Press, 
London, 1967, pp. 108-13. 
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our detestation of the South African system apparent in every .  
action. The Tanganyika Government cannot afford to have any 
relations with the South African Government, and it must, 
within the bounds of international law, lend support to those 
who struggle against the system of apartheid. It is for these 
reasons that we have, as a Government, already indicated our 
support for the boycott of South African goods, and have ended 
the labour recruitment contracts despite the heavy economic 
costs to this economically poor territory. 
Now that the question of South Africa's membership of the 
Commonwealth is under discussion, our attitude is inevitable. 
We believe that South African membership under the present 
conditions makes a mockery of the "inter-racial" composition of 
the Commonwealth. If the Commonwealth is, as, we believe, a voluntary association of friends, a "Club", we do not see how 
any country like ourselves, committed to policies based on the dignity of man, can be a member at the same time as South Africa is one. 
There are, it is true, many people who sincerely dislike 
South Africa's policies, yet feel that her exclusion from the 
Commonwealth would destroy the organization. For this reason they would have us ignore the problem facing the Commonwealth, 
and when we refuse to do so they feel that it is we who are 
damaging the "Club". They say truly that the Republican issue, 
which is the occasion for the present Prime Ministers' Conference 
discussion of South Africa's membership, is irrelevant to the 
apartheid issue. Yet the fact remains that the Commonwealth 
has now to take a definite stand on the question of South African 
membership - because of a decision with South Africa. All matters affecting the issue must be considered. 
Whatever the phraseology used to announce the decision, or afterwards. the whole world will take the re-admission of 
South Africa into the Commonwealth as condoning her policies, 
or at the very least as a cynical dismissal of all principles 
of human political activity. Speeches, however phrased, will 
make no difference. The judgement of the world, and particularly of Africa, will be based on actions. Suffering is not helped 
by sympathy from those who call the attacker their friend; it 
might be by actions designed to weaken the attacker, or even to isolate the evil. 
Neither can the issue be avoided. To discuss the admission 
of Sierra Leone, which becomes independent in April, and pretend 
that South African membership does not have to be discussed 
because the Republic only cones into existence in May is cynicism 
and hypocrisy carried to extremes. Its only result would be to make the Commonwealth a target for contempt. The issue must be 
faced. No one realizes more than we, who were looking forward 
to our admission, the danger that this question could wreck the 
very structure of the Commonwealth. But if this happens it will 
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be the result of South Africa's attitude, not of ours. Their 
policies are a daily challenge to the basic concepts of the 
Commonwealth. Neutrality is not possible. 
Still there are some people who are worried about the 
possible future implications of excluding South Africa. They 
point out that the great virtue of the Commonwealth is that 
each individual country remains completely free, while at 
the same time obtaining the intangible benefits of association 
with other peoples. They often use this analogy of a Club, 
through which members gain the benefits of community living 
at the same time as retaining their freedom to live their own 
lives as they wish. 
We accept this analogy, but believe that this Club, like 
any other, can only survive while certain basic laws of 
humanity are taken for granted as a guide for conduct. No 
Club exists which allows a member to get all the benefits of 
association while he continues deliberately to commit serious 
offences against the other members, and against the principles 
of the Club itself. 
The seriousness of South Africa's design is not in question. 
Neither is there likely to be much dispute that what this amounts 
to is a systematic attempt to degrade the Non-European population 
of South Africa. 
Is this, however, an internal affair - as South Africa 
says - and thus no concern of the other Commonwealth Members? 
• We believe not. In the first place, there has been since the 
Second World War a realization that human oppression is of 
international concern. This we believe. But we do not base 
our case on this alone. Every country in Africa feels the 
effects of South African policy in its own life. The political 
and social pressures working against our aim of non-racialism 
are greatly strengthened by the events in South Africa. It is 
not that we fear a resurgence of discrimination against Africans in this Territory; what we fear is the evils of racial-
ism, and its results on the minds of majorities and minorities 
alike. It is this which we must guard against, and we know 
that an evill idea can only be defeated by clear and unqualified 
support for a better idea, pursued with all the energy at our 
command. We believe that the dignity of man is the idea 
which can defeat racialism; but we know that any action of ours 
which appears to compromise with the evil we fight correspond-
ingly weakens the execution of our own policies. 
This means that we cannot join any "association of friends" 
which includes a State deliberately and ruthlessly pursuing a 
racialist policy. To do so would be to confuse the minds of 
our own people, and to jeopardize our own purposes. By refusing 
we would be making it clear to all enemies of the freedom and dignity of man that we are prepared to do anything which is 
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necessary to protect our society from spiritual as well as 
material evia. 
There is one other argument which worries people who are 
concerned to help the Non-Europeans and liberal Europeans 
of South Africa. It is suggested that diplomatic pressures 
through the "Club" are likely to be more successful in amel-
iorating their conditions than any public expression of opinion, 
or action designed to isolate the Union. To use this argument 
is, of course, accepting the use of the Non-Europeans as hostages 
for the "good behaviour" of other States in the international 
field. It is blackmail, and succumbing to blackmail very 
rarely gives any lasting benefits. But in any case, there is 
no evidence that the South African government is amenable to 
reason, even from other members of the "Club". We presume that 
the United Kingdom has been trying to use her influence, yet 
conditions in South Africa have been getting worse year by 
year. In fact, the policies are based on fundamental beliefs, 
not subject to arguments or reason. The only hope is to make 
people realize the full implications to themselves of their 
false doctrines, and perhaps to shock them into thinking more 
deeply about their basic assumptions. 
The important issue, however, is the effect on the Non-
European peoples of South Africa, on other Africans, and on 
the principles and strength of the Commonwealth. We have to 
face the fact that, rightly or wrongly, South Africa's member-
ship of the Commonwealth leads to a cynicism about "fine words 
and theories" which affects every member - not least the United 
Kingdom. The whole idea of democracy and non-racialism is 
likely to fall a victim to this cynicism. The exclusion of 
South Africa from membership will demonstrate to the whole of 
Africa that these are not mere words, that they are valid 
concepts, with a world wide applicability and a meaning for 
every human being. When, eventually, changes do cone in 
South Africa this will be of fundamental importance. The 
emerging people will look first for their ideas and their 
friends to the opponents of the old regime. Are they to feel 
that these can only be found in Communism? Such an answer would 
be naive, for doctrines are not invalidated by the failure of 
men to live up to them. But it is natural enough after a - 
period of difficulty to trust those whose voice has been loudest 
in your support; their motives are generally questioned much 
later. 
We in Tanganyika value the principles on which the Common-
wealth is based. We could both give and receive benefit from 
Commonwealth membership provided we are not asked to compromise 
the principles upon which our society is based in order to get 
the benefits of association with other peoples. We believe 
that the principles of the Commonwealth are betrayed by an 
affirmative answer to South Africa's application for re-admission 
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as a Republic. Inevitably, therefore, we are forced to say 
that to vote South Africa in, is to vote us out. This decision we have made reluctantly, in the face of full knowledge of 
what this will mean to us - an undeveloped country, determined 
to overcome the poverty, ignorance and disease which now afflict 
many of our nine million people. 
In announcing this stand now we are under no illusions. 
Even if we wished to do so, we could not blackmail the Common-
wealth; it is comparatively wealthy, and has a large number of 
people of European descent. We are smaller, poorer, and not 
yet even independent. But we have an elected government, 
representative of the people, committed to fundamental human 
values which are rooted in world-wide traditions and we wish to 
have the greatest opportunity to apply these principles in 
our country. 
We want the Prime Ministers* Conference, and all other 
people, to understand our position, for we believe it 
epitomizes the choice before the Commonwealth. 
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